BOARD CHARACTERISTICS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AGENCY PROBLEMS IN INDIAN COMPANIES

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Venugopalan T.
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Board Characteristics

scholarly journals Stewardship theory: is board accountability necessary?

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (6) ◽  
pp. 1292-1314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Keay
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Stewardship Theory ◽  
Content Type ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that notwithstanding the fact that stewardship theory embraces things like trust of directors, their professionalism, loyalty and willingness to be concerned for the interests of others, as well as rejecting the foundations of classic agency problems that are asserted by agency theory, board accountability is as relevant to stewardship theory as it is to agency theory. Design/methodology/approach The paper applies the theory underlying board accountability in corporate governance, which is so often applied both in the corporate governance literature and in practice with agency theory in mind, to stewardship theory. Findings While the idea of accountability of boards is generally associated with an explanation and conceptualisation of the role and behaviour of directors as agents within classic agency theory, the paper demonstrates that board accountability is a necessary part of board life even if the role of directors is explained and conceptualised in terms of stewardship theory. Practical implications The paper suggests some accountability mechanisms that might be employed in a stewardship approach. Originality/value While many authors have talked in general terms about board accountability and its importance, this is the first paper that has engaged in a substantial study that links board accountability directly with stewardship theory, and to establish that accountability is necessary.

Do board directors and good corporate governance improve integrated reporting quality? The moderating effect of CSR: an empirical analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jamel Chouaibi ◽  
Saida Boulhouchet ◽  
Raghad Almallah ◽  
Yamina Chouaibi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Moderating Effect ◽  
Integrated Reporting ◽  
Board Diversity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Corporate Social

PurposeThis paper targets to shed light on the relationship between board characteristics, good corporate governance and the integrated reporting quality (IRQ) and even if this relationship is moderated by the corporate social responsibility.Design/methodology/approachData from a sample of 185 European firms selected from STOXX 600 Index between 2010 and 2019 are used to test the model using panel data and multiple regression. This paper is motivated by using panel data estimated feasible generalized least squares method. A multiple regression model is used to analyze the moderating effect of the corporate social responsibility on the association between board characteristics, good corporate governance and the IRQ.FindingsConsistent with the expectations, the results showed that there is a positive relationship between board independence, board diversity, good corporate governance and IRQ. Furthermore, the findings suggest that moderating effect positively affects the relationship between the board characteristics, good corporate governance and IRQ.Practical implicationsThe results of this study have an impact on policymakers. The presence of women and independent members of the board should be encouraged. This has a positive effect on the availability of high-quality information, able to drive investment levels and stakeholder participation.Originality/valueThis study supports the existing literature. First, it expands the scientific debate on the topic of integrated reporting (IR). Second, it extends the scope of agency theory, which is rarely used to explain IR-related phenomena. This study is one of the first to examine the moderating effect of corporate social responsibility on the association between a set of governance characteristics (i.e. Board independence and board diversity) and integrated reporting adoption.

Does audit committee substitute or complement other corporate governance mechanisms

2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (7) ◽  
pp. 658-681 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yousef Hassan ◽  
Rafiq Hijazi ◽  
Kamal Naser
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Governance System ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between audit committee (AC) and a set of other corporate governance mechanisms in one of the emerging economies, United Arab of Emirates (UAE). In particular, the current study examines whether an effective AC can serve as a substitute or as a complement mechanism to board characteristics and ownership structure of Emirati listed non-financial companies. Design/methodology/approach Using substitution and complementary theories, a panel data from 48 nonfinancial companies listed on the UAE Stock Exchanges [Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market] during the period between 2011 and 2013 were used in the current study. A composite measure of four proxies has been used to measure the AC effectiveness, namely, AC size, independence, financial expertise and diligence. To test the hypotheses formulated for the study, a logistic regression model was used to identify the influence of a set of board characteristics and ownership structure variables on the effectiveness of the AC after controlling for firm size, auditor type, industry type and profitability. Findings While AC effectiveness appeared to be positively associated with board size and board independence, it is negatively associated with CEO duality. This points to a complementary governance relation. On the other hand, the negative relationship between AC effectiveness and each of institutional and government ownership suggests substitutive relations. Research limitations/implications The main shortcoming of the current study is that it examines the influence of a certain set of corporate governance factors on the effectiveness of AC. Other corporate governance mechanisms may, however, contribute to the effectiveness of AC. The findings of the study can be used by companies’ managements and regulators in the UAE to improve the corporate governance system. Originality/value To the best of researchers’ knowledge, this study provides the first evidence about the interaction among multiple governance mechanisms required by the code of corporate governance issued by the UAE Ministry of Economy in 2009. The current paper is expected to add to the limited AC literature in Middle East and North African countries in general and Arab World in particular.

