Moral Luck, Self-cultivation, and Responsibility: The Confucian Conception of Free Will and Determinism

2013 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyung-Sig Hwang
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Luck

scholarly journals No best world: creaturely freedom

2005 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRIAN LEFTOW
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Possible World ◽  
William Rowe ◽  
Libertarian Free Will ◽  
Do So

William Rowe and others argue that if this is a possible world than which there is a better, it follows that God does not exist. I now reject the key premise of Rowe's argument. I do so first within a Molinist framework. I then show that this framework is dispensable: really all one needs to block the better-world argument is the assumption that creatures have libertarian free will. I also foreclose what might seem a promising way around the ‘moral-luck’ counter I develop, and contend that it is in a way impossible to get around.

scholarly journals Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 224-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristin M. Mickelson
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Will Self

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Gerald Lang
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Pairwise Comparison ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Lack Of Control ◽  
Normative Issues ◽  
Constitutive Luck ◽  
Specific Challenge

The Introduction identifies the 1976 symposium between Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel as the key moment in the development of the contemporary wide-ranging debate on moral luck. Despite Nagel’s proposal to proceed with an account of luck that can straddle the gap between ethics and epistemology, it is argued that the sort of luck relevant to moral and political philosophy need not be identical with the sort of luck pressed into service by epistemologists. The ‘Lack of Control Account’ of luck will serve adequately for normative issues, even if it leaves theoretical philosophers dissatisfied. Nagel’s familiar taxonomy of types of moral luck is outlined: resultant luck, circumstantial luck, constitutive luck, and causal luck. The treatment of moral luck in this book prescinds from any detailed engagement with issues of free will and responsibility, and also issues of blameworthiness and responsibility. Different views can be taken about these various issues, but the specific challenge of moral luck will still await resolution. That challenge is fundamentally distributive in character, and is typically focused on the apparatus of the pairwise comparison. The anti-luckist programme in normative ethics objects to different assignments of blameworthiness to agents whose acts turn out differently due to luck. The problem here lies with that prior investment in the pairwise comparison. That contention will be pursued across the early chapters of the book.

When Mother Earth Rises Up

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 271-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simona Sacchi ◽  
Paolo Riva ◽  
Marco Brambilla
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Natural Disasters ◽  
Natural Disaster ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Disaster Victims ◽  
Willingness To Help ◽  
Mother Earth

Anthropomorphization is the tendency to ascribe humanlike features and mental states, such as free will and consciousness, to nonhuman beings or inanimate agents. Two studies investigated the consequences of the anthropomorphization of nature on people’s willingness to help victims of natural disasters. Study 1 (N = 96) showed that the humanization of nature correlated negatively with willingness to help natural disaster victims. Study 2 (N = 52) tested for causality, showing that the anthropomorphization of nature reduced participants’ intentions to help the victims. Overall, our findings suggest that humanizing nature undermines the tendency to support victims of natural disasters.

Free will and agency.

1994 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. A. Sappington
Keyword(s):  
Free Will

The Pity of Evil: Assumptions of Free Will and Responsibility in Psychology

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (47) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer E. Hettema
Keyword(s):  
Free Will

Freud and Free Will: Fact, Fantasy, and Philosophy

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Boag
Keyword(s):  
Free Will

What’s all the recent free-will ado about?

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno G. Breitmeyer
Keyword(s):  
Free Will

Do We Really Have the Concepts of Free Will and Responsibility?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takayuki Suzuki ◽  
Koji Tsuchiya ◽  
Makoto Suzuki
Keyword(s):  
Free Will

The brain minds whether we believ in free will

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Rigoni ◽  
M. Brass ◽  
B. Burle
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The Brain
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