A Nuclear Safety Basis for Assigning Priorities to Human Engineering Concerns at Nuclear Power Plants

1983 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-183
Author(s):  
Edward J. Sheehy

At this point in the integration of human factors into the nuclear power industry an important issue is how are the various discrepancies between the post Three Mile Island operator interface guidelines and the actual control room configuration to be assigned priorities for resolution? While it is generally agreed that safety-related discrepancies should receive first priority, it is not at all clear just what “safety-related” means when considered in an operational sense. This paper describes the current state of evolving standard definitions for hardware oriented safety features. It discusses how these definitions could be expanded to include operationally related considerations and explores some benefits which would ensue. These include (1) establishing a nuclear safety basis which can be used in establishing priorities for resolution of human engineering concerns, and (2) obtaining legal recognition of operational concerns in general in the design and licensing arenas.

Author(s):  
Kevin LaFerriere ◽  
Jessica Stevens ◽  
Ryan Flamand NuScale

The NuScale Small Modular Reactor (SMR) is premised on well-established nuclear technology principles with a focus on integration of components, simplification or elimination of systems, automation, and use of passive safety features. Traditional nuclear power plants have in some cases operated up to four modules from a single control room. Due to the unique nontraditional operating characteristics of this technology a state-of-the art control room design was needed to ensure proper staffing totals for monitoring and control of multiple modules (twelve) from a single control room. To accomplish this, the human system interface and control room layout must translate the functional and task requirements needed for safe operation of the plant into the detailed design of workstations, alarms, controls, navigation, and other needs of the control room operations staff.


Author(s):  
Christian Hessler ◽  
Tobias Scharf

Screen-based human-machine interfaces, having been standard for many years in most process industries, are now also well acknowledged in the main control room of nuclear power plants. Being a standard feature of digital I&C systems, they offer significant benefits and interesting options for control room design, but also constitute challenges for the designer. Attractive opportunities for the designer and operator are for example the minimization of equipment, compared to design of hardwired panels, the reduction of cabling and cable separation issues, the flexibility and increased possibility for customization to specific utilities and operator needs. However, this flexibility brings also new challenges to the design, for new builds as well as for plant modernization projects, such as ensuring overall situation awareness of the operator, in spite the intrinsically serial character of information presentation, and the need to integrate different, even diverse digital human-machine interfaces of the safety and non-safety I&C systems. The reference concept of AREVA NP for all projects involving control room design relies on an overall I&C architecture, based on the TELEPERM XS for safety I&C systems, and Siemens SPPA T2000. SPPA T2000’s OM690 screen-based monitoring and control system is used as the integrated main operator interface, supporting plant operation in all plant states. Additionally control boards are used to implement a separate safety panel satisfying nuclear safety qualification requirements. These components are used to tailor the design of main control room, remote shut-down stations and local control stations, in accordance with licensing requirements, utility expectations and operating staff needs.


Author(s):  
Daniel Tasset ◽  
Jean-Paul Labarthe

The French N4 reactor series is the new generation of reactors in France. One of its innovations consists in a computerized man-machine operating system, that has some impact on operation in normal as well as in incident and accident situation. This paper describes how human factors aspects are taken into account during the safety assessment and approval process, and what main lessons can be gained from this experience as regards human factors and safety in the design and evaluation of a computerized control room.


1978 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 644-648
Author(s):  
C. Christian Stiehl ◽  
Michael J. Pfauth

The safety of nuclear power plants, particularly with regard to human factors concerns, has been the subject of several studies in the past few years. These studies have established the need for human factors research in nuclear power plants. Power plant operators and regulatory agencies have responded by funding further research and implementing safety programs that reflect human engineering principles. An example of an industry-sponsored research effort is reported. The purpose of this project was to evaluate the probable operator responses to a large earthquake in the vicinity of Pacific Gas and Electric's Diablo Canyon facility. As a result of this effort, several improvements were made in the control room and related facilities.


Author(s):  
Ronald L. Boring ◽  
Roger Lew ◽  
Thomas A. Ulrich

The Guideline for Operational Nuclear Usability and Knowledge Elicitation (GONUKE) outlines multiple types and stages of human factors evaluation to support system design activities. Originally developed to support human factors requirements for control room modernization at nuclear power plants, GONUKE includes verification, validation, and epistemiation. Epistemiation is a novel term for the process in which knowledge from expert users is elicited to shape the design of the system. Especially in the case of control rooms, the importance of knowledge transfer between expert operators and system designers may prove more beneficial than traditional verification and validation. This paper outlines epistemiation, provides background on expert users, and illustrates the process through a case study. Although GONUKE and epistemiation are native to nuclear power applications, the approach is generalizable to other domains that feature expert users.


Author(s):  
Pedro Trueba Alonso ◽  
Lui´s Ferna´ndez Illobre ◽  
Alfonso Jime´nez Ferna´ndez-Sesma ◽  
Fernando Ortega Pascual

Tecnatom has been performing Human Factors Engineering Verification and Validation (HFE V&V) from the mid-eighties. This activity started as one of the various activities of the post TMI requirements followed also in Spain: performing detailed Control Room Design Reviews (DCRDRs). All the existing Spanish Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) were reviewed to identify Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs). DCRDRs were completed by the mid-nineties, and the following V&V activities have been related to new designs and plant modifications as part of the activities described in the Human Factors Program Review Model (HFE PRM), included in NUREG-0711 since 1994. The NRC recommends following the HFE PRM or an acceptable alternative method in the case of the HFE activities and the Spanish Regulatory Body (CSN) recommend the same approach for new designs, design modifications and even for conventional plants. The activities embedded in a HFE V&V process are Task Support Verification (TSV), HFE Design Verification (HFE DV) using NUREG-0700 HFE Guidelines, and Integrated System Validation (ISV), with the execution of performance based tests, mainly in simulator facilities. This paper describes some of the experience of Tecnatom during the past years regarding the execution of these V&V activities previously mentioned, and in relation to the applicability and methodological aspects of each of these activities. Methodological aspects regarding TSV are related to its execution when there is a no Task Analysis to use. Methodological aspects regarding the HFE DV are related to the type of HSI to verify (small or large), its development status (paper design or implemented), the selection and translation of applicable HFE guidelines, and the HED preparation. Methodological aspects regarding the ISV are related to the necessary crews, training, number of scenarios, issues to test, data collection and performance measures. The experience is mainly related to Tecnatom’s work is Spanish NPP like Jose´ Cabrera, Almaraz and Vandello´s and in the case of foreign plants Beznau and an advanced NPP in Taiwan amongst others.


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