Optimal Compensation and Pay-Performance Sensitivity in a Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Model

Management Science ◽

10.1287/mnsc.1110.1417 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 58 (3) ◽

pp. 641-657 ◽

Author(s):

Nengjiu Ju ◽

Xuhu Wan

Keyword(s):

Continuous Time ◽

Principal Agent ◽

Agent Model ◽

Performance Sensitivity ◽

Principal Agent Model

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A study on the incentive compensation structure with payroll tax: a continuous-time principal-agent model

The North American Journal of Economics and Finance ◽

10.1016/j.najef.2021.101489 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 101489

Author(s):

Huan Wang ◽

Chong Lai ◽

Shaoyong Lai

Keyword(s):

Continuous Time ◽

Incentive Compensation ◽

Principal Agent ◽

Payroll Tax ◽

Agent Model ◽

Compensation Structure ◽

Principal Agent Model

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A solvable continuous time dynamic principal–agent model

Journal of Economic Theory ◽

10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.006 ◽

2015 ◽

Vol 159 ◽

pp. 989-1015 ◽

Author(s):

Noah Williams

Keyword(s):

Continuous Time ◽

Principal Agent ◽

Agent Model ◽

Time Dynamic ◽

Principal Agent Model

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Optimal Investment by the Principal in Order to Increase the Probability of Favourable States of Nature in the Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard

Journal of the Operational Research Society ◽

10.1038/sj/jors/0440211 ◽

1993 ◽

Vol 44 (2) ◽

pp. 193-198

Author(s):

Matthew A Waller

Keyword(s):

Moral Hazard ◽

Optimal Investment ◽

Principal Agent ◽

Agent Model ◽

Principal Agent Model ◽

States Of Nature

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Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model

The Economic Journal ◽

10.2307/2233961 ◽

1990 ◽

Vol 100 (403) ◽

pp. 1109 ◽

Author(s):

Michael Suk-Young Chwe

Keyword(s):

Principal Agent ◽

Agent Model ◽

Principal Agent Model

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Research on Principal-Agent Model In Logistics Outsourcing

Logistics ◽

10.1061/40996(330)103 ◽

2009 ◽

Author(s):

Jing Yu

Keyword(s):

Principal Agent ◽

Logistics Outsourcing ◽

Agent Model ◽

Principal Agent Model

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Technological Improvement and the Decentralizatiton Penalty in a Simple Principal/Agent Model

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.2945702 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Ruochen Liang ◽

Thomas Marschak

Keyword(s):

Principal Agent ◽

Agent Model ◽

Technological Improvement ◽

Principal Agent Model

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Incentive Mechanism for University Teachers under Multi-task Principal-Agent Model

2014 Seventh International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization ◽

10.1109/cso.2014.23 ◽

2014 ◽

Author(s):

Lu Fang ◽

Zhang Jiangshun ◽

Ding Ti Luo

Keyword(s):

Incentive Mechanism ◽

Principal Agent ◽

Agent Model ◽

University Teachers ◽

Principal Agent Model

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Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard

Journal of Economic Theory ◽

10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.007 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 148 (6) ◽

pp. 2383-2403 ◽

Author(s):

Sandrine Ollier ◽

Lionel Thomas

Keyword(s):

Moral Hazard ◽

Adverse Selection ◽

Principal Agent ◽

Agent Model ◽

Ex Post ◽

Principal Agent Model ◽

Participation Constraint

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Wealth Effects in the Principal Agent Model

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.102622 ◽

1998 ◽

Author(s):

Henrik Thiele ◽

Achim Wambach

Keyword(s):

Wealth Effects ◽

Principal Agent ◽

Agent Model ◽

Principal Agent Model

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A Theory of Tax Avoidance -- Managerial Incentives for Tax Planning in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.2463582 ◽

2014 ◽

Author(s):

Ralf Ewert ◽

Rainer Niemann

Keyword(s):

Tax Avoidance ◽

Managerial Incentives ◽

Tax Planning ◽

Principal Agent ◽

Agent Model ◽

Principal Agent Model

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