The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea: Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence

2017 ◽  
Vol 132 (4) ◽  
pp. 651-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terence Roehrig
2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 113-131
Author(s):  
Sungjoon Moon

This study aims to examine the development status and technical characteristics of low-yield nuclear weapons initiated by the Trump administration, predict the development trend in the Biden administration, analyze strategic implications that have affected the R.O.K.-U.S. Tailored Deterrence Strategy, and seek future countermeasures. Regarding deterrence theory, low-power nuclear weapons are evaluated as a means of simultaneously expanding deterrence by denial and by retaliation. Additionally, low-yield nuclear weapons can be evaluated as having the capability, communication of nuclear retaliation wills and possibilities, and credibility for these wills and capabilities, which are 3C elements of deterrence in that they are “possible-use nuclear weapons.” Hence, they can be evaluated as highly-applicable deterrence means. As North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities have advanced and the U.S. is developing and deploying low-yield nuclear weapons, this article intends to make several suggestions regarding deterrence and response. First, because North Korea's policy to strengthen its tactical nuclear capabilities in 2021 is inevitably closely related to the technical characteristics of the development of low-yield nuclear weapons, it should be evaluated and prepared in connection with this. Second, it is necessary to understand the Biden administration's nuclear strategy regarding the extended deterrence strategy of the U.S. and discuss it closely based on the 5th NPR unveiled in early 2022. Third, to ensure the credibility of the R.O.K.-U.S. tailored deterrence strategy, “multilateral deterrence measures” must be considered at the regional level, including low-yield nuclear weapons.


Author(s):  
Misa Kayama ◽  
Wendy Haight ◽  
May-Lee Ku ◽  
Minhae Cho ◽  
Hee Yun Lee

Stigmatization is part of the everyday lives of children with disabilities, their families, and their friends. Negative social encounters, even with perfect strangers, can dampen joyful occasions, add stress to challenging situations, and lead to social isolation. This book describes a program of research spanning a decade that seeks to understand disabilities in their developmental and cultural contexts. The authors are especially interested in understanding adults’ socialization practices that promise to reduce stigmatization in the next generation. Guided by developmental cultural psychology, including the concept of “universalism without uniformity,” the authors focus on the understandings and responses to disability and associated stigmatization of elementary-school educators practicing in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the U.S. Educators from all four cultural groups expressed strikingly similar concerns about the impact of stigmatization on the emerging cultural self, both of children with disabilities and their typically developing peers. Educators also described culturally nuanced socialization goals and practices pertaining to inclusive education. In Japan, for instance, educators emphasized the importance of peer group belonging and strategies to support the participation of children with disabilities. In the U.S., educators placed relatively more emphasis on individual development and discussed strategies for the equitable treatment of children with disabilities. Educators in South Korea and Taiwan emphasized the cultivation of compassion in typically developing children. The understanding gained through examination of how diverse individuals address common challenges using cultural resources available in their everyday lives provides important lessons for strengthening theory, policy, and programs.


Asian Survey ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-110
Author(s):  
Gi-Wook Shin ◽  
Rennie J. Moon

President Park faced a leadership crisis after revelations that she relied on a confidant with no official position for key decision-making in state affairs. Heavy industry met with serious financial difficulties, and a strong anti-corruption law was enacted. North Korea tested more nuclear weapons and missiles. Controversy over the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense strained South Korea’s relations with China.


Author(s):  
Sungho Cho ◽  
NaRi Shin ◽  
Dae Hee Kwak ◽  
Amy Chan Hyung Kim ◽  
Won Seok Jang ◽  
...  

2017 ◽  
Vol 73 (6) ◽  
pp. 349-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans M. Kristensen ◽  
Robert S. Norris

1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 33-40
Author(s):  
Robert Jervis

A rational strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons is a contradiction in terms. The enormity of the destruction, either executed or threatened, severs the nexus of proportionality between means and ends which used to characterize the threat and use of force. This does not mean, however, that all nuclear strategies are equally irrational. The nuclear policy of the Reagan administration—which is essentially the same as that of the Carter administration and which has its roots in developments initiated by even earlier administrations—is particularly ill-formed. As I will demonstrate, the basic reason for this is that the strategy rests on a profound underestimation of the impact of nuclear weapons on military strategy and attempts to understand the current situation with intellectual tools appropriate only in the pre-nuclear era.American strategy for the past several years—the “countervailing strategy”—has been based on the assumption that what is crucial is the ability of American and allied military forces to deny the Soviets military advantage from any aggression they might contemplate. The U.S. must be prepared to meet and block any level of Soviet force. The strategy is then one of counterforce—blocking and seeking to destroy Soviet military power. The goal is deterrence. Although it is concerned with how the U.S. would fight many different kinds of wars, both nuclear and non-nuclear, it is not correct to claim that the strategy seeks to engage in wars rather than deter them.


2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 12-22
Author(s):  
Sun Yuhong ◽  
Mu Yifei ◽  
Jun Yang

Abstract On 5 October 2015, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) led by the U.S. was signed. Already, 12 countries1 have joined the agreement, but China has not. Thus, lots of research has focused on the negative effect of the TPP on China’s foreign trade. On the other hand, China is moving forward in its own efforts to establish bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and free trade zones. In June 2015, China-South Korea and China-Australia signed bilateral FTAs which went into effect in December 2015. Several questions were raised: Since South Korea and Australia are the major trade partners in the Pacific area and the bilateral FTAs will be effective before the TPP, will these FTAs’ positive effects on China’s foreign trade offset some of the negative effects of the TPP? If China and the U.S. adopted a competitive trade policy, which countries would benefit? If China and the U.S. adopted a cooperative trade policy, how would the trade value and economic welfare change? This paper simulates and analyses the mutual effects of China-South Korea and China-Australia FTAs and the enlarging TPP using the computable general equilibrium model. The major conclusions drawn suggest that China-South Korea and China-Australia FTAs will significantly offset the TPP’s negative effect on China’s foreign trade. If China is not included, the U.S. economic benefit from the TPP will be limited. The economic welfare for a country like Australia, which joined both the bilateral FTA and the TPP, will be increased the most. In the long run, China joining the TPP would be the most beneficial decision for its national interest. However, if the TPP cannot be approved by the US congress, the U.S.’s economic indicators and export would be decreasing sharply. China’s economy and export will benefit from FTAs.


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