scholarly journals Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from the Constraints of the Open-Economy Trilemma

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Davenport Hull
Keyword(s):  
Open Economy ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Economic Shocks

scholarly journals Economic shocks and civil conflict at the regional level

2014 ◽  
Vol 124 (3) ◽  
pp. 530-533 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Hodler ◽  
Paul A. Raschky
Keyword(s):  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Regional Level ◽  
Economic Shocks

scholarly journals Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: A Comment

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 215-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Ciccone
Keyword(s):  
Negative Correlation ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Sub Saharan Africa ◽  
Economic Shocks ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
Sub Saharan ◽  
Conflict Risk

Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti (2004), henceforth MSS, argue that lower rainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks increase conflict risk in sub-Saharan Africa. This conclusion rests on their finding of a negative correlation between conflict in t and rainfall growth between t — 1 and t — 2. I show that this finding is driven by a (counterintuitive) positive correlation between conflict in t and rainfall levels in t — 2. If lower rainfall levels or negative rainfall shocks increased conflict, MSS's finding should have been due to a negative correlation between conflict in t and rainfall levels in t – 1. In the latest data, conflict is unrelated to rainfall. (JEL D74, E32, O11, O17, O47)

Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach

2004 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 725-753 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Miguel ◽  
Shanker Satyanath ◽  
Ernest Sergenti
Keyword(s):  
Instrumental Variables ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Economic Shocks ◽  
Instrumental Variables Approach

Re-examining Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 228-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Miguel ◽  
Shanker Satyanath
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Annual Rainfall ◽  
Economic Shocks ◽  
Theoretical Justification ◽  
Rainfall Variation ◽  
Annual Changes ◽  
Conflict In Africa

Miguel, Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti (2004), henceforth MSS, show that economic growth is negatively related to civil conflict in Africa, using annual rainfall variation as an IV for growth. Antonio Ciccone (2011) argues that thanks to rainfall's mean-reverting nature, rainfall levels are preferable to annual changes. We make three points. First, MSS's findings hold using rainfall levels as instruments. Second, Ciccone (2011) does not provide theoretical justification for preferring rainfall levels. Third, the first-stage relationship between rainfall and growth is weaker after 2000, suggesting that alternative instruments are needed when studying recent conflicts. We highlight the accumulating microeconomic evidence that adverse economic shocks lead to political violence. (JEL D74, E32, O11, O17, O47)

SHOULD THE PRIVATE SECTOR PROVIDE PUBLIC CAPITAL?

2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 318-346
Author(s):  
SANTANU CHATTERJEE
Keyword(s):  
Open Economy ◽  
Public Capital ◽  
Borrowing Constraints ◽  
International Capital ◽  
Standard Assumption ◽  
Production Externalities ◽  
International Capital Markets ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Large Production ◽  
Government Provision

The choice between private and government provision of a productive public good like infrastructure (public capital) is examined in the context of an endogenously growing open economy. The accumulation of public capital need not require government provision, in contrast to the standard assumption in the literature. Even with an efficient government, the relative costs and benefits of government and private provision depend crucially on the economy's underlying structural conditions and borrowing constraints in international capital markets. Countries with limited substitution possibilities and large production externalities may benefit from governments encouraging private provision of public capital through targeted investment subsidies. By contrast, countries with flexible substitution possibilities and relatively smaller externalities may benefit either from governments directly providing public capital or from regulation of private providers. The transitional dynamics also are shown to depend on the underlying elasticity of substitution and the size of the production externality.

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