Constitution-As-Commons

2021 ◽  
Vol 120 (1) ◽  
pp. 232-241
Author(s):  
Kalpana Kannabiran

Extrapolating from the ideas of Elinor Ostrom and scholars of the commons, the conceptualization of the Constitution as a commons opens the Constitution out to radical, insurgent readings that redefine belonging and ownership—it is no longer the property of state legislatures and courts to (mis)interpret in the service of political expediency/judicial bias/equivocation. It is the people who, through collective action and civic engagement, hold institutions to account and provide the tools and experiences that must shape constitutional interpretation. This article will examine the emergence of the constitution-as-commons as the space for a public, shared, collectively crafted jurisprudence of citizenship, occupying the commons of the nation and the commons that the Constitution in fact is, bringing space and belonging together in unanticipated ways. What are the implications for courts and for the futures of the Constitution of the rupture of a sequestered “constitutional jurisprudence” through the articulation of an expansive, inclusive constitution-as-commons by “we, the people?”


1969 ◽  
pp. 324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Dworkin

Commentators have seen the disabling provisions found in the American and Canadian constitutions as undemocratic because they restrict majority powers. Building upon the work of John Hart Ely, this paper puts forward a conception of democracy which nourishes both collective responsibility and individual judgment. The distinguishes between "statistical" and "communal'' conceptions of democracy. Traditional theories, such as Ely's, have relied on the statistical notion which of individuals in a democracy acting each on their own. In the communal conception, decisions are made by the ' 'people'' acting as a distinct and collective unit of responsibility. The author then elaborates on the communal conception by identifying two variations of it, ' 'integrated'' and ' 'monolithic' 'forms of collective action. In the latter, both the unit of responsibility and the unit of judgment are collective, while in the former the unit of judgment resides in the individual. If democracy is understood in the integrated communal sense, then many of the disabling provisions in the American and Canadian constitutions can be seen to democracy rather than contradict it.



2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Catherine L. Dumas

This study aims to reveal patterns of e-petition co-signing behavior that are indicative of the mobilization of online “communities” engaging in collective action to express policy preferences on We the People (WtP), the first web-enabled US government petitioning system initiated by Obama. This Internet-based tool allowed users to petition the Obama Administration and solicit support for policy suggestions. Using petition data from WtP, this case study examines a set of 125 petitions that were created by individuals that are associated with a white supremacist group called The White Genocide Project (The White Genocide Project has recently changed their name to Fight White Genocide). Using data mining techniques, namely market basket analysis and social network analysis, I found evidence of the mobilization of “communities” of an extremist group of white supremacists who systematically and strategically used the WtP platform to broadcast their message by creating and co-signing petitions every month for almost four years.



Author(s):  
John D. Skrentny

This chapter focuses on government employment. It begins by examining those placed at the highest positions in the country, because political elites set the tone for America in general. The chapter shows that politicians do not practice what they preach: they may give rhetorical support to classical liberalism, but both parties commonly follow racial-realist logics when appointing government officials, including judges. It then shows the long and prominent support given to racial realism in policing and education. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the constitutional jurisprudence that has authorized racial realism in law enforcement but barred it in other sectors, including education.



Author(s):  
Chaihark Hahm ◽  
Sung Ho Kim
Keyword(s):  


2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald C. Dahlin
Keyword(s):  






2021 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-340
Author(s):  
Laura Phillips Sawyer

A long-standing, and deeply controversial, question in constitutional law is whether or not the Constitution's protections for “persons” and “people” extend to corporations. Law professor Adam Winkler's We the Corporations chronicles the most important legal battles launched by corporations to “win their constitutional rights,” by which he means both civil rights against discriminatory state action and civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution (p. xvii). Today, we think of the former as the right to be free from unequal treatment, often protected by statutory laws, and the latter as liberties that affect the ability to live one's life fully, such as the freedom of religion, speech, or association. The vim in Winkler's argument is that the court blurred this distinction when it applied liberty rights to nonprofit corporations and then, through a series of twentieth-century rulings, corporations were able to advance greater claims to liberty rights. Ultimately, those liberty rights have been employed to strike down significant bipartisan regulations, such as campaign finance laws, which were intended to advance democratic participation in the political process. At its core, this book asks, to what extent do “we the people” rule corporations and to what extent do they rule us?



2007 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-682 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Lee Teten
Keyword(s):  


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