scholarly journals The Ethical Life of Counter-Communities

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Daniel Loick

Abstract This article explores the normative structure of counter-communities. These communities do not simply fulfill a compensatory function for excluded or oppressed groups; their specific sociality is transcendent of society at large. The article outlines this notion of the “superiority of the subjugated” with Hegel and explains its social-theoretical relevance by turning to Marx and Engels. This tradition of thought offers two explanations for the superiority of subjugated sociality, one that relies on a philosophy of history (the servant's way of existence anticipates a coming sociality), and one that relies on anthropological premises (servants have an already-present access to specific social potentials of their species being that the masters are missing). After considering these two options with regard to the proletariat as a form of subjugated sociality, the article makes the case for a general theory of the ethical life of counter-communities and applies it to the examples of queer and diasporic forms of collectivity. In closing, the article explores the success conditions of counter-collectivization as well as names some social-theoretical implications.

2020 ◽  
pp. 43-110
Author(s):  
Will D. Desmond

Hegel’s exposition of the ‘rational’ state in The Philosophy of Right draws on ancient ethics, politics, and history, and cannot be fully understood without reference to his Lectures on the Philosophy of History. This chapter seeks to explore the many ‘moments of antiquity’ in the Philosophy of Right, when ancient practices or ideas infiltrate Hegel’s more abstract analysis of ethico-political phenomena. It does so by following the tripartite division of the Philosophy of Right: for example, the analysis of property in ‘Abstract Right’ is incomplete without appreciating Hegel’s response to ancient forms of slavery and the Roman ‘law of things’; the second section on ‘Morality’ is primarily Kantian, yet is also implicitly in dialogue with Socratic thinkers for its evaluation of virtue, the Good, and conscience; finally, Hegel’s innovative concept of ‘Ethical Life’ is significantly indebted to his understanding of the Greek and Roman families, ancient constitutional arrangements, and Justinian’s Code. Turning from these and other ‘moments of antiquity’, the chapter then offers a more continuous presentation and evaluation of Hegel’s understanding of Greek and Roman histories, explaining how his concept of the ‘beautiful’ Greek polis and ‘lawful’ Roman empire were for him the two historically necessary stages in the development of the modern ‘rational state’.


2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (69) ◽  
pp. 1255-1294
Author(s):  
Marcos Lutz Müller

