scholarly journals Social Dilemmas in Environmental Economics and Policy Considerations: A Review

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 156-173
Author(s):  
Nicola Cerutti

Many crucial environmental issues lead to social dilemmas, in which the personally optimal solution, and the socially optimal solution diverge. Finding a solution to this dilemma is extremely important to allow a good and sustainable management of many exhaustible natural resources. This is especially true when the resource users need to develop collectively a set of rules or practices, and the institutions are unable to provide, or enforce, effective regulations. A few examples are forests, and fisheries, but also carbon emissions. This review presents a selected number of results coming from field observations, laboratory experiments, and theoretical work, which pinpoint some of the more crucial aspects of these decision environments. Knowing which incentives and situational aspects may motivate resource users to adopt a more or less cooperative behavior can potentially be of pivotal importance to develop effective policies and regulations. At the same time, the research we present is also of great interestfor any diagnostic or explorative study that aims to study direct resource users, and their development of cooperative attitudes and practices.

2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 554-555

Shaun McRae of the University of Michigan reviews “The Economics of Electricity Markets: Theory and Policy”, by Pippo Ranci and Guido Cervigni. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Six papers address the main issues that arise when competition is introduced into the electricity industry. Papers discuss wholesale electricity markets (Guido Cervigni and Dmitri Perekhodtsev); generation capacity adequacy (Cervigni, Andrea Commisso, and Perekhodtsev); congestion management and transmission rights (Perekhodtsev and Cervigni); competition policy in the electricity industry (Cervigni and Perekhodtsev); retail competition (Anna Creti and Clara Poletti); and climate change and the future of the liberalized electricity markets (Cervigni). Ranci is Professor of Economic Policy at the Catholic University of Milan and Chair of the Board of Appeal of the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. Cervigni is Research Director at the Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy at Bocconi University and Chief Economist at A2A S.p.A. Index.”


2002 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 1254-1266
Author(s):  
Ekko van Ierland ◽  
Corjan Brink ◽  
Leen Hordijk ◽  
Carolien Kroeze

Environmental economics deals with the optimal allocation of production factors and correcting market failure in protecting the environment. Market failure occurs because of externalities, common property resources, and public goods. Environmental policy instruments include direct regulation, taxes/subsidies, tradable permits, deposit systems, voluntary agreements, and persuasion.Environmental policies usually focus on one pollutant or environmental issue but may have substantial impacts on other emissions and environmental problems. Neglecting these impacts will result in suboptimal policies. We present an integrated optimisation model for determining cost-effective strategies to simultaneously reduce emissions of several pollutants from several sources, allowing for interrelations between sources and abatement options. Our integrated approach in regard to acidifying compounds and greenhouse gases will be able to provide cost-effective policy options that will result in lower overall abatement costs.This paper shows that efficient emission reduction can be calculated, but we argue that, for transboundary air pollution and climate change, it is difficult to implement the socially optimal solution because strong incentives exist for “free-riding”. In order to implement efficient policies, international environmental agree-ments like the Gothenburg or the Kyoto Protocol are necessary to establish stable coalitions. The stability of these agreements depends on the distribution of costs and benefits over countries and on the redistribution of the gains of cooperation.


1985 ◽  
Vol 61 (4) ◽  
pp. 462
Author(s):  
Glen D. Anderson ◽  
Paul B. Downing

Author(s):  
Karen S. Cook ◽  
Bogdan State

This chapter explores the linkages between trust and cooperation in social dilemmas. In the typical social dilemma individuals do not know what others will do, thus they must make assumptions about the likelihood that others will cooperate. This judgment is sometimes made on the basis of the presumed trustworthiness of the others involved, and, if so, trust makes cooperation possible. However, there are other mechanisms at work. This chapter considers when trust facilitates cooperation and when other factors are more likely to. In addition it discusses briefly the nature of the applications of work on trust and social dilemmas to a wide range of phenomena focusing on collective action in relation to corruption, systems of taxation, environmental issues, and health-related dilemmas as well as those that arise in the sharing economy. It ends with speculation about the potential for solutions of social dilemmas to improve trust in society.


2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 285-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Hartwick

The Nobel Prize Committee for Economics has been pretty good about drawing attention to innovative developments in economics since 1969, but in the past 20 years only one prize has been awarded for work that had a strong natural resources dimension, namely that on ad hoc cooperative solutions to the management of common property resources (Elinor Ostrom, University of Indiana). At least three Peace Prizes have been awarded for contributions to issues in conservation and the environment (Al Gore, the IPCC, and Wangari Maathai in Kenya for a tree-planting campaign). Toronto's Globe and Mail newspaper speculated in October 2012 that William Nordhaus would win the prize in economics, probably for his simulation model of economic growth and global warming (an Integrated Assessment Model). But to date only Ms Ostrom has been awarded the Economics Prize for essentially environmental economics. Thomas Schelling has circled back to environmental issues in his research over the years and was awarded the prize in economics, but it was for his contributions to game theory that he was singled out. Ronald Coase (Economics Nobel winner) focused the attention of economists on possible ‘markets’ for externalities, among other things, but few would refer to him as an environmental economist. Robert Solow set out the basic model of economic sustainability but again his prize was for other contributions. Observers in Stockholm and Oslo have thus made known their concern for environmental issues but have remained fairly agnostic about the significance of work by resource and environmental economists on such issues.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document