Hedge Fund Manager Skill and Style-Shifting

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
George J. Jiang ◽  
Bing Liang ◽  
Huacheng Zhang

Using a novel style identification procedure, we show that style-shifting is a dynamic strategy commonly used by hedge fund managers. Three quarters of hedge funds shifted their investment styles at least once over the period from January 1994 to December 2013. We perform empirical tests of two hypotheses for the motivations of hedge fund style-shifting, namely backward-looking and forward-looking hypotheses. We find no evidence that style-shifting funds are backward-looking. Instead, we show evidence that managers of style-shifting funds exhibit both style-timing ability and the skill of generating abnormal returns in new styles. The new styles that hedge funds shift to on average outperform their old styles by 0.76% and style-shifting funds on average outperform their new style benchmark by 1.10% over the subsequent 12-month horizon. Finally, we show that small funds, winner funds, and funds with net inflows are more likely to shift styles. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance.

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (6) ◽  
pp. 1991-2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Smith ◽  
Na Wang ◽  
Ying Wang ◽  
Edward J. Zychowicz

This article presents a unique test of the effectiveness of technical analysis in different sentiment environments by focusing on its usage by perhaps the most sophisticated and astute investors, namely, hedge fund managers. We document that during high-sentiment periods, hedge funds using technical analysis exhibit higher performance, lower risk, and superior market-timing ability than nonusers. The advantages of using technical analysis disappear or even reverse in low-sentiment periods. Our findings are consistent with the view that technical analysis is relatively more useful in high-sentiment periods with larger mispricing, which cannot be fully exploited by arbitrage activities because of short-sale impediments.


Author(s):  
Bart Osinga ◽  
Marc Schauten ◽  
Remco C. J. Zwinkels

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Cassar ◽  
Joseph Gerakos

ABSTRACT: We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees. We find that internal controls are stronger in funds with higher potential agency costs. Further, internal controls are stronger in funds domiciled in jurisdictions that provide investors with limited legal redress for fraud and financial misstatements. Short selling funds, however, are more likely to protect information about their investment positions by implementing weaker internal controls. With respect to fees, we find that the percentage of positive profits that the manager receives increases in the strength of the fund’s internal controls. Finally, removing the manager from setting and reporting the fund’s official net asset value, along with reputational incentives and monitoring by leverage providers, are all associated with lower likelihoods of future regulatory investigations of fraud and/or financial misstatement.


2008 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Majed R. Muhtaseb ◽  
Chun Chun “Sylvia” Yang

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is two fold: educate investors about hedge fund managers' activities prior to the fraud recognition by the authorities and to help investors and other stakeholders in the hedge fund industry identify red flags before fraud is actually committed.Design/methodology/approachThe paper investigates fraud committed by the Bayou Funds, Beacon Hill Asset Management, Lancer Management Group (LMG), Lipper & Company and Maricopa investment fund. The fraud activities took place during 2000 and 2005.FindingsThe five cases alone cost the hedge fund investors more than $1.5 billion. Investors may have had a good opportunity for avoiding the irrecoverable costs of the fraud had they carefully vetted the backgrounds of the hedge fund managers and/or continuously monitored the funds activities, especially during turbulent market environments.Originality/valueThis is the first research paper to identify and extensively investigate fraud committed by hedge funds. In spite of the size of the hedge fund industry and relatively substantial level and inevitably recurring fraud, academic journals are to yet address this issue. The paper is of great value to hedge funds and their individual and institutional investors, asset managers, financial advisers and regulators.


2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 5505-5531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Grinblatt ◽  
Gergana Jostova ◽  
Lubomir Petrasek ◽  
Alexander Philipov

Classifying mandatory 13F stockholding filings by manager type reveals that hedge fund strategies are mostly contrarian, and mutual fund strategies are largely trend following. The only institutional performers—the two thirds of hedge fund managers that are contrarian—earn alpha of 2.4% per year. Contrarian hedge fund managers tend to trade profitably with all other manager types, especially when purchasing stocks from momentum-oriented hedge and mutual fund managers. Superior contrarian hedge fund performance exhibits persistence and stems from stock-picking ability rather than liquidity provision. Aggregate short sales further support these conclusions about the style and skill of various fund manager types. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-439
Author(s):  
Sandip Dutta ◽  
James Thorson

Purpose Extant literature suggests that the difficulty associated with the interpretation of macroeconomic news announcements by the market in general in different economic environments, might be the reason why most studies do not find any significant relationship between real-sector macroeconomic variables and financial asset returns. This paper aims to use a different approach to measure macroeconomic news. The objective is to examine if a different measure of a macroeconomic news variable, constructed from media coverage of the same, significantly affects hedge fund returns. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a news index for unemployment, which is a real-sector variable, constructed from newspaper coverage of unemployment announcements and examine its impact on hedge fund returns. Findings Contrary to the other studies that examine the impact of macroeconomic news on hedge fund returns, the authors find that media coverage of unemployment news announcements significantly affects hedge fund returns. Practical implications Overall, this paper demonstrates that the manner in which the market interprets macroeconomic news announcements in different economic environments is probably a more relevant factor for hedge funds and is more likely to impact hedge fund returns. In conjunction with variables – constructed from media coverage of unemployment news announcements – that factor in the manner of interpretation, it is found that surprises also matter for hedge fund returns. This is an important consideration for hedge fund managers as well. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines the impact of media coverage of macroeconomic news announcements on hedge fund returns and finds significantly different results with real-sector macro variables.


