Subjective Logic and the Unity of Thought and Being: Hegel’s Logical Reconstruction of Aristotle’s Speculative Empiricism

Gaunilo Parodies Anselm

History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis ◽

10.30965/26664275-01701004 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 17 (1) ◽

pp. 45-71

Author(s):

Geo Siegwart

Keyword(s):

Detailed Comparison ◽

The Third ◽

Common Structure ◽

Logical Reconstruction ◽

Points Of View ◽

And Function

The main objective is an interpretation of the island parody, in particular a logical reconstruction of the parodying argument that stays close to the text. The parodied reasoning is identified as the proof in the second chapter of the Proslogion, more specifically, this proof as it is represented by Gaunilo in the first chapter of his Liber pro insipiente. The second task is a detailed comparison between parodied and parodying argument as well as an account of their common structure. The third objective is a tentative characterization of the nature and function of parodies of arguments. It seems that parodying does not add new pertinent points of view to the usual criticism of an argument.

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Autonomy in Psychiatric Ethics

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198732365.013.27 ◽

2015 ◽

Author(s):

Lubomira Radoilska

Keyword(s):

Conceptual Framework ◽

Personal Autonomy ◽

Positive Theory ◽

Logical Reconstruction

This chapter explores four kinds of skepticism about autonomy in general and its applicability to psychiatric ethics in particular. It is argued that although there are valuable lessons to be learnt from each of these skeptical challenges, their overall contribution is best understood in terms of friendly correctives to an autonomy-centered normative and conceptual framework instead of viable alternatives to it. The first four sections each provide a logical reconstruction of a distinct skeptical line of reasoning about autonomy and expand on its implications for psychiatric ethics: skepticism about personal autonomy; skepticism about autonomy as an agency concept; vulnerability-grounded skepticism about autonomy; and paternalism-friendly skepticism about autonomy. The fifth section identifies and explores the underlying presuppositions that motivate the previously discussed forms of skepticism about autonomy, and the sixth reflects on the significance of psychiatric ethics for rebutting skepticism about autonomy and developing a new, more promising positive theory.

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