Real-effort laboratory experiment on the effects of production uncertainty on agent effort allocation among two inputs.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Phipps
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Effort Allocation ◽  
Production Uncertainty ◽  
Real Effort

scholarly journals In Search of Workers' Real Effort Reciprocity-a Field and a Laboratory Experiment

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 817-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ◽  
Abdolkarim Sadrieh ◽  
Bettina Rockenbach
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Real Effort

scholarly journals Merit, Luck, and Taxes: Societal Reward Rules, Self-Interest, and Ideology in a Real-Effort Voting Experiment

2020 ◽  
pp. 106591292096023
Author(s):  
Markus Tepe ◽  
Pieter Vanhuysse ◽  
Maximilian Lutz
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Political Ideology ◽  
Flat Tax ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Counting Task ◽  
Treatment Conditions ◽  
Legitimate Target ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Real Effort ◽  
Group Members

When are high earnings considered a legitimate target for redistribution, and when not? We design a real-effort laboratory experiment in which we manipulate the assignment of payrates (societal “reward rules”) that translate performance on a real-effort counting task into pre-tax earnings. We then ask subjects to vote on a flat tax rate in groups of three. We distinguish three treatment conditions: the same payrate for all group members (“equal” reward rule), differential (low, medium, and high) but random payrates (“luck” rule), and differential payrates based on subjects’ performance on a quiz with voluntary preparation opportunity (“merit” rule). Self-interest is the dominant tax voting motivation. Tax levels are lower under “merit” rule than under “luck” rule, and merit reasoning overrides political ideology. But information is needed to activate merit reasoning. Both these latter effects are present only when voters have “full merit knowledge” that signals precisely how others obtained their incomes.

scholarly journals How success breeds success

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ambroise Descamps ◽  
Changxia Ke ◽  
Lionel Page
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Relative Strength ◽  
Information Revelation ◽  
Strategic Effect ◽  
Turn On ◽  
Early Success ◽  
Real Effort ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
Positive Effect

We investigate if, and why, an initial success can trigger a string of successes. Using random variations in success in a real-effort laboratory experiment, we cleanly identify the causal effect of an early success in a competition. We confirm that an early success indeed leads to increased chances of a later success. By alternatively eliminating strategic features of the competition, we turn on and off possible mechanisms driving the effect of an early success. Standard models of dynamic contest predict a strategic effect due to asymmetric incentives between initial winners and losers. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that they can explain the positive effect of winning. Instead, we find that the effect of winning seems driven by an information revelation effect, whereby players update their beliefs about their relative strength after experiencing an initial success.

A Cross-Cultural Real-Effort Experiment on Wage-Inequality Information and Performance

2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 1095-1120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Liu-Kiel ◽  
C. Bram Cadsby ◽  
Heike Y. Schenk-Mathes ◽  
Fei Song ◽  
Xiaolan Yang
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Wage Inequality ◽  
Work Performance ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Performance Gap ◽  
Piece Rate ◽  
Real Effort ◽  
Disclosure Of Information ◽  
And Performance

Abstract We conduct a real-effort laboratory experiment to examine how disclosure of information about the pay received by co-workers affects work performance in Germany and China. We employ an individual piece-rate setting in which a piece rate is received for each unit of output successfully produced. We find that receiving information that one’s co-workers are all receiving the same piece rate as oneself has no significant effect on performance compared to non-disclosure. In contrast, learning that one co-worker is receiving a higher piece rate than oneself does significantly affect performance. In particular, receiving such information initially results in a larger performance increase than receiving information that others are all receiving the same piece rate as oneself. However, this performance gap decreases toward the end of the experiment.

scholarly journals In Search Of Workers' Real Effort Reciprocity—A Field and a Laboratory Experiment

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 817-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heike Hennig-Schmidt ◽  
Bettina Rockenbach ◽  
Abdolkarim Sadrieh
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Real Effort

Susceptibility of Angoff Method to Judgmental Errors: A Laboratory Experiment

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daren S. Protolipac ◽  
Lisa Finkelstein ◽  
John Kulas
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Angoff Method

Investigation of discontinuous periodic signals using the measuring labview complex

2020 ◽  
pp. 72-79
Author(s):  
E.B. Solovyeva ◽  
◽  
Yu.M. Inshakov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Fourier Series ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Gibbs Phenomenon ◽  
Electrical Signals ◽  
Measuring Complex ◽  
Universal Measuring ◽  
Depth Study ◽  
Periodic Signals ◽  
Truncated Fourier Series

General approaches to the analysis of the Gibbs phenomenon for discontinuous periodic signals approximated by the truncated Fourier series are considered. Methods for smoothing the truncated Fourier series and improving its convergence are discussed. The software means for modeling is a universal measuring complex LabVIEW, which possesses a convenient environment for analyzing electrical signals, on the basis of this complex a laboratory experiment is carried out. The advantages of the measuring LabVIEW complex and its capabilities for in-depth study of discontinuous periodic signals are noted.

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