The Walk-down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives

2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 885-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
SCOTT RICHARDSON ◽  
SIEW HONG TEOH ◽  
PETER D. WYSOCKI
Keyword(s):  
Insider Trading ◽  
Analyst Forecasts ◽  
Equity Issuance

The SEC’s Impact on the Federalization of Corporate Governance—A Traditional Perspective

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Outside Directors ◽  
Tender Offers ◽  
Going Private ◽  
Rule Making

This chapter examines, from a traditional perspective, several areas where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has impacted corporate governance in a meaningful way. By way of example, these subjects include insider trading, qualitative materiality, the role of gatekeepers (such as outside directors, attorneys, and accountants), the Commission’s use of disclosure to influence conduct, the implementation by subject companies of undertakings pursuant to SEC enforcement proceedings, and mergers and acquisitions (including tender offers and going-private transactions). This chapter’s focus is on the manner in which the SEC for well over 50 years has impacted corporate governance by means of exercising its rule-making and oversight authority.

The Stewardship Role of Analyst Forecasts, and Discretionary Versus Non-discretionary Accruals

2013 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter O. Christensen ◽  
Hans Frimor ◽  
Florin Şabac
Keyword(s):  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Analyst Forecasts

Meeting Individual Analyst Expectations

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (6) ◽  
pp. 2203-2231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
David A. Reppenhagen ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Analyst Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Analyst Expectations ◽  
Management Literature ◽  
Two Measures ◽  
Reported Earnings

ABSTRACT The expectations management literature has so far focused on firms meeting the analyst consensus forecast—the expectations of analysts as a group—at earnings announcements. In this study we argue that investors may use individual analyst forecasts as additional benchmarks in evaluating reported earnings because the consensus forecast underutilizes private information contained in individual analyst forecasts. We predict that measures reflecting such private information have incremental explanatory power over the consensus forecast for the market's reaction to earnings news. We find results consistent with this prediction by examining two measures: (1) the percentage of individual forecasts met and (2) meeting the key analyst forecast. We extend the literature by documenting the role of individual analyst forecasts in investors' evaluations of reported earnings. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14; G24. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

The Consequences of Insider Trading and the Role of Academic Research

1991 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 83-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jang Y. Cho ◽  
Michael K. Shaub ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Insider Trading ◽  
Academic Research

scholarly journals The Diversification Puzzle: The Role of Asymmetric Information and Insider Trading in Pakistan

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 97-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mushtaq Hussain Khan ◽  
Ahmad Fraz ◽  
Arshad Hassan
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Fundamental Issue ◽  
Diversification Strategies ◽  
Management Literature

While corporate diversification is a fundamental issue both in the management literature and in corporate policy, the question that remains is whether it destroys or enhances firm value. This empirical study of the corporate diversification–value relationship for Pakistani firms looks at the role of asymmetric information and insider trading over a 10-year sample period, 2005–14. Using the industrial entropy index and purchase ratio to capture corporate diversification and insider trading, respectively, the study provides empirical evidence that questions the agency theory-based explanation of the corporate diversification–value relationship. Our results show that, in cases of asymmetric information, insiders increase the purchase of their firms’ shares in the open market when diversification is high. This contradicts the corporate diversification–value destruction stance of agency theory as well as the idea that outside investors’ undervaluation occurs due to information asymmetries. These results have strategic implications for corporate diversification strategies and are relevant to firm managers, regulators and shareholders.

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