scholarly journals The role of the external auditor in corporate governance: The case of companies listed in the NYSE Euronext Lisbon

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 38-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Manuel Bernardo Vaz Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Multiple Regression ◽  
Direct Relationship ◽  
Logistic Models ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Securities Market ◽  
External Auditors ◽  
External Auditor ◽  
Economic Crimes

This study investigates the effects of the presence of the external auditor on corporate governance in Portugal, in the way listed companies are managed, based on the verification of compliance with the corporate governance regulations of the Securities Market Commission, as well as the transparency of information and the reduction of agency problems, fraud and economic crimes. By comparing government reports of companies listed on NYSE Euronext Lisbon, during several periods and with surveys conducted in the 1st half of 2013 in Portugal to the external auditors responsible for the majority of the legal certification of accounts of companies during 2007 to 2011, a significant direct relationship in the fulfillment of the recommendations of corporate governance and its verification by the external auditor is concluded. Based on multiple regression and multinomial logistic models, it is concluded that a greater involvement of the ROC in complying with corporate governance recommendations, allows for greater transparency of information and a reduction of agency problems, fraud and economic crimes

Is top-management remuneration influenced by board characteristics?

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastien Deschenes ◽  
Hamadou Boubacar ◽  
Miguel Rojas ◽  
Tania Morris
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Top Management Teams ◽  
Top Management ◽  
Management Compensation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Board Characteristics ◽  
Good Corporate Governance

Purpose – The purpose of this article is to examine if certain board characteristics have an impact on the total remuneration of top management and the ratio of stock-based remuneration to total top-management remuneration. Design/methodology/approach – The study draws on data from the largest public Canadian companies, the constituents of the TSX/60 index. The study controls for firm size and profitability. Findings – The authors concludes that total remuneration of top management is directly linked to board-member total remuneration and the board average number of director-tenure years. The study also shows that the ratio of stock-based to total top-management remuneration is positively affected by the percentage of independent directors, total remuneration of board directors, the ratio of stock-based remuneration of directors to their total remuneration and the average number of tenure years of the board of directors. Practical implications – If regulators are determined to curb the excesses in top-management remuneration by means of promoting boards with certain characteristics, they should implement measures facilitating the control of directors’ remuneration and tenure, to discourage cronyistic behavior. Good corporate governance requires that the board act as a counterbalance to top management, ensuring that a substantial percentage of top-executive total compensation is variable, and not fixed. According to our findings, the boards that are the most likely to hold managerial avoidance of variable pay in check are those favoring director independence, variable director remuneration and longer director tenures. Social implications – The present article examines specifically the latter aspect, namely, the role of board characteristics (independence, size, compensation, board director ownership and tenure, etc.) in the determination of top-management compensation. This relationship is important because it allows us to further the analysis of corporate governance. If the above-mentioned traits of boards have a meaningful relationship with the compensation of the top management, one might conclude that certain practices in the composition of boards could influence good corporate governance practices. This is relevant for regulatory agencies, for investors and for corporations. Originality/value – The article adds to the extant literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it considers the role of the traits of the board in the determination of the compensation of the top-management teams, and not only of the chief executive officer, as is the focus of previous literature. Secondly, the article focuses on the power interplay between boards and managers, and, more particularly, on the ability of boards to be an effective mechanism of corporate governance. Finally, the article examines the potential impact of board traits in the determination of top-management compensation in the context of Canadian firms, a subject that has received less attention from academic research, which has mostly concentrated on analyzing the issue in the US context.

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