scholarly journals Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 224-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristin M. Mickelson
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Will Self

Moral Luck, Self-cultivation, and Responsibility: The Confucian Conception of Free Will and Determinism

2013 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyung-Sig Hwang
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Luck

Emergence of free will and consciousness in humans: implications for doctor-patient interactions

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (1112) ◽  
pp. 354-356
Author(s):  
Philip D Welsby
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Personal Responsibility ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Voting Systems ◽  
Patient Interactions ◽  
Will Self ◽  
Human Brains ◽  
Correct Voting ◽  
The Brain

Human brains have about 100 billion neurons each with about 1000 dendritic connections with other neurons giving a total of 100 000 billion deterministic dendritic switches. Various voting systems that the brain may use can produce conflicting results from identical inputs without any indication as to which one or ones would be correct. Voting systems cannot deliver unequivocal results in any other than the simplest situations. It is hypothesised that these conflicting results provide an indeterminacy that underlies free will, self-awareness, awareness of others, consciousness and personal responsibility, all of which can influence doctor-patient interactions.

scholarly journals Libertad, autodeterminación e imputabilidad: El determinismo no necesitarista de Leibniz

2012 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Agustín Echavarría
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Present Article ◽  
Critical Evaluation ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Logical Possibility ◽  
The Will ◽  
Will Self

RESUMENEn el presente artículo se analiza la fundamentación leibniziana de la voluntad libre entendida como capacidad de autodeterminación, a partir de sus notas esenciales: espontaneidad, deliberación y contingencia. Al estar la voluntad determinada por la serie de percepciones que brotan de la naturaleza de la sustancia, el dominio de esta sobre sus propios actos es indirecto y diacrónico. Si bien Leibniz elude el necesitarismo mediante la atribución a la voluntad de la posibilidad lógica de obrar de forma que como obra, la imputabilidad moral de las acciones queda seriamente comprometida. El artículo concluye con una valoración crítica de la postura de Leibniz desde una perspectiva de la naturaleza de la voluntad como apertura trascendental al bien en cuanto tal.PALABRAS CLAVELIBERTAD, AUTODETERMINACIÓN, IMPUTABILIDAD, DETERMINISMO, LEIBNIZABSTRACTIn the present article we analyze Leibniz’s foundation of free will, understood as a potency of self-determination, examining it from its essential features: spontaneity, deliberation and contingency. Since will is determined by the series of perceptions which flow from the nature of substance, its dominion over its own acts is indirect and diachronic. Even if Leibniz avoids necessitarianism by attributing the logical possibility of doing otherwise to the will, the actions’ moral imputability is seriously compromised. The article concludes with a critical evaluation of Leibniz’s position, from a perspective in which the nature of will is considered as a transcendental openness towards good as such.KEY WORDSFREE WILL, SELF-DETERMINATION, IMPUTABILITY, DETERMINISM, LEIBNIZ

Learning Free Will, Self-Control, and Philosophy

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-36
Author(s):  
Peter B. Raabe
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Will Self

scholarly journals No best world: creaturely freedom

2005 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-285 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRIAN LEFTOW
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Possible World ◽  
William Rowe ◽  
Libertarian Free Will ◽  
Do So

William Rowe and others argue that if this is a possible world than which there is a better, it follows that God does not exist. I now reject the key premise of Rowe's argument. I do so first within a Molinist framework. I then show that this framework is dispensable: really all one needs to block the better-world argument is the assumption that creatures have libertarian free will. I also foreclose what might seem a promising way around the ‘moral-luck’ counter I develop, and contend that it is in a way impossible to get around.

Free Will, Self-Governance and Neuroscience: An Overview

Neuroethics ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 237-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alisa Carse ◽  
Hilary Bok ◽  
Debra JH Mathews
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Will Self

On the selection and balancing of multiple selfish goals

2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catalina Kopetz ◽  
Wilhelm Hofmann ◽  
Reinout W. H. J. Wiers
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Self Control ◽  
Multiple Goals ◽  
Goal Selection ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Goal Pursuits ◽  
Will Self ◽  
Control Failures

AbstractThe selfish goal metaphor is interesting and intriguing. It accounts for the idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies in peoples' goal pursuits without invoking free will, self-regulatory, or self-control failures. However, people pursue multiple goals, sometimes simultaneously. We argue that the model proposed in the target article may gain significant theoretical and practical value if the principles underlying goal selection and/or balancing on a moment-to-moment basis are clearly specified and integrated with the notion of the selfish goal.

Free will, self-causation, and strange loops

1990 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-73
Author(s):  
Michael Morden
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Will Self ◽  
Strange Loops

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Gerald Lang
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Pairwise Comparison ◽  
Normative Ethics ◽  
Bernard Williams ◽  
Lack Of Control ◽  
Normative Issues ◽  
Constitutive Luck ◽  
Specific Challenge

The Introduction identifies the 1976 symposium between Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel as the key moment in the development of the contemporary wide-ranging debate on moral luck. Despite Nagel’s proposal to proceed with an account of luck that can straddle the gap between ethics and epistemology, it is argued that the sort of luck relevant to moral and political philosophy need not be identical with the sort of luck pressed into service by epistemologists. The ‘Lack of Control Account’ of luck will serve adequately for normative issues, even if it leaves theoretical philosophers dissatisfied. Nagel’s familiar taxonomy of types of moral luck is outlined: resultant luck, circumstantial luck, constitutive luck, and causal luck. The treatment of moral luck in this book prescinds from any detailed engagement with issues of free will and responsibility, and also issues of blameworthiness and responsibility. Different views can be taken about these various issues, but the specific challenge of moral luck will still await resolution. That challenge is fundamentally distributive in character, and is typically focused on the apparatus of the pairwise comparison. The anti-luckist programme in normative ethics objects to different assignments of blameworthiness to agents whose acts turn out differently due to luck. The problem here lies with that prior investment in the pairwise comparison. That contention will be pursued across the early chapters of the book.

How Tolstoevskii Pleased Readers and Rewrote a Russian Myth

Slavic Review ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 538-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Brooks
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Nikolai Gogol ◽  
Cultural Transformations ◽  
Narrative Structures ◽  
Popular Novel ◽  
Will Self ◽  
Serial Novel

Jeffrey Brooks argues that Fedor Dostoevskii and Lev Tolstoi drew on and recast a particularly Russian mythology of doomed rebellion in order to explore issues of free will, self-fulfillment, and redemption. The literary giants employed narrative structures similar to popular formulas. They imagined their work and even their lives in terms of an opposition between freedom and order, echoing themes of Aleksandr Pushkin and Nikolai Gogol'. By linking Tolstoi and Dostoevskii to mythologies of banditry, Brooks illuminates the interaction between high and low cultures. He locates their work in the context of social and cultural transformations of the liberal postreform era, showing how readers' expectations changed in a fluid society. Readers increasingly wanted freedom to triumph over the myth's earlier doom, but censors remained vigilant. He shows how Tolstoi and Dostoevskii satisfied both censors and readers by framing tales of adventure and romance with moralistic beginnings and endings conforming to the format of the long serial novel. The formulaic sandwich that frustrated the censors was used with similar effect by N. I. Pastukhov, author of Russia's first modern popular novel, The Bandit Churkin, which was serialized in Moskovskii listok in the early 1880s. Brooks affirms the mastery of Tolstoi and Dostoevskii that transcends time and place, but shows the roots of their work in Russian preoccupations with freedom and order.

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