We conducted a 3 × 3 × 2 experiment to verify the moral preference hypothesis and extend the boundary conditions of the moral frame effect. Participants played a trade-off game (TOG), in which they unilaterally choose between an equitable or efficient option. We manipulated
the labeling of the options to describe the equitable versus efficient option as morally right, and controlled the amount of the stakes and division schemes in the TOG. We found there was a significant effect of moral frame when stakes were low in the TOG, and participants would choose a morally
right option whether it was equitable or efficient. However, the effect of moral frame was nonsignificant when the stakes were high. In addition, the division schemes in the TOG had a great impact on the moral frame effect. Therefore, we found that when participants’ interest in the
options remains the same or the changes are small, and other players’ interest changes greatly, the moral frame effect is not significant.
The Influence of Frame Effect and Ambiguity Effect on Accounting Judgment
