scholarly journals Wprowadzenie do współczesnego ekspresywizmu: Allan Gibbard i emotywistyczne inspiracje

Etyka ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrian Kuźniar
Keyword(s):  
Allan Gibbard

Artykuł poświęcony jest realizacji celu badawczego, na który składają się trzy zadania. Pierwszym z nich jest zarysowanie głównych cech ekspresywizmu metaetycznego, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem różnic i podobieństw zachodzących między tym typem teorii a tradycyjnym emotywizmem. Drugim zadaniem jest przedstawienie podstawowych twierdzeń najbardziej wyrafinowanej wersji współczesnego ekspresywizmu – koncepcji Allana Gibbarda – z uwzględnieniem miejsca uczuć moralnych w analizie sądów moralnych. Po trzecie w artykule omawia się podjęte przez Gibbarda zastosowanie podejścia ekspresywistycznego w metateorii znaczenia i jego metaetyczne konsekwencje, zwłaszcza w zakresie relacji między ekspresywizmem a antynaturalizmem.

Skookumchuck, Kiidk’yaas, Gibbard: normativity, meaning, and idealization (critical notice of Allan Gibbard Meaning and Normativity)

2014 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 148-161
Author(s):  
Adam Morton
Keyword(s):  
Review Article ◽  
Allan Gibbard ◽  
Horror Story ◽  
The Right ◽  
Critical Notice ◽  
The Way

Gibbard argues that ‘meaning is normative’. He explains the claim with an account of the normative which bases it on the process of planning, taken in part as issuing instructions to oneself. It seems to entail that the right kind of plans make norms. One ought to continue adding with plus rather than quus in a Kripkenstein horror story. I focus on Gibbard’s characterization of normativity: it is not what one might expect. The main purpose of this review article is to present the way of understanding normativity that makes most sense of what he says, and which makes some otherwise implausible assertions defensible and perhaps even true. I give reasons for thinking that Gibbard’s understanding of normativity-through-plans cannot do the work he wants it to. I also argue that he is onto something right, and it opens interesting new questions.

AN INTRODUCTION TO ALLAN GIBBARD’S HARVARD SEMINAR PAPER

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Weymark
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Amartya Sen ◽  
Graduate Seminar ◽  
Allan Gibbard ◽  
Kenneth Arrow

This note provides an introduction to the accompanying article by Allan Gibbard that was originally written for the 1968–69 Harvard graduate seminar conducted by Kenneth Arrow, John Rawls and Amartya Sen.

The Normativity of Meaning

2002 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 57-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Millar
Keyword(s):  
Rule Following ◽  
Allan Gibbard ◽  
Normativity Of Meaning ◽  
Answering Questions

In a discussion of rule-following inspired by Wittgenstein, Kripke asks us to consider the relation which holds between meaning plus by ‘+’ and answering questions like, ‘What is the sum of 68 and 57?’. A dispositional theory has it that if you mean plus by ‘+’ then you will probably answer, ‘125’. That is because, according to such a theory, to mean plus by ‘+’ is, roughly speaking, to be disposed, by and large, and among other things, to answer such questions with the correct sum. Kripke wants to emphasize, by contrast, that if you mean plus by ‘+’ then, faced with the question, ‘What is 68 + 57?’ you ought to answer, ‘125’. One could sum up the assumption about meaning which appears to underpin this criticism of dispositional theories in terms of the slogan that meaning is normative. Allan Gibbard gives us a way of reading that slogan which is suggested by Kripke's brief remarks:The crux of the slogan that meaning is normative … might be another slogan: that means implies ought. To use roughly Kripke's example, from statements saying what I mean by the plus sign and other arithmetic terms and constructions, it will follow that I ought to answer ‘7’ when asked ‘What's 5 + 2?’.

On Gibbard’s Defence of the Dispositional Theory of Meaning

Dialogue ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 513-525
Author(s):  
ALI SABOOHI
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Meaning ◽  
Allan Gibbard

According to the dispositional theory of meaning and content, what a speaker means by an expression is determined by her dispositions to use it. The literature contains two well-known objections against this theory: the problem of finitude and the problem of error. In his bookMeaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard propounds a novel defence against these objections. In this paper, I argue that Gibbard’s suggestions fail to save the dispositional theory. Moreover, I argue that Gibbard’s deflationary view about facts prevents him from saying anything about the property of meaning that would hold any interest for a naturalist.

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