2011 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 525
Author(s):  
Gustavo Passarelli Giroud Joaquim ◽  
Marcelo Leite Moura

This study investigates the performance and persistence of the Brazilian hedge fund market using daily data from September 2007 to February 2011, a period marked by what was characterized by many as the world’s worst financial crisis since the great depression of the 1930s. Despite the financial turmoil, the results indicate the existence of a representative group of funds with abnormal returns and evidence of a joint persistence of funds with time frames of one to three months. Individual evaluations of the funds, however, indicate a reduced number of persistent funds.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 214
Author(s):  
Jun-Hao Li ◽  
Chun-Fan You

This paper examines Chinese mutual fund managers’ market, volatility, and liquidity abilities. Using a daily frequency sample of Chinese open-end equity funds from 2015 to 2019, we find evidence that mutual fund managers can time the market. Among the funds with different investment styles, the active funds have better market and liquidity timing ability, whereas the steady funds have better volatility timing ability. In different investment periods, there are more funds with timing ability in the fall period than in the rise period. We find the same results in the market (T-M), volatility, and liquidity timing models. It is especially for the active funds, nearly half of which have liquidity timing ability in the fall period. Among the funds with stock selection ability, the funds with market timing ability can outperform than the funds with other timing ability.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-77
Author(s):  
Majed R. Muhtaseb

Purpose The loss of an amount in excess of $100m cash deposit can be disruptive to the operations, definitely the liquidity of the hedge fund. Should a hedge fund liquidity position deteriorate, its compromised solvency could impact its vendors, most notably creditors and prime brokers. Large successful hedge funds do make basic mistakes. Lawyer Marc Dreier committed the criminal act of selling fraudulent promissory notes to hedge funds and others. Mr Drier’s success in selling fraudulent promissory notes was facilitated by his accomplices who posed as fake representatives of legitimate institutions. Drier and team presented bogus “audited financial statements” and forged developer’s signatures, and even went as far as using the unsuspecting institutions’ premises for meetings to meet potential notes buyers to further falsely legitimize the scheme. He had the notes buyers send their payments to his law firm account, to secure the money. His actions cost his victims, who include 13 hedge fund managers, other investors and entities, $400m in addition to his law firm’s employees who also suffered when his law firm was dissolved. For his actions, he was sentenced 20 years in federal prison for investment fraud. This study aims to direct hedge fund investors and other stakeholders to thoroughly vet the compliance function, especially controls on cash disbursements, even if the hedge fund is sizable (in excess of $1bn). Investors and even other stakeholders also should place a greater focus on what is usually overlooked issue; most notably the credit quality and authenticity of short-term investments bought by their hedge funds. Design/methodology/approach A thorough investigation of a fraud committed by a lawyer against a number of hedge funds. Several important lessons are identified to professionals who conduct due diligence on hedge funds. Findings The details of the case are very remarkable. This case directs investors’ attention to place greater efforts on certain aspects of operational risk and due diligence on not only hedge funds but also other investment managers. Normally investors conduct operational due diligence on the fund and its operations. Investors also vet fund external parties such as prime brokers, custodians, accountants and fund administrators. Yet, investors normally do not suspect the quality of short-term fund investments. In this case, the short-terms investments were the source of unforeseen yet substantial risk. Research limitations/implications Stakeholders in hedge funds need to carefully investigate the issuer of and the quality of short-term investments that a hedge fund invests in. Future research can investigate the association of hedge fund manager failure with a liquidity position of the fund. Practical implications Investors must thoroughly the entirety of the fund including short-term securities. Originality/value Normally, it is the hedge funds that commit the fraud against investors. In this case, it is the multi-billion hedge funds run by sophisticated fund managers, who are the victims.


2021 ◽  
pp. 190-214
Author(s):  
Neil M. Kellard

This chapter examines whether hedge funds herd, how this herding occurs, and any potential market wide effects. Bringing together the mainstream finance literature and that from a more management and sociological perspective, it is shown that hedge funds herd, although there is some evidence this is less than other large institutional investors. Mechanistically, such consensus trades occur because hedge firms communicate within tight knit clusters of trusted and smart managers, who share and analyze trading positions together. This industry structure is a function of the hyper decision-making environment faced by hedge fund managers, coupled with a desire for legitimization and to maintain reputation. Finally, note that hedge fund herding can have market wide effects either directly via network risk and indirectly, as follower institutional investors amplify hedge fund trading patterns.


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