Which Promises Actually Matter? Election Pledge Centrality and Promissory Representation

Parties make hundreds of campaign promises but not all are seen by voters as central to a party’s offering. Studies of government promise fulfillment accept that not all promises are equivalent but in practice treat all promises equally because they lack an appropriate means of measuring promise centrality. To demonstrate the importance of accounting for pledge fulfillment, we develop a conjoint experiment method to measure public opinion about promise centrality which can be used to construct centrality weights. We demonstrate this approach’s utility by examining the 2017 UK Conservative manifesto. Centrality weighting reduces our assessment of Conservative promise keeping by 21 percentage points (1.3 standard deviations of typical promise-completion rates found in comparative studies). Weighting increases the centrality of EU promises sevenfold and immigration promises sixfold, and reduces the centrality of miscellaneous administrative promises by more than half. These results illustrate that pledge centrality cannot be ignored when assessing pledge fulfillment.

Do Job Candidates' Effort Promises Matter When the Labor Market is Competitive? Experimental Evidence

Using an experiment, we investigate whether job candidates' noncontractible effort promises increase their actual effort in the work relationship when the labor market is competitive. Due to promise-keeping preferences, individuals tend to keep promises even if doing so is costly. However, when promises can be made strategically to influence hiring decisions, it is unclear whether workers are less likely to keep their promises. We develop theory to predict that making effort promises matters even more when labor markets are competitive. We find workers promise higher effort levels when competing for a job than when they do not, but do not keep promises to a lesser extent although the costs of promise-keeping increase with the promise size, thereby increasing the total effort provided. The results enhance our understanding of the effects of worker-employer communication during hiