A Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Model on Margin Bidding

Multi-attribute reverse auction has many advantages for the buyer with the multi-dimensional attribute requirements. However, it is hard to design an optimal auction mechanism for the scenario in practice. Therefore, this paper presents a method transforming multi-attribute auction into single-attribute auction by bidding in deposit. The analysis indicates that our method can reduce not only the transaction risk caused by the supplier’s bid abandonment but also the operating cost and complexity of the multi-attribute auction. Besides, our method meets the incentive compatibility and participation constraint conditions by promising that the highest bidding supplier is the winner in the Auction and can obtain higher expected profits than traditional auctions for the buyer.

The Participation Constraint and CEO Equity Grants

We examine whether firms benchmark annual equity grants to compensation peers and whether meeting the participation constraint is a motive. Studying CEO equity grants over the period of 2006-2016 and compensation peers disclosed by the firm, we find that equity grants by these peers significantly determine a firm's equity grants. We find no evidence that the relation between a firm's and its peers' CEO equity grants is an indirect outcome of meeting peer total compensation levels. In contrast, we show that firms are more likely to meet peer equity grant levels when the labor market is more competitive and when losing key personnel is a risk factor. We also find that CEO turnover is more likely when the CEO receives lower equity grants than peers. Collectively, these findings are consistent with the theoretical prediction that benchmarking equity grants helps firms satisfy the participation constraint, which varies with performance.

A Comparative Study of Leisure Constraints in Outdoor Leisure Activities Depending on Recognition of the Level of Particulate Matter (PM10): Focused on Golf Participants in the Republic of Korea

Particulate matter, one of the most recent social problems in Korea, not only poses a threat to people’s health, but is also emerging as a constraint to discourage outdoor leisure activities. Golf, a leisure sport played outdoors for hours, is not free from such a threat, and now is time to analyze golfers’ recognition of particulate matter. To examine whether particulate matter, among other constraints for golfers, had a significant effect as well as how golfers recognized particulate matter, we used 324 collected questionnaires in this study. After exploratory factor analysis and reliability analysis through SPSS 23.0, we divided questionnaire participants into recognition and non-recognition groups based on whether they checked and recognized atmospheric conditions, including particulate matter, before playing golf, and used multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to compare and analyze leisure constraints. Respondents in the recognition group who recognized particulate matter in advance experienced participation constraints in weather and health factors, while those in the non-recognition group experienced participation constraints in skill and confidence factors. In other words, respondents participated in outdoor leisure activities even though they recognized the level of hazardous particulate matter in the air beforehand, and particulate matter worked as a participation constraint for them; this finding confirmed that it will be necessary in the future to take preventative action more actively against the danger of particulate matter.

A note on Gollier's model for a collective pension scheme

Gollier proposed in 2008 a model for the analysis of pension schemes that is helpful to focus attention on the impact of intergenerational risk sharing and on the role of the participation constraint. He uses the model to analyze the relative attractiveness of a collective scheme with respect to schemes that may be implemented by individuals for themselves. The analysis makes use of an assumption concerning the ownership rights of investment returns realized by generations that are between career start and retirement at the time of the transition from an individual to a collective system. The present paper investigates the consequences of adopting an alternative assumption. In a calibration exercise, the increase of the effective rate of return obtained by switching from an existing ‘autarky’ scheme to an infinite-horizon ‘collective’ scheme is found to be 8 basis points, as opposed to 72 basis points as reported by Gollier. Additionally, the effects are considered of changes in the specification of agents' preferences, aiming to express the specific nature of retirement income provision in the second pillar. The Black–Scholes assumptions are used to model the economic environment, so that many results can be obtained in closed form.

Information design and sequential screening with ex post participation constraint

We study a principal–agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the process by which the agent learns his type and, concurrently, the screening mechanism. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative rents ex post. We characterize the profit‐maximizing mechanism. In that optimal mechanism, learning proceeds in continuous time and, at each moment, the agent learns a lower bound on his type. For each type, there is one of two possible outcomes: the type is allocated the efficient quantity or is left with zero rents ex post.

BILATERAL RISK SHARING WITH HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS AND EXPOSURE CONSTRAINTS

This paper studies bilateral risk sharing under no aggregate uncertainty, where one agent has Expected-Utility preferences and the other agent has Rank-dependent utility preferences with a general probability distortion function. We impose exogenous constraints on the risk exposure for both agents, and we allow for any type or level of belief heterogeneity. We show that Pareto-optimal risk-sharing contracts can be obtained via a constrained utility maximization under a participation constraint of the other agent. This allows us to give an explicit characterization of optimal risk-sharing contracts. In particular, we show that an optimal risk-sharing contract contains allocations that are monotone functions of the likelihood ratio, where the latter is obtained from Lebesgue’s Decomposition Theorem.

A Literature Review of Financial Contracting Theory from the Islamic and Conventional Overviews: Contributions, Gaps, and Perspectives

This paper discusses the financial contracting theory from the conventional and Islamic perspectives. It provides an overview of the contributions in this field and discusses the gaps in the literature. In addition, it proposes two relevant approaches namely the financial contracting enforceability approach and the adverse selection analysis in order to deal with conflicts of interest among economic agents. The first approach is meant to assess the contract that maximizes the value of the firm subject to the enforcement constraint for the agent and the participation constraint for the principal. The second approach considers an adverse selection framework in order to determine the principal’s subjective perception of the risk of default when equity and debt financings are used. Similarly, it suggests avenues for future research. Firstly, it calls for a deeper understanding of venture capital as a potential model of mushārakah. Secondly, it puts stress on the importance of examining crowd-funding functioning from the principal-agent point of view. Thirdly, it sheds some light on the necessity to yield financial explanation about the excessive use of murābaḥah instead of ijārah. In a nutshell, we assume that the alternative approaches can be adopted to provide relevant insights regarding the proposed future researches.

Motivation, Human Capital Investment and Compensation in an Agency Problem

This paper considers a firm's optimal investment in training and motivation measures in a hidden action agency problem. We study how these strategies interact with each other and the contract in order to create value for the firm. Productivity enhancing training can be firm specific or non-firm specific and firm specific motivation can enhance utility or reduce effort cost. Whether these measures are complements or independents depends on the firm specificity of human capital and whether the participation constraint is binding. We characterize how a tighter labor market affects marginal profitabilities and examine the relative benefits of motivation measures which enhance utility versus those which decrease effort cost.