Centralized or Decentralized Transfer Prices: A Behavioral Approach for Improving Supply Chain Coordination

Author(s):  
Elena Katok ◽  
Sebastián Villa

Problem definition: We study supply chain coordination in a setting with transshipment. We use centralized and decentralized transfer prices as a way to increase supply chain coordination. Academic/practical relevance: The ability to transship can improve channel efficiency by improving the match between supply and demand. We study how human decision makers behave in this setting and provide clear insights to improve coordination. Methodology: We use controlled laboratory experiments with financially incentivized human subjects. We study a broad set of critical ratios under both decentralized and centralized transfer-price settings. In the decentralized transfer-price setting, retailers negotiate a transfer price. In the centralized transfer-price setting, we use two different approaches: theoretical and behavioral transfer price. Both approaches suggest opposite recommendations. Results: Analytically, the optimal transfer price should depend on the critical ratio; but results from the decentralized setting show that participants set prices as if they ignore the critical ratio and instead focus on splitting potential profit from transshipped units in half. However, there is a positive relationship between transfer prices and ordering decisions. Moreover, generalizing the pull-to-center effect, we find that subjects do not place orders that coordinate the supply chain. For the centralized setting, we find that using the theoretical approach does not coordinate ordering decisions and does not improve decisions compared with the decentralized setting. The behavioral approach suggests a transfer price close to product selling price for a high critical ratio and a transfer price below product cost for a low critical ratio. These recommendations lead to coordinating ordering decisions. Managerial implications: We draw two practical conclusions from our research. First, transshipments are unambiguously beneficial, resulting in higher profitability, and, when feasible, should be encouraged. Second, when possible, transfer prices should be set centrally but taking into account subjects’ behavior. Otherwise, price negotiation might lead to better performance.

Author(s):  
Ju Myung Song ◽  
Yao Zhao

Problem definition: We study the coordination of an E-commerce supply chain between online sellers and third party shippers to meet random demand surges, induced by, for instance, online shopping holidays. Academic/practical relevance: Motivated by the challenge of meeting the unpredictable demand surges in E-commerce, we study shipping contracts and supply chain coordination between online sellers and third party shippers in a novel model taking into account the unique features of the shipping industry. Methodology: We compare two shipping contracts: the risk penalty (proposed by UPS) and the flat rate (used by FedEx), and analyze their impact on the seller, the shipper, and the supply chain. Results: Under information symmetry, the sophisticated risk penalty contract is no better than the simple flat rate contract for the shipper, against common belief. Although both the risk penalty and the flat rate can coordinate the supply chain, the risk penalty does so only if the shipper makes zero profit, but the flat rate can provide a positive profit for both. These results represent a new form of double marginalization and risk-sharing, in sharp contrast to the well-known literature on the classic supplier-retailer supply chain, where risk-sharing contracts (similar to the risk penalty) can bring benefits to all parties, but the single wholesale price contract (similar to the flat rate) can achieve supply chain coordination only when the supplier makes zero profit. We also find that only the online seller, but not the shipper, has the motivation to vertically integrate the seller-shipper supply chain. Under information asymmetry, however, the risk penalty brings more benefit to the shipper than the flat rate, but hurts the seller and the supply chain. Managerial implications: Our results imply that information plays an important role in the shipper’s choices of shipping contracts. Under information symmetry, the risk penalty is unnecessarily complex because the simple flat rate is as good as the risk penalty for the shipper; moreover, it is better for the seller-shipper coordination. However, under information asymmetry, the shipper faces additional shipping risk that can be offset by the extra flexibility of the risk penalty. Our study also explains and supports the recent practice of online sellers (e.g., Amazon.com and JD.com), but not shippers, to vertically integrate the supply chain by consistently expanding their shipping capabilities.


Author(s):  
Yimin Wang ◽  
Scott Webster

Problem definition: With heightened global uncertainty, supply chain managers are under increasing pressure to craft strategies that accommodate both supply and demand risks. Although product flexibility is a well-understood strategy to accommodate risk, there is no clear guidance on the optimal flexibility configuration of a supply network that comprises both unreliable primary suppliers and reliable backup suppliers. Academic/practical relevance: Existing literature examines the value of flexibility with primary and backup suppliers independently. For a risk-neutral firm, research shows that (a) incorporating flexibility in a primary supplier by replacing two dedicated ones (in absence of backup supply) is always beneficial and that (b) adding flexibility to a reliable backup supplier (in absence of product flexibility in primary suppliers) is always valuable. It is unclear, however, how flexibility should be incorporated into a supply network with both unreliable primary suppliers and reliable backup suppliers. This research studies whether flexibility should be incorporated in a primary supplier, a backup supplier, or both. Methodology: We develop a normative model to analyze when flexibility benefits and when it hurts. Results: Compared with a base case of no flexibility, we prove that incorporating flexibility in either primary or backup suppliers is always beneficial. However, incorporating flexibility in both primary and backup suppliers can be counterproductive because the supply chain performance can decline with saturated flexibility, even if flexibility is costless. A key reason is that the risk-aggregation effect of consolidating flexibility in an unreliable supplier becomes more salient when flexibility is already embedded in a backup supplier. Managerial implications: This research refines the existing understanding of flexibility by illustrating that flexibility is not always beneficial. When there is a choice, a firm should prioritize incorporating flexibility in a reliable backup supplier.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Novi Swandari Budiarso ◽  
Winston Pontoh

