A Test of Income Smoothing Using Pseudo Fiscal Years

The purpose of our study is to further understand managerial incentives that affect the volatility of reported earnings. Prior research suggests that the volatility of fourth-quarter earnings may be affected by the integral approach to accounting (i.e., “settling up” of accrual estimation errors in the first three quarters of the fiscal year) or earnings management to meet certain reporting objectives (e.g., analyst forecasts). We suggest that another factor affecting fourth-quarter earnings is managers’ intentional smoothing of fiscal-year earnings. For each firm, we create pseudo-year earnings using four consecutive quarters other than the four quarters of the reported fiscal year. We then compare the earnings volatility of pseudo years to the earnings volatility of the firm’s own reported fiscal year. We find evidence consistent with fourth-quarter accruals reflecting managerial incentives to smooth fiscal-year earnings. This conclusion is validated by several cross-sectional tests, the pattern in quarterly cash flows and accruals, and several robustness tests. Overall, we contribute to the literature exploring alternative explanations for the differential volatility of fiscal-year and fourth-quarter earnings. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.

The impact of IFRS on earnings management: evidence from Mexico

PurposePrior literature investigating the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) finds that managerial incentives, capital market institutions and accounting standards interact to endogenously determine accounting outcomes. In this paper, we investigate the impact of changing from local GAAP to IFRS in 2012 on earnings management by public firms in Mexico. Given the institutional environment and managerial incentives in Mexico, there is not a clear theoretical prediction for the impact of Mexico's adoption of IFRS on earnings management. Thus, it is an empirical question whether a change in accounting standards had any effect on earnings management.Design/methodology/approachWe use three measures of earnings smoothing and one measure of upwards earnings management. Logistic regression analysis along with t-tests across two time periods, pre-IFRS (2009–2011) and post-IFRS (2013–2015) are used to determine if there is a significant change in the earnings management of Mexican firms, and if this change is different for companies cross-listed in the US and companies listed only in the Bolsa.FindingsWe hypothesize and find that adopting IFRS is associated with lower earnings management via earnings smoothing in Mexico, and the reduction is greater for firms cross-listed in the United States. Our results support the contention that strong institutions and enforcement aid in the implementation of new accounting standards.Originality/valueFirst, we contribute to the literature on the adoption of IFRS around the world. The consensus in the literature is that the impact of IFRS on financial reporting is country-specific. To our knowledge, we are the first to conduct such research on Mexico. Second, our findings indicate that IFRS adoption is associated with a reduction in earnings management through income smoothing by firms in Mexico. This contributes to a small but growing body of literature documenting consequences of improvements in Mexican capital markets. Results of research in this area provide important insights to capital market participants and regulators in Mexico.

Strategic Use of Volume of Financial Items in 10-K Reports

We investigate whether firms limit the volume of financial items in annual reports (including the financial statements and footnotes) to obfuscate poor future firm performance, and how investors react to this reduced volume. We estimate abnormal volume to capture managers’ discretion over reporting in the 10-K and find that abnormally low volume predicts poor future earnings. This relation is more pronounced in firms where the market has difficulty in detecting managerial intervention in the disclosure process. We also find that abnormally low volume predicts negative future returns, suggesting that managers benefit from disclosing fewer financial items by delaying the incorporation of bad news into stock prices. Further corroborating our results, we find that the volume is abnormally low when there exist strong managerial incentives to withhold bad news and manipulate investor perceptions upward. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the notion that managers attempt to obfuscate poor future performance and inflate current stock prices by disclosing fewer financial items in the 10-K.