Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in Great Britain and the United States Since 1850: Reply

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (5) ◽  
pp. 2041-2049 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Long ◽  
Joseph Ferrie
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Occupational Mobility ◽  
The United States ◽  
Relative Mobility

We respond to several criticisms by Avery Guest and Michael Hout (2013) and Yu Xie and Alexandra Killewald (2013) to Jason Long and Joseph Ferrie (2013). We do not dispute Guest and Hout's characterization of the importance of total mobility in addition to relative mobility. We find much in their additional analyses that supports our original findings. In response to Xie and Killewald, we discuss the limitations of our data and the conceptualization of mobility. (JEL J62, N31, N32, N33, N34)

scholarly journals Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in Great Britain and the United States Since 1850: Comment

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (5) ◽  
pp. 2021-2040 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Hout ◽  
Avery M Guest
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Economic Growth ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Occupational Mobility ◽  
Occupational Status ◽  
The United States ◽  
Intergenerational Correlation ◽  
Structural Mobility ◽  
Over Time

We reanalyze Long and Ferrie's data. We find that the association of occupational status across generations was quite similar over time and place. Two significant differences were: (i) American farms in 1880 were far more open to men who had nonfarm backgrounds than were American farms in 1973 or British farms in either century; (ii) of the four cases, the intergenerational correlation was strongest in Britain in 1881. Structural mobility related to, among other things, economic growth and occupational differentiation, affected mobility most in 1970s America. (JEL J62, N31, N32, N33, N34)

scholarly journals Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in Great Britain and the United States Since 1850

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (4) ◽  
pp. 1109-1137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Long ◽  
Joseph Ferrie
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Occupational Mobility ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Us ◽  
Late Twentieth ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Fathers And Sons ◽  
Late Twentieth Century

The US tolerates more inequality than Europe and believes its economic mobility is greater than Europe's, though they had roughly equal rates of intergenerational occupational mobility in the late twentieth century. We extend this comparison into the nineteenth century using 10,000 nationally-representative British and US fathers and sons. The US was more mobile than Britain through 1900, so in the experience of those who created the US welfare state in the 1930s, the US had indeed been “exceptional.” The US mobility lead over Britain was erased by the 1950s, as US mobility fell from its nineteenth century levels. (JEL J62, N31, N32, N33, N34)

scholarly journals Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in Great Britain and the United States Since 1850: Comment

2013 ◽  
Vol 103 (5) ◽  
pp. 2003-2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Xie ◽  
Alexandra Killewald
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
Comparative Study ◽  
Data Quality ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Social Mobility ◽  
Occupational Mobility ◽  
The United States ◽  
Significant Decline

Using historical census and survey data, Long and Ferrie (2013) found a significant decline in social mobility in the United States from 1880 to 1973. We present two critiques of the Long-Ferrie study. First, the data quality of the Long-Ferrie study is more limiting than the authors acknowledge. Second, and more critically, they applied a method ill-suited for measuring social mobility of farmers in a comparative study between 1880 and 1973, a period in which the proportion of farmers dramatically declined in the United States. We show that Long and Ferrie's main conclusion is all driven by this misleading result for farmers. (JEL J62, N31, N32, N51, N52)

Corruption as a Political Issue in Modern Societies: France, Great Britain and the United States in the Long 19th Century

Public Voices ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens Ivo Engels
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Great Britain ◽  
19Th Century ◽  
French Revolution ◽  
Political Corruption ◽  
The United States ◽  
Modern World ◽  
Political Issue ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Bureaucratic State

The so-called “long 19th century”, from the French Revolution to the First World War, ranks as the crucial phase in the genesis of the modern world. In the Western countries this period was characterized by the differentiation of the public and the private spheres, the birth of the modern bureaucratic state and the delegitimation of early modern practices such as clientelism and patronage. All these fundamental changes are, among other things, usually considered important preconditions for the modern perception of corruption.This paper will concentrate on this crucial phase by means of a comparative analysis of debates in France, Great Britain and the United States, with the aim to elucidate the motives for major anti-corruption movements. The questions are: who fights against corruption and what are the reasons for doing so? I will argue that these concerns were often very different and sometimes accidental. Furthermore, an analysis of political corruption may reveal differences between the political cultures in the countries in question. Thus, the history of corruption serves as a sensor which enables a specific perspective on politics. By taking this question as a starting point the focus is narrowed to political corruption and the debates about corruption, while petty bribery on the part of minor civilservants, as well as the actual practice in the case of extensive political corruption, is left aside.

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