We consider the problem of sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in non-cooperative undirected networks where a set of receivers R wants to be connected to a common source s. The set of choices available to each receiver r ∈ R is represented by the set of all (s, r)-paths in the network. Given the choices performed by all the receivers, a public known cost sharing method determines the cost share to be charged to each of them. Receivers are selfish agents aiming to obtain the transmission at the minimum cost share and their interactions create a non-cooperative game. Devising cost sharing methods yielding games whose price of anarchy (price of stability), defined as the worst-case (best-case) ratio between the cost of a Nash equilibrium and that of an optimal solution, is not too high is thus of fundamental importance in non-cooperative network design. Moreover, since cost sharing games naturally arise in socio-economical contests, it is convenient for a cost sharing method to meet some constraining properties. In this paper, we first define several such properties and analyze their impact on the prices of anarchy and stability. We also reconsider all the methods known so far by classifying them according to which properties they satisfy and giving the first non-trivial lower bounds on their price of stability. Finally, we propose a new method, namely the free-riders method, which admits a polynomial time algorithm for computing a pure Nash equilibrium whose cost is at most twice the optimal one. Some of the ideas characterizing our approach have been independently proposed in Ref. 10.
The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games