Liberdade e eticidade: o diagnóstico crítico da modernidade política em Hegel Resumo: Após uma sucinta caracterização do processo de diferenciação e separação histórico-conceitual entre sociedade civil e Estado, respectivamente, entre o indivíduo burguês e o cidadão como traço principal da modernidade política (1), empreende-se uma análise concisa dos três registros da “apresentação” (Darstellung) do conceito de liberdade, que, no âmbito do espírito objetivo, culmina no desenvolvimento do conceito de eticidade (2). Em seguida, explicita-se os três momentos lógicos, isto é, os três elementos constitutivos e processuais do conceito de liberdade (universalidade, particularidade e singularidade) (3), que, em sua efetivação no âmbito do espírito subjetivo, assume três figuras, a da vontade natural, a da vontade do arbítrio e a da vontade livre que quer a efetivação universal da liberdade como seu “conteúdo, objeto e fim” (4). Hegel é por excelência o filósofo da modernidade política e, ao mesmo tempo, o seu crítico, na medida em que aprofunda a ruptura com a fundamentação teológica e jusnaturalista que o contratualismo moderno introduz no pensamento ético-político ao fundar a família, a sociedade e o poder político na vontade livre autônoma, ao mesmo tempo em que critica o caráter atomista e negativo da liberdade individual que o paradigma contratualista põe como sua base. (5) Por fim, examina-se mais detidamente os dois pilares fundamentais que fundam a estrutura normativa de uma eticidade moderna e reflexiva (6): a pessoa como sujeito de direitos (6A) e a liberdade subjetiva da consciência moral moderna (6B). Palavras-chave: Liberdade. Modernidade política. Diferença entre sociedade e Estado. Eticidade. Pessoa. Consciência moral. Freiheit und Sittlichkeit: die kritische Diagnose der politischen Modernität bei Hegel Zusammenfassung: Nach einer kurzen Darlegung des historisch-begrifflichen Differenzierungs- und Trennungsprozesses von burgerlicher Gesellschaft und Staat, beziehunsweise, zwischen dem „bourgeois“  und dem staatlichen Bürger, als den auszeichnenden Hauptzug der politischen Modernität (1), wird eine gedrängte Analyse der drei Ebenen der Darstellung des Freiheitsbegriffs, dessen Verwirklichung im Bereich des objektiven Geistes in der Entwicklung des Sittlichkeitbegriffs seinen Höhepunkt hat. (2) Danach werden die drei logischen Momente, das heisst, die drei prozessualen Bestantandsteile des abstrakten Freiheitsbegriffs (Allgemeinheit, Besonderheit und Einzelheit) ausgelegt (3), die in ihrer Verwirklichung im subjektiven Geist die entresprechenden drei Gestalten des natürlichen Willens, des Willens als Willkür und desjenigen freien Willens, der die allgemeine Verwirklichung der Freiheit als „Inhalt, Gegenstand und Zweck“ hat (4). Hegel erweist sich als der profilierte und zugleich kritische Philosoph der politischen Modernität, insofern er den vom Kontraktualismus eingeführten Bruch mit der theologischen und naturrechtlichen Fundierung der Familie, der Gesellschat und der politischen Macht weiter vertieft und zugleich die negative und atomistische Dimension der individuellen Freiheit kritisiert, die der Kontraktualismus zu seiner Voraussetzung hat. (5) Endlich, werden die zwei Grundpfeiler auseinandergelegt, welche die normative Struktur einer reflexiven und modernen Sittlichkeit begründen (6): die Person als Rechtssubjekt (6A) und die subjektive Freiheit als moralisches Gewissen (6B). Schlüsselbegriffe: Freiheit. Politische Modernität. Differenz zwischen bürgerlicher Gesellschat und Staat. Sittlichkeit. Person. Gewissen. Freedom and ethical life: Hegel’s critical diagnosis of political modernity Abstract: Departing from a brief characterization of the historical-conceptual process by which civil society and the state, respectively, the bourgeois and the citizen, differed and separated from one another – a fundamental trait of political modernity – (1), I have undertaken a concise analysis of the three moments of the exposition (Darstellung) of freedom’s concept, which, within the scope of objective spirit, culminates in the development of the concept of ethical life (2). Thereupon, I have elucidated the three logical moments, that is, the three constitutive and procedural elements of freedom’s concept, namely, universality, particularity and singularity (3), which, in their effectivation within the scope of subjective spirit, assume three figures: that of natural will, arbitrary will and the free will which wants the universal effectivation of freedom as its “content, object and aim” (4). Hegel is thus the philosopher of political modernity par excellence and, simultaneously, its severe critic, inasmuch as he, on the one hand, deepens the rift which modern contractualism introduced in ethical-political thought when it founded family, society and political power upon autonomous free will, and on the other, inasmuch as he, at the same time, tears down the atomist and negative character of individual freedom set forth by the contractualist paradigm as its basis. (5) Finally, I examined in detail the two fundamental columns upon which a normative structure of a modern and reflexive ethical life are based: the person as subject of rights (6.a) and the modern moral consciousness’ as subjective freedom (6.b). Keywords: Freedom. Political modernity. Difference between society and state. Ethical life. Person. Moral consciousness. Data de registro: 30/07/2020 Data de aceite: 21/10/2020  


1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
William H. Dray

Central to R. G. Collingwood's philosophy of history, and among the most controvrsial of his doctrines, is the contention that historical understanding requires a re-anactment of past experience or a re-thinking of past thought. Some critics have found this contention in it-self incoherent or otherwise unsatisfactory, even as applied to what Collingwood apparently regarded as paradigm cases of historical thinking: for example, accounting for Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon in terms of his political ambitions. Others, while accepting the applicability of notions like re-enactment and re-thinking to such cases, have nevertheless rejected them as a basis for a general theory of historical understanding on the ground that their range of application is too narrow to encompass anything like the normal concerns of historians. In particular, these notions have been held to throw little light on what historians have had to say about largescale social events, conditions and processes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Crimston ◽  
Matthew J. Hornsey

AbstractAs a general theory of extreme self-sacrifice, Whitehouse's article misses one relevant dimension: people's willingness to fight and die in support of entities not bound by biological markers or ancestral kinship (allyship). We discuss research on moral expansiveness, which highlights individuals’ capacity to self-sacrifice for targets that lie outside traditional in-group markers, including racial out-groups, animals, and the natural environment.


1992 ◽  
Vol 37 (11) ◽  
pp. 1225-1225
Author(s):  
No authorship indicated

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