scholarly journals Jump Bidding Strategies in Internet Auctions

2004 ◽  
Vol 50 (10) ◽  
pp. 1407-1419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert F. Easley ◽  
Rafael Tenorio
2009 ◽  
pp. 1526-1539 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Friesner ◽  
Carl S. Bozman ◽  
Matthew Q. McPherson

Internet auctions have gained widespread appeal as an efficient and effective means of buying and selling goods and services. This study examines buyer behavior on eBay, one of the most wellknown Internet auction Web sites. eBay’s auction format is similar to that of a second-price, hardclose auction, which gives a rational participant an incentive to submit a bid that is equal to his or her maximum willingness to pay. But while traditional second-price, hard-close auctions assume that participants have reliable information about their own and other bidders’ reservation prices, eBay participants usually do not. This raises the possibility that eBay participants may adapt their bidding strategies and not actually bid their reservation prices because of increased uncertainty. In this article, we empirically examine the bidding patterns of online auction participants and compare our findings to the behavior of bidders in more conventional auction settings.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 202-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosane Hungria-Gunnelin

Purpose This paper aims to empirically test the effect of list price and bidding strategies in ascending auctions of residential real estate. Design/methodology/approach Three regression models are estimated, using a unique data set from 629 condominium apartments in the inner-city of Stockholm, Sweden, sold between January 2010 and December 2011. Findings The results show that jump bidding has the predicted effect of reducing competition by scaring off bidders. However, a higher average bid increment leads to a higher selling price. Furthermore, results show that a fast auction in terms of average time between bids acts to increase the probability of so-called auction fever as both the number of bidders and the selling price are positively correlated with the speed of the auction. While the average behavior of all auction participants, in terms of jump bidding and time between bids, significantly affects auction outcomes, differences in strategies applied by winners and losers show mixed results. The results of this study with respect to sellers’ list price strategy show that underpricing is an ineffective strategy in terms of enticing more bidders to participate in the auction. Furthermore, underpricing is not sufficient to have a positive effect on the selling price. Originality/value This paper is one of the first papers to empirically analyze how different bidding strategies affect the outcome of residential real estate auctions in terms of competition and the final selling price.


Author(s):  
Daniel Friesner ◽  
Carl S. Bozman ◽  
Matthew Q. McPherson

Internet auctions have gained widespread appeal as an efficient and effective means of buying and selling goods and services. This study examines buyer behavior on eBay, one of the most well-known Internet auction Web sites. eBay’s auction format is similar to that of a second-price, hard-close auction, which gives a rational participant an incentive to submit a bid that is equal to his or her maximum willingness to pay. But while traditional second-price, hard-close auctions assume that participants have reliable information about their own and other bidders’ reservation prices, eBay participants usually do not. This raises the possibility that eBay participants may adapt their bidding strategies and not actually bid their reservation prices because of increased uncertainty. In this article, we empirically examine the bidding patterns of online auction participants and compare our findings to the behavior of bidders in more conventional auction settings.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Abdelmoaty ◽  
Wessam Mesbah ◽  
Mohammad A. M. Abdel-Aal ◽  
Ali T. Alawami

In the recent electricity market framework, the profit of the generation companies depends on the decision of the operator on the schedule of its units, the energy price, and the optimal bidding strategies. Due to the expanded integration of uncertain renewable generators which is highly intermittent such as wind plants, the coordination with other facilities to mitigate the risks of imbalances is mandatory. Accordingly, coordination of wind generators with the evolutionary Electric Vehicles (EVs) is expected to boost the performance of the grid. In this paper, we propose a robust optimization approach for the coordination between the wind-thermal generators and the EVs in a virtual<br>power plant (VPP) environment. The objective of maximizing the profit of the VPP Operator (VPPO) is studied. The optimal bidding strategy of the VPPO in the day-ahead market under uncertainties of wind power, energy<br>prices, imbalance prices, and demand is obtained for the worst case scenario. A case study is conducted to assess the e?effectiveness of the proposed model in terms of the VPPO's profit. A comparison between the proposed model and the scenario-based optimization was introduced. Our results confirmed that, although the conservative behavior of the worst-case robust optimization model, it helps the decision maker from the fluctuations of the uncertain parameters involved in the production and bidding processes. In addition, robust optimization is a more tractable problem and does not suffer from<br>the high computation burden associated with scenario-based stochastic programming. This makes it more practical for real-life scenarios.<br>


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