Determination of transfer prices and selling prices is not only a matter of large companies. This problem can occur in a type of Small and medium enterprise. But sometimes managers from small and medium businesses do not realize that in their business there is a transfer price transaction that can affect the selling price of the product to external consumers and subsequently affect operating profit. In order to overcome this problem, you can use the transfer pricing method and selling price so that you get the right transfer price and selling price for a business. The results of the transfer price calculation using the cost method and the selling price using the full cost method, the results of the transfer of semi-finished products from the preparation business unit are Rp. 4,900 / unit, while the selling price of the settlement division to external consumers is Rp. 11,020 / unit .Keywords : transfer price, selling price, cost based transfer price, market based transfer price, negotiated transfer price.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (01) ◽  
Author(s):  
Novi Swandari Budiarso ◽  
Winston Pontoh

Determination of transfer prices and selling prices is not only a matter of large companies. This problem can occur in a type of Small and medium enterprise. But sometimes managers from small and medium businesses do not realize that in their business there is a transfer price transaction that can affect the selling price of the product to external consumers and subsequently affect operating profit. In order to overcome this problem, you can use the transfer pricing method and selling price so that you get the right transfer price and selling price for a business. The results of the transfer price calculation using the cost method and the selling price using the full cost method, the results of the transfer of semi-finished products from the preparation business unit are Rp. 4,900 / unit, while the selling price of the settlement division to external consumers is Rp. 11,020 / unit .Keywords : transfer price, selling price, cost based transfer price, market based transfer price, negotiated transfer price.


Author(s):  
Mehdi H. Farahani ◽  
Milind Dawande ◽  
Haresh Gurnani ◽  
Ganesh Janakiraman

Problem definition: We analyze a contract in which a supplier who is exposed to disruption risk offers a supply-flexibility contract comprising of a wholesale price and a minimum-delivery fraction (“flexibility” fraction) to a buyer facing random demand. The supplier is allowed to deviate below the order quantity by at most the flexibility fraction. The supplier’s regular production is subject to random disruption, but she has access to a reliable expedited supply source at a higher marginal cost. Academic/practical relevance: Despite the prevalence of supply-flexibility contracts in practice, to the best of our knowledge, there is no previous academic literature examining the optimal design of supply-flexibility contracts. As such, the level of flexibility in practice is usually set on an ad-hoc basis, with buyers typically reluctant to share risk with suppliers. Our analysis of supply-flexibility contracts informs practice in two ways: First, using analytically supported arguments, it educates managers on the effects of their decisions on the economic outcomes. Second, it shows that the supply-flexibility contract benefits both the supplier and the buyer, regardless of which player chooses how supply risk is allocated in the supply chain. Methodology: Non-cooperative game theory, non-convex optimization. Results: We derive the supplier-led optimal contract and show that supply chain efficiency improves relative to the price-only contract. More interestingly, even though the buyer lets the supplier decide how the two share supply risk, profits of both the players increase by the introduction of flexibility into the contract. Further, supply flexibility may be even more valuable for the buyer compared with the supplier. Interestingly, the flexibility fraction is not monotone in supplier reliability and a more reliable supplier may even prefer to transfer more risk to the buyer. The robustness of these findings is established on two extensions: one where we study a buyer-led contract (i.e., the buyer chooses the flexibility fraction) and the other where the expedited supply option is available to both the supplier and the buyer. Managerial implications: The supply-flexibility contract is mutually beneficial for both players and yet retains all the advantages of the price-only contract—it is easy to implement, it requires minimal operational and administrative burden, and there is evidence of the use of such contracts in practice. While our focus is not on supply chain coordination, we note that the combination of two mechanisms—the supply-flexibility contract derived in this paper to share supply risk and a buyback contract to share demand risk—yields a coordinating contract.


2021 ◽  
Vol 306 ◽  
pp. 02005
Author(s):  
Pria Sembada ◽  
Arief Daryanto ◽  
Silvia Dewi Sagita Andik

The poultry sector in Indonesia faces complex challenges in the time of the Covid 19 pandemic. This pandemic disrupted the supply chain of broiler chickens. This study aims to identify impacts of Covid-19 on the broiler chicken supply chain. Data were collected using in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with actors in the broiler chicken business, breeders’ associations, academics, experts, and the government. Also, secondary data was collected, including production data, demand data, and balance data. The data were analysed using the rich picture approach, supply chain analysis, and descriptive analysis. The results showed that accessibility and supply of production factors were hampered due to activity limitation policies and production control policies resulting in decreased production. Disruption in the distribution process also affects supply and demand. The decrease in demand for broiler chickens is very high. These factors might affect the fluctuation in the price of production factors and the selling price of the live birds at the farmer level. Issues due to a pandemic must be appropriately addressed and thoroughly as a mitigation effort in facing crises in the future. The right strategies need to be carried out comprehensively from the upstream, supply chain, and downstream levels. For instance, the partnership with the processing industries (or integrator), investments in the cold chain, and promotion would play an important role.


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