Corporate Governance, Agency Problems, and Executive Compensation

Author(s):  
Robert W. Kolb
2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (6) ◽  
pp. 1292-1314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Keay

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that notwithstanding the fact that stewardship theory embraces things like trust of directors, their professionalism, loyalty and willingness to be concerned for the interests of others, as well as rejecting the foundations of classic agency problems that are asserted by agency theory, board accountability is as relevant to stewardship theory as it is to agency theory. Design/methodology/approach The paper applies the theory underlying board accountability in corporate governance, which is so often applied both in the corporate governance literature and in practice with agency theory in mind, to stewardship theory. Findings While the idea of accountability of boards is generally associated with an explanation and conceptualisation of the role and behaviour of directors as agents within classic agency theory, the paper demonstrates that board accountability is a necessary part of board life even if the role of directors is explained and conceptualised in terms of stewardship theory. Practical implications The paper suggests some accountability mechanisms that might be employed in a stewardship approach. Originality/value While many authors have talked in general terms about board accountability and its importance, this is the first paper that has engaged in a substantial study that links board accountability directly with stewardship theory, and to establish that accountability is necessary.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 877
Author(s):  
Gandy Wahyu Maulana Zulma ◽  
Fitri Chairunnisa ◽  
Azolla Degita Azis

The aim of this study is to examine whether multiple large shareholders held by the company can affect the relation between accounting performance and executive compensation, using panel data of all publicly company in Indonesia (except financialand mining industries) with the research period 2017-2019. The result shows that the existence of 2nd largest shareholders that owns more than 10% stocks and also if the board has representation from 2nd largest shareholders in the company, it can reduce the positive effect of accounting performance to executive compensation. This research findings could be as an additional literature in financial accounting and corporate governance area, and also for practitioners in Indonesia that if a firm has good controlling function from multiple large shareholders, it can reduce the opportunistic discretion from executive management if the company has performance evaluation based on earnings.


2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 467-479
Author(s):  
Yusuf Mohammed Nulla

This research study explores the relationship between the executive compensation and corporate governance among the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX/S&P) companies from 2005 to 2010. The quantitative research method was selected for this research study. The eighty largest companies from the New York Stock Exchange and the Toronto Stock Exchange were selected. The random sample method was used to select the two populations from each index. The research question for this research study was: is there a relationship between CEO cash compensation and corporate governance among the Toronto Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange companies. The four statistical regression models found that there was a weak relationship between corporate governance and executive compensation among the TSX/S&P and the NYSE populations. Also, the Pearson correlation results indicated that the corporate governance has a minimal role towards the determination of the executive compensation


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 38-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Manuel Bernardo Vaz Ferreira

This study investigates the effects of the presence of the external auditor on corporate governance in Portugal, in the way listed companies are managed, based on the verification of compliance with the corporate governance regulations of the Securities Market Commission, as well as the transparency of information and the reduction of agency problems, fraud and economic crimes. By comparing government reports of companies listed on NYSE Euronext Lisbon, during several periods and with surveys conducted in the 1st half of 2013 in Portugal to the external auditors responsible for the majority of the legal certification of accounts of companies during 2007 to 2011, a significant direct relationship in the fulfillment of the recommendations of corporate governance and its verification by the external auditor is concluded. Based on multiple regression and multinomial logistic models, it is concluded that a greater involvement of the ROC in complying with corporate governance recommendations, allows for greater transparency of information and a reduction of agency problems, fraud and economic crimes


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