On Gibbard’s Defence of the Dispositional Theory of Meaning
According to the dispositional theory of meaning and content, what a speaker means by an expression is determined by her dispositions to use it. The literature contains two well-known objections against this theory: the problem of finitude and the problem of error. In his bookMeaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard propounds a novel defence against these objections. In this paper, I argue that Gibbard’s suggestions fail to save the dispositional theory. Moreover, I argue that Gibbard’s deflationary view about facts prevents him from saying anything about the property of meaning that would hold any interest for a naturalist.
Keyword(s):
2018 ◽
2018 ◽
Keyword(s):
1993 ◽
Vol 31
(1)
◽
pp. 71-94
◽
Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):