A study on the development and implications of low-yield nuclear weapons, focusing on deterrence theory

This study aims to examine the development status and technical characteristics of low-yield nuclear weapons initiated by the Trump administration, predict the development trend in the Biden administration, analyze strategic implications that have affected the R.O.K.-U.S. Tailored Deterrence Strategy, and seek future countermeasures. Regarding deterrence theory, low-power nuclear weapons are evaluated as a means of simultaneously expanding deterrence by denial and by retaliation. Additionally, low-yield nuclear weapons can be evaluated as having the capability, communication of nuclear retaliation wills and possibilities, and credibility for these wills and capabilities, which are 3C elements of deterrence in that they are “possible-use nuclear weapons.” Hence, they can be evaluated as highly-applicable deterrence means. As North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities have advanced and the U.S. is developing and deploying low-yield nuclear weapons, this article intends to make several suggestions regarding deterrence and response. First, because North Korea's policy to strengthen its tactical nuclear capabilities in 2021 is inevitably closely related to the technical characteristics of the development of low-yield nuclear weapons, it should be evaluated and prepared in connection with this. Second, it is necessary to understand the Biden administration's nuclear strategy regarding the extended deterrence strategy of the U.S. and discuss it closely based on the 5th NPR unveiled in early 2022. Third, to ensure the credibility of the R.O.K.-U.S. tailored deterrence strategy, “multilateral deterrence measures” must be considered at the regional level, including low-yield nuclear weapons.

Examining the impact of both legal and nonlegal factors on following a vehicle too closely utilizing three deterrence-based theories

Following a vehicle too closely (otherwise known as tailgating) is a high-risk behavior and major contributor to motor-vehicle collisions and injuries. Both legal and nonlegal countermeasures are currently in place in an attempt to prevent this behavior, yet there has been limited research that has examined the effectiveness of both legal and nonlegal factors on engagement in the behavior. Therefore, this research utilized a combination of the three most salient deterrence-based theories used in road safety to understand the impact of both legal and nonlegal sanctions on following a vehicle too closely. A survey was completed by 887 Queensland drivers aged 17–84 years ( Mage = 49 years; 55% males). Variables from Classical Deterrence Theory, the reconceptualized deterrence theory and the extended deterrence-based model (that includes perceived internal loss, physical loss, and social sanctions), as well as measures of following a vehicle too closely were used. The majority of the sample (98%) reported following a vehicle too closely at some point, with the average frequency ranging from rarely to sometimes. Significant predictors of more frequent unsafe following distances included: being male, younger in age, and avoiding punishment for the behavior. Meanwhile, significant predictors of less frequent unsafe following distances included knowing others who have been punished for the behavior, as well as fearing the physical and internal losses resulting from unsafe following distances. Notably, the severity of the punishment was also a significant deterrent, while the perceived certainty of being apprehended for the offence was low and did not impact engagement in behavior. These results have a number of important implications on how to maximize both legal and nonlegal countermeasures to further prevent following a vehicle too closely.

US POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE THEORY OF EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

The US policy towards North Korea is shaped by the nuclear non-proliferation policy and security guarantees provided to Japan and the Republic of Korea. These guarantees have a dual purpose. On the one hand, they are a tool to deter the DPRK from aggression against other countries in the region and, above all, US allies – Japan and South Korea. On the other hand, these guarantees are also an assurance of the latter's abandonment of the policy of acquiring a nuclear arsenal. The aim of the article is to analyze the foundations of Washington's policy towards Pyongyang and its influence on relations with allies through the prism of the theory of extended nuclear deterrence. It is stated that the effectiveness of deterrence consists of the conviction of the willingness to react with an adequate response. At the same time, the persuasiveness of extended deterrence is lower, as the protecting state must respond to threats from the ally that is to say outside its own national borders. There is controversy among scholars who reflect on the relevance of extended deterrence during the Cold War and in the modern security environment. It is noted that the emergence of new threats and an increasing number of conflicts, if any, change the nature of extended deterrence, but this does not diminish the importance of the "nuclear umbrella" of the United States for both the NPT and the security of the region. The author analyzes the reasons for the United States' security guarantees for South Korea and Japan. Particular attention is paid to the factor of North Korea's aggressive policy and its progress in the development of the nuclear missile program. With the reduction and withdrawal of US troops from Japan and South Korea, Pyongyang's destructive policies have exacerbated the American allies' sense of danger and provoked talks about developing their own nuclear programs. This scenario threatened the NPT regime and international stability, as well as US strategic interests in the region. Therefore, Washington is stepping up cooperation with its allies in the process of resolving the problem of North Korea's nuclear missile program and is officially reaffirming its unwavering security and defense commitments, which should restore trust between the parties and increase the role of extended deterrence in general.

Deterrence theory and strategy in the international system from the Cold War to the multipolar era. Towards a new strategy of ‘extended deterrence’ in Greek-Turkish relations

Deterrence is the key concept for understanding the strategy and diplomacy of the age (Kenny, 1985). Its various versions — or better yet — its main manifestations appear during the Cold War period (Brodie, Wolfers, Viner, at A. Lupovici, 2010), initially through competition, especially in the field of scientific discoveries and then in the balance between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. This article, using a historical and conceptual perspective, analyses the philosophy and dynamic of the deterrence theory, both in the conventional and especially in its Cold War and the multipolar era dimension. This article revisits the concept of deterrence and defends a more plausible deterrence theory — the ‘extended deterrence’ conception. Drawing on insights from the IR theory and security studies, we are going to use Greek-Turkish relations as a case study of this approach. This approach supports an implementation of the extended deterrence by the enrichment of the NATO’s article 5. The findings of this study can help members of the academic community familiarize themselves with this new concept of deterrence. Keywords: deterrence, strategic theory, doctrine, IR theory, nuclear weapons.