Coercive Engagement: Lessons from US Policy towards China

In 1996 the U.S. convinced China to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), even though this treaty materially disadvantaged China’s nuclear weapons program. Why did U.S. engagement initiatives—without invoking coercive material measures and offering side payments—succeeded in prodding Beijing to do something that caused damage to its relative power position? This chapter argues that the normative mechanism through which engagement influences Beijing is not socialization. Rather, it argues that engagement works through a realist-constructivist mechanism that several scholars call “rhetorical coercion” or “rhetorical entrapment.” By appealing to the commitments to which Beijing has agreed in public, America and its allies locked Chinese leaders in their own words, leaving them unable to continue with policies contrary to the “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development” discourses they have proposed before international audiences. The case illustrates a realist-constructivism by showing what may be called coercive engagement.