Opportunistic Avoidance of Litigation Loss Accruals and the Mitigating Effects of Auditors

We find that firms with preliminary earnings that are expected to just meet analyst forecasts are more likely to only disclose (i.e., not accrue) litigation loss contingencies, claiming that the litigation event falls below the qualitative thresholds necessitating accrual. We also find that this opportunistic treatment of a subjective estimate is reduced when firms’ auditors have expertise in the defendant’s industry or have experience auditing litigation contingencies. Furthermore, we find that opportunistic disclosure usage increases when firms are more economically important to auditors’ client portfolios. Our results are robust to a series of additional tests. We provide evidence to support the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) call for increased auditor professional skepticism toward management bias and opportunism when evaluating subjective estimates.

A Test of Income Smoothing Using Pseudo Fiscal Years

The purpose of our study is to further understand managerial incentives that affect the volatility of reported earnings. Prior research suggests that the volatility of fourth-quarter earnings may be affected by the integral approach to accounting (i.e., “settling up” of accrual estimation errors in the first three quarters of the fiscal year) or earnings management to meet certain reporting objectives (e.g., analyst forecasts). We suggest that another factor affecting fourth-quarter earnings is managers’ intentional smoothing of fiscal-year earnings. For each firm, we create pseudo-year earnings using four consecutive quarters other than the four quarters of the reported fiscal year. We then compare the earnings volatility of pseudo years to the earnings volatility of the firm’s own reported fiscal year. We find evidence consistent with fourth-quarter accruals reflecting managerial incentives to smooth fiscal-year earnings. This conclusion is validated by several cross-sectional tests, the pattern in quarterly cash flows and accruals, and several robustness tests. Overall, we contribute to the literature exploring alternative explanations for the differential volatility of fiscal-year and fourth-quarter earnings. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.

Executive equity incentives and opportunistic manager behavior: new evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

This study provides plausible causal evidence on the effect of executive equity incentives on opportunistic manager behavior. I exploit a unique setting created by the introduction of Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R in 2005, which led to an exogenous increase in the cost of option pay, causing a substantial decline in option pay for some firms while leaving others largely unaffected. Using difference-in-differences analyses with a treatment group of firms that show a decline in option pay and two control groups, I find that the likelihood of a treatment firm meeting or beating analyst forecasts decreases by 14–20%. The results show that the relatively high levels of meet-or-beat before FAS 123R were largely driven by real activities manipulation such as abnormal asset sales and sales manipulation to beat analysts’ benchmarks, while accrual manipulation and analyst management were less relevant. Together, the results suggest that equity incentives encourage opportunistic actions to meet or beat earnings expectations, and a decline in option pay results in a decline in earnings management to meet earnings expectations.

Attention to dividends, inattention to earnings?

We examine whether dividends serve as substitutes or complements to accounting information in firm valuation. Consistent with dividends substituting for earnings information, we find that dividend paying firms have 11%–15% lower earnings response coefficients (ERCs) than non-payers. We find more substitution when the dividend provides a stronger signal of permanent earnings: when the firm is less likely to cut the dividend, when the firm is likely to fund the dividend out of earnings rather than cash reserves, or when the dividend is larger. We then show that dividend payers have lower absolute returns, less trading volume, and fewer analyst forecasts at the earnings announcement (EA), suggesting that dividend payers attract less attention to their less informative EAs. Finally, we show that the lower EA attention translates into less earnings management and fewer earnings-related disclosures for dividend payers relative to non-payers. Collectively, this evidence suggests that dividends supply information about permanent earnings and, although costly, could be an efficient way for some firms to satisfy investors’ demand for earnings information.

Analyst Forecasts during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Evidence from REITs

The COVID-19 pandemic disrupts capital markets and confuses decision makers. This event represents an opportunity to better understand how financial analysts forecast earnings. We focus on forecasts for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in the United States, since REITs are relatively transparent during normal times, and since the real estate sector, as a whole, displays wide variations in forecasts during the pandemic. Using data between October 2018 and November 2020, our regression analysis finds that the severity of the pandemic increases analysts’ forecast error and dispersion. Government interventions have an offsetting effect, which is relevant during the more severe times. These results are robust to various measures of the severity of the pandemic. We also find that the pandemic has differential effects across property types, where forecast error rises by more, for REITs, when focusing on Hospitality and Industrial properties, and dispersion rises by more, for REITs, when focusing on Hospitality, Retail, and Technology properties.

Private lenders' use of analyst earnings forecasts when establishing debt covenant thresholds

We examine whether lenders use analyst forecasts of the borrower's earnings as inputs when establishing covenant thresholds in private debt contracts. We find that, among debt contracts that include an earnings covenant, earnings thresholds are set closer to analyst forecasts when analysts have historically issued more accurate earnings forecasts. These results are robust to firm fixed effects and an instrumental variable approach. Further, we find that, following a plausibly exogenous decline in the availability of analyst earnings forecasts, debt contracts are less likely to include earnings covenants. Our evidence is consistent with lenders using analyst earnings forecasts as an input when establishing debt covenant thresholds and suggests sell-side analysts play a role in debt contracting.

INCOME SMOOTHING THROUGH R&D MANAGEMENT AND EARNINGS INFORMATIVENESS

We examine whether income smoothing via R&D management is associated with more informative earnings. While the literature finds earnings smoothing through accruals improves earnings informativeness, it is unclear whether smoothing through R&D management is used to inform investors because R&D management is relatively more difficult to detect and curb. We find that R&D management, which represents a subset of real activities management, is associated with more informative earnings but the association is weaker, relative to smoothing through accruals. We also document that R&D-based smoothing is associated with more accurate and less disperse analyst forecasts of earnings but the association is weaker, relative to smoothing through accruals. Overall, we provide novel evidence suggesting that managers use R&D management to smooth temporary shocks to earnings and inform investors.