From Property Rights to Liberty Rights: We the Corporations, A Review Essay

2021 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-340
Author(s):  
Laura Phillips Sawyer

A long-standing, and deeply controversial, question in constitutional law is whether or not the Constitution's protections for “persons” and “people” extend to corporations. Law professor Adam Winkler's We the Corporations chronicles the most important legal battles launched by corporations to “win their constitutional rights,” by which he means both civil rights against discriminatory state action and civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution (p. xvii). Today, we think of the former as the right to be free from unequal treatment, often protected by statutory laws, and the latter as liberties that affect the ability to live one's life fully, such as the freedom of religion, speech, or association. The vim in Winkler's argument is that the court blurred this distinction when it applied liberty rights to nonprofit corporations and then, through a series of twentieth-century rulings, corporations were able to advance greater claims to liberty rights. Ultimately, those liberty rights have been employed to strike down significant bipartisan regulations, such as campaign finance laws, which were intended to advance democratic participation in the political process. At its core, this book asks, to what extent do “we the people” rule corporations and to what extent do they rule us?

2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Seth Kershner

Occupy Wall Street. Black Lives Matter. The #MeToo movement. Over the past decade, the United States has seen a surge in activism around civil rights, broadly defined as the right to be free from discrimination and unequal treatment in arenas such as housing, the workplace, and the criminal justice system. At times, as when activists are arrested at a protest, calls for civil rights can also be the occasion for violations of civil liberties—certain basic freedoms (e.g., freedom of speech) that are either enshrined in the Constitution or established through legal rulings. While civil rights are distinct from civil liberties, students often struggle to articulate these differences and appreciate the links between the two concepts. Complicating this distinction is the fact that historically reference materials have tended to cover either one or the other but not the two in combination. Combining these two concepts in one work is what makes a revised edition of the Encyclopedia of American Civil Rights and Liberties so timely and valuable.


Author(s):  
Donald W. Rogers

This epilogue shows that Hague v. CIO had a legacy more complex than its reputation as a speech rights victory for workers and others over dictatorial city boss Frank Hague under the Bill of Rights. The American Civil Liberties Union and renamed Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) immediately split over the decision’s ramifications. Moreover, while the ruling enlarged constitutional protection for the right of public assembly to the benefit of Jehovah’s Witnesses, civil rights demonstrators, and others, it did little to enhance picketing and other “labor speech,” or to shield union organizers from police harassment. And while the decision freed the CIO to organize in Jersey City, it did not destroy Mayor Hague, who accommodated CIO unions and was ousted later due to city politics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 647-678
Author(s):  
Shane Landers

The Fourth Amendment provides for the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Search warrants may only be issued upon a finding of probable cause. This core tenet of our constitutional republic becomes progressively flexible with every development in Fourth Amendment interpretation. In Peffer v. Stephens, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit delivered the latest blow to constitutional rights that restrict the State from engaging in unprincipled searches. In an issue of first impression, the Sixth Circuit held that a criminal defendant’s alleged use of a computer during the commission of a crime was adequate probable cause to justify a search of the defendant’s home and a seizure of the technological equipment inside. Such a shortsighted justification fails to consider technological innovation, economic policy, and historical civil liberties. Peffer v. Stephens is the latest proof of the parasitic relationship between the law and technological advancement. As technology evolves, the law struggles to keep pace and resultingly impedes economic development. With the exponential growth of technology in the 21st century, a visionary approach to search and seizure law is necessary to promote economic innovation and to refrain from further dismantling Fourth Amendment protections.


2010 ◽  
Vol 125 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-47
Author(s):  
Robert Williams

This is an expanded and footnoted version of a lecture delivered by Robert F. Williams at the New Jersey Historical Commission’s 2009 Annual Conference, “New Jersey and the Bill of Rights,” held on November 21st in Trenton, New Jersey. The quote in the title comes from Article I, Paragraph 6 of the 1844 New Jersey Constitution.


2021 ◽  
Vol VI (I) ◽  
pp. 9-16
Author(s):  
Naseem Razi ◽  
Rashida Zahoor ◽  
Ghulam Abbas

The Constitution of Pakistan 1973 protects its citizens by guaranteeing some fundamental rights. It is, however, a matter of great concern that these rights do not cover the "right to access the necessities of life like access to clean water, food, clothing, shelter, and medicine etc". It, thus, leads imperfection of the constitutional rights. Therefore, this study aims to highlight this gap by evaluating the constitutional fundamental rights in the light of the necessities of life. This study concludes that lack of access to the necessities of life has made the people least concern towards the national issues and development of the country. Hence, this paper recommends filling up this gap and to incorporate the "right to access to the necessities of life" in the Constitution 1973.


