Wprowadzenie do współczesnego ekspresywizmu: Allan Gibbard i emotywistyczne inspiracje

Artykuł poświęcony jest realizacji celu badawczego, na który składają się trzy zadania. Pierwszym z nich jest zarysowanie głównych cech ekspresywizmu metaetycznego, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem różnic i podobieństw zachodzących między tym typem teorii a tradycyjnym emotywizmem. Drugim zadaniem jest przedstawienie podstawowych twierdzeń najbardziej wyrafinowanej wersji współczesnego ekspresywizmu – koncepcji Allana Gibbarda – z uwzględnieniem miejsca uczuć moralnych w analizie sądów moralnych. Po trzecie w artykule omawia się podjęte przez Gibbarda zastosowanie podejścia ekspresywistycznego w metateorii znaczenia i jego metaetyczne konsekwencje, zwłaszcza w zakresie relacji między ekspresywizmem a antynaturalizmem.

Indeterminacy as Indecision, Lecture III: Indeterminacy as Indecision

This lecture presents my own solution to the problem posed in Lecture I. Instead of a new theory of speech acts, it offers a new theory of the contents expressed by vague assertions, along the lines of the plan expressivism Allan Gibbard has advocated for normative language. On this view, the mental states we express in uttering vague sentences have a dual direction of fit: they jointly constrain the doxastic possibilities we recognize and our practical plans about how to draw boundaries. With this story in hand, I reconsider some of the traditional topics connected with vagueness: bivalence, the sorites paradox, higher-order vagueness, and the nature of vague thought. I conclude by arguing that the expressivist account can explain, as its rivals cannot, what makes vague language useful.

On Gibbard’s Defence of the Dispositional Theory of Meaning

According to the dispositional theory of meaning and content, what a speaker means by an expression is determined by her dispositions to use it. The literature contains two well-known objections against this theory: the problem of finitude and the problem of error. In his bookMeaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard propounds a novel defence against these objections. In this paper, I argue that Gibbard’s suggestions fail to save the dispositional theory. Moreover, I argue that Gibbard’s deflationary view about facts prevents him from saying anything about the property of meaning that would hold any interest for a naturalist.

Is Gibbard a Realist?

In Thinking How to Live, Allan Gibbard claims that expressivists can vindicate realism about moral discourse. This paper argues that Gibbard’s expressivism does not provide such a vindication.

AN INTRODUCTION TO ALLAN GIBBARD’S HARVARD SEMINAR PAPER

This note provides an introduction to the accompanying article by Allan Gibbard that was originally written for the 1968–69 Harvard graduate seminar conducted by Kenneth Arrow, John Rawls and Amartya Sen.

Skookumchuck, Kiidk’yaas, Gibbard: normativity, meaning, and idealization (critical notice of Allan Gibbard Meaning and Normativity)

Gibbard argues that ‘meaning is normative’. He explains the claim with an account of the normative which bases it on the process of planning, taken in part as issuing instructions to oneself. It seems to entail that the right kind of plans make norms. One ought to continue adding with plus rather than quus in a Kripkenstein horror story. I focus on Gibbard’s characterization of normativity: it is not what one might expect. The main purpose of this review article is to present the way of understanding normativity that makes most sense of what he says, and which makes some otherwise implausible assertions defensible and perhaps even true. I give reasons for thinking that Gibbard’s understanding of normativity-through-plans cannot do the work he wants it to. I also argue that he is onto something right, and it opens interesting new questions.