19. Searle’s derivation of promissory obligation

2020 ◽  
pp. 255-270
Keyword(s):  
Promissory Obligation

The Bounds of Morality

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 217-234
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Helmreich ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Joint Commitment ◽  
Related Point ◽  
The Right ◽  
Paradigm Shifting ◽  
Promissory Obligation ◽  
Moral Requirements

Margaret Gilbert’s ‘Three Dogmas about Promising’ is a paradigm-shifting contribution to the literature, not only for its account of promissory obligation based on joint commitment, but for its equally important focus on two properties of such obligation, which her account uniquely and elegantly captures: first, that the duty to keep a promise is necessary—the obligation stands regardless of the content or morality of the promise—and, second, that it is directed, with the promisee having unique standing to demand performance. A related point, implied by Gilbert’s argument, is that moral requirements, alone, can never have those properties. Here I challenge that point, arguing that moral requirements, under the right circumstances, can give rise to necessary and directed obligations, after all, and I propose one such moral obligation of which the duty to keep a promise may well be an instance. Nevertheless, I conclude, it may not provide as plausible a basis of promissory obligation as joint commitment.

scholarly journals Consequentialism and Promises

2020 ◽  
pp. 288-309
Author(s):  
Alida Liberman
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Moral Force ◽  
Intrinsic Good ◽  
Common Sense Morality ◽  
Promise Keeping ◽  
Promissory Obligation

I explore the debate about whether consequentialist theories can adequately accommodate the moral force of promissory obligation. I outline a straightforward act consequentialist account grounded in the value of satisfying expectations, and I raise and assess three objections to this account: that it counterintuitively predicts that certain promises should be broken when common-sense morality insists that they should be kept, that the account is circular, and Michael Cholbi’s argument that this account problematically implies that promise-making is frequently obligatory. I then discuss alternative act consequentialist accounts, including Philip Pettit’s suggestion that promise-keeping is an intrinsic good and Michael Smith’s agent-relative account. I outline Brad Hooker’s rule consequentialist account of promissory obligation and raise a challenge for it. I conclude that appeals to intuitions about cases will not settle the dispute, and that consequentialists and their critics must instead engage in substantive debate about the nature and stringency of promissory obligation.

scholarly journals Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation

Ethics ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 127 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham Sesshu Roth
Keyword(s):  
Promissory Obligation

Aesthetic Reasons and Aesthetic Shoulds

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-87
Author(s):  
Andrew McGonigal ◽  
Erin Taylor ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Normative Structure ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Promissory Obligation

Some questions about normative structure are global. We can ask how we should live, or what we ought to do all things considered, or whether there are any categorical oughts. But we can also examine local normative structure. We might ask ourselves about what we should do from the moral point of view rather than the prudential one, or discuss promissory obligation in contrast with what friendship demands. How should we understand such localized forms of normativity? We argue that a plausible sounding treatment of the distinction cannot account for what we call the “interrelatedness” of reasons from different domains.

Scanlon on Promissory Obligation

2004 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Gilbert ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Promissory Obligation

Promising and Assertion

2019 ◽  
pp. 178-200
Author(s):  
Mark van Roojen
Keyword(s):  
New Creation ◽  
Illocutionary Acts ◽  
Promissory Obligation

Even if promising is a kind of assertion or accomplished by making an assertion, it has a normative upshot that goes beyond the normative upshot of ordinary assertions. When one breaks a promise, one is liable to criticism for actions subsequent to making the promise—a kind of criticism to which merely asserting something would not make one liable. This article explores various explanations for the ways in which a promise creates these obligations. It distinguishes those that see the relevant obligations as falling out of some prior obligation and those that treat promissory obligation as a new creation. If obligations generate reasons to comply, these latter accounts seem to postulate reasons that come from nowhere, and this in turn has led to some puzzlement. This article surveys the puzzlement, as well as ways to embrace it and ways to avoid it, while also examining reasons to be glad one can bind oneself by promising. Finally, it explores the possibility that promises as illocutionary acts are a species of assertion or constituted by assertions.

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