Author(s):  
Анастасия Юрьевна Сивцова

В статье приводится анализ источников, регламентирующих процесс регламентации персональных данных, анализ норм российских нормативных правовых актов, закрепляющих основные права человека и гражданина, основные конституционные права осужденных на жизнь, здоровье. Автором поясняются некоторые аспекты нормативного регулирования понятия «персональные данные осужденных», право на личную жизнь. На основе научного анализа мнений ученых-юристов автором выстраивается логическая цепочка нормативного регламентирования заявленных дефиниций. В ключевом выводе по данной работе автором дается определение категории информации в следующей трактовке: персональные данные в отношении лиц, содержащихся в следственных изоляторах и осужденных к лишению свободы, - любая информация, относящаяся к прямо или косвенно определенному или определяемому подозреваемому, обвиняемому или осужденному, включающая в себя сведения о частной жизни, связях с родственниками и друзьями, пристрастиях, половой идентификации и предпочтениях, социальном и финансовом положении, о взглядах и убеждениях, о состоянии здоровья, в том числе совокупность информации, способная привести к идентификации осужденного. Предлагается авторская классификация персональных данных специальных субъектов. The article provides an analysis of the sources that regulate the process of regulating personal data, an analysis of the norms of Russian normative legal acts that reflect the basic human and civil rights, the basic constitutional rights of convicts to life and health. The author explains some aspects of the statutory regulation of the concept of "personal data of convicts", the right to privacy. Based on the scientific analysis of the opinions of legal scholars, the author builds a logical chain of statutory regulation of the stated definitions. In the key conclusion of this work, the author defines the category of information in the following interpretation: personal data in relation to persons held in pre-trial detention centers and sentenced to imprisonment - any information related directly or indirectly to a certain or identifiable person, suspect, accused or convicted person, including information about private life, relationships with relatives and friends, addictions, sexual identification and preferences, social and financial status, views and beliefs, health status, including a set of information that can lead to the identification of the convicted person. The author's classification of personal data of special subjects is proposed.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 1039-1051 ◽  
Author(s):  
W.J. Waluchow

In his rich and thoughtful paper, Richard Bellamy sketches a theory of individual rights that ascribes to them an inherently democratic character that “is best captured by a republican view of liberty as non-domination, rather than the standard liberal account of liberty as non-interference.” According to this view, “rights involve an implicit appeal to democratic forms of reasoning.” That is, the only justifiable “foundation of rights must be some form of ongoing democratic decision making that allows rights to be claimed under conditions of political equality.” Bellamy uses this particular model of rights to defend a somewhat unique thesis concerning the legitimacy of judicial review under a constitutional charter or bill of rights (henceforth constitutional review). Many legal theorists question whether constitutional review can ever be rendered consistent with the theoretical and practical demands of democracy. According to these theorists, democracy embodies a form of self-rule whereby the members of a society establish and exercise legitimate authority over themselves. But self-rule seems seriously compromised once constitutional review enters the picture. Instead of having the people and their elected representatives setting the basic terms of social cooperation, we have instead a small group of elite, unelected, and unaccountable judges performing this vital task. Constitutional review empowers these individuals, in constitutional review cases, to substitute their own contestable views and preferences with respect to the basic terms of social cooperation for the duly considered views and preferences of the people and those whom they have duly elected to represent them. This is something one simply cannot tolerate in a democracy.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danny Michelsen

The article deals with the question of whether or under which circumstances it is reasonable to interpret some forms of illegal state action as civil disobedience and whether republican political theory can make a difference to the justification of those actions. It is argued that the theory of freedom as non-domination and the interpretation of the right to participation as the “right of rights” in a legitimate state provide a better justificatory scheme for cases in which developing or emerging countries break international trade laws for the purpose of protecting constitutional rights than Rawls’ theory of civil disobedience, because it takes the problem of power asymmetries in international relations and the status of social rights more seriously. However, these republican standards do not offer different practical solutions for a specific type of state disobedience, humanitarian intervention, because transferring the standards of non-domination and the fundamental right to participation to international relations would lead to a “maximalist” interpretation of human rights, which would undermine the function of such interventions as an instrument of last resort against oppressive governments.


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