The dramaturgy of earnings guidance: an institutional analysis of a soft landing

PurposeMuch in accounting research depends upon equity valuation. Too often, what the stock of publicly traded companies trade at is taken at its face value. Knowing that valuation is a function of performance relative to consensus security analyst expectations, more needs to be known about how these expectations are created and changed. The paper aims to assert that the guidance provided by top-level company management is important to the work product of analysts. The paper develops information from managers involved in these interactions.Design/methodology/approachSemi-structured interviews were conducted with 31 high-level executives employed by large USA companies in several industries. What those companies provided was interpreted through the theoretical lens of institutional theory and amounts to a qualitative content analysis approach to the subject.FindingsThe authors find that institutional theory well describes the important features of analyst guidance. Participants are aware of the broad societal interest that exists in the outcome of the guidance process. The participants accept the need for independent analyst opinions about their companies and their future prospects. In many ways, executives provide analysts more than just raw information and employ strategic structuring for analysts to produce expectations that will allow their companies a favorable pathway to future success as such is judged by the markets. The result is understood as being in the best interests of all market participants, even if it disproportionately benefits current corporate leadership.Research limitations/implicationsResults are dependent upon the interview process, needing the correct questions to be asked and the willingness of interviewees to speak their lived truth. The paper calls into question traditional capital markets studies that evaluate quantitative relationships between projected accounting balances and subsequent stock market prices as a literal truth or as the result of scientific calculation.Practical implicationsMarket participants should be somewhat more skeptical about companies that are routinely able to meet analyst expectations. To a large extent, such displays do not just happen but instead are manufactured to take place by virtual of a careful dance that is mindful of excesses on several sides.Social implicationsThe antagonistic interests of two important groups in the stock market is actually an unrecognized symbiotic dependency that prioritizes continued permission.Originality/valueThe accounting literature is very dependent on the work product of analysts. This is a rare opportunity to peak behind the curtain of their expertise in a critical fashion. The paper breaks ranks with the literature by trying to understand the thinking behind the narratives of capital market participants.

Does Audit Firm Tenure Matter to Audit Committee Members? Evidence from an Accounting Dispute

SYNOPSIS This study examines the effects of Big 4 audit firm tenure on audit committee member support for the auditor in an auditor/management dispute over a subjective accounting issue. One hundred eighteen U.S. public company audit committee members participated in an experiment with audit firm tenure (short/long) manipulated randomly between subjects. The results indicate that participants in the long audit firm tenure group provide more support for the auditor in the dispute than participants in the short tenure group. Audit committee support for the auditor is positively related to audit committee member experience and CPA status, as well as perceived management pressure to meet analyst expectations, but negatively related to perceived management experience in financial reporting. Finally, audit committee members' perceptions of audit firm reliability (i.e., credibility and dependability) mediate the audit firm tenure-auditor support relation. Overall, our results suggest enhanced audit committee support for longer-tenured auditors.

Earnings Predictability And Broker-Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Bias

Scholars have reasoned that analysts issue optimistic forecasts to improve their access to managers’ private information when earnings are unpredictable. While this requires a managerial preference for analyst forecast optimism, the observed walk-down of analyst expectations to beatable forecasts is consistent with a managerial preference for pessimism in short-horizon forecasts. Using data from various sample periods, alternative model specifications, and various measures of earnings unpredictability, we find that pessimism, not optimism, in short-horizon forecasts is associated with increasingly unpredictable earnings. Our results suggest that firms can more effectively manage analysts’ earnings expectations downward when earnings are relatively unpredictable.

Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence

ABSTRACT We provide new evidence on the agency theory of corporate tax avoidance (Slemrod 2004; Crocker and Slemrod 2005; Chen and Chu 2005) by showing that increases in institutional ownership are associated with increases in tax avoidance. Using the Russell index reconstitution setting to isolate exogenous shocks to institutional ownership, and a regression discontinuity design that facilitates sharper identification of treatment effects, we find a significant and discontinuous increase in tax avoidance following Russell 2000 inclusion. The tax avoidance involves the use of tax shelters, and immediate benefits include higher profit margins and likelihood of meeting or beating analyst expectations. Collectively, the results shed light on the effect of increased ownership concentration on tax avoidance.

Ownership Structure And Managerial Behavior To Beat Market Expectation In Korea

This paper examines whether firms ownership structure in Korea changes managers' behavior to meet or beat market expectations. We examine whether managers manage earnings upward and/or guide analyst expectations downward to avoid negative earnings surprises. By using companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange, we find that the inclusion of a higher proportion of foreign ownership significantly increases the probability to meet or beat market expectations. The finding suggests that the firms with higher foreign ownership try to satisfy their foreign investors who emphasize current profits by boosting the stock price. We also find that managers are less likely to avoid negative earnings surprises as large shareholders ownership increases. The results imply that large shareholders play an internal monitoring role for managers' earnings and/or expectations management. In addition, firms with large shareholders ownership rely less on income-increasing discretionary accruals. Our findings supports the convergence-of-interest hypothesis that as the controlling shareholders ownership level increases, the interest of the controlling shareholder decreases managers opportunistic behavior to manage earnings.

Meeting Individual Analyst Expectations

ABSTRACT The expectations management literature has so far focused on firms meeting the analyst consensus forecast—the expectations of analysts as a group—at earnings announcements. In this study we argue that investors may use individual analyst forecasts as additional benchmarks in evaluating reported earnings because the consensus forecast underutilizes private information contained in individual analyst forecasts. We predict that measures reflecting such private information have incremental explanatory power over the consensus forecast for the market's reaction to earnings news. We find results consistent with this prediction by examining two measures: (1) the percentage of individual forecasts met and (2) meeting the key analyst forecast. We extend the literature by documenting the role of individual analyst forecasts in investors' evaluations of reported earnings. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14; G24. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.