scholarly journals Free Trade Agreements and the Consolidation of Democracy

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuepeng Liu ◽  
Emanuel Ornelas

We study the relationship between participation in free trade agreements (FTAs) and the sustainability of democracy. Our model shows that FTAs can critically reduce the incentive of authoritarian groups to seek power by destroying protectionist rents, thus making democracies last longer. This gives governments in unstable democracies an extra motive to form FTAs. Hence, greater democratic instability induces governments to boost their FTA commitments. In a dataset with 116 countries over 1960–2007, we find robust support for these predictions. They help to rationalize the rapid simultaneous growth of regionalism and of worldwide democratization since the late 1980s. (JEL D72, F13, F15, O19, O24)

Author(s):  
Neslihan Koç

Turkey, because of its responsibilities derived from Custom Union with European Union, makes limited Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with those states which have already signed such agreements with EU. As yet Turkey has signed FTAs with 19 countries including Macedonia. It's expected from FTA's that raise awareness of partner countries about each other’s economic and commercial potentials. In this study a general overview will be made to emphasize the relationship between FTAs which Turkey has signed with other countries and increase in Turkey’s trade volume in the same period. Subsequently, with regarding the FTA and commercial relations with Macedonia, an assessment will be made by using the lists of countries imports and exports, based on Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy statistics for the period of 2001-2012.


Author(s):  
Stefan Griller

The author argues that the mega-regionals are incorporating WTO standards on the removal of technical barriers to trade (TBT), but do not go much further. Consequently, domestic policies on consumer or environmental protection are inevitably affected. However, in this regard, the mega-regionals would not result in a substantive change. By contrast, the relationship between the removal of TBT and investment protection standards is qualified as poorly balanced, unclear, and creating fresh problems. This includes the possibility that damages might be awarded even in cases where the party to the agreement has correctly used its ‘right to regulate’. Moreover, a critical account of the investor-state dispute settlement system foreseen is offered. It is presented as unnecessarily complex, and creating unbalanced advantages for investors. The better alternative would be integrating national courts into the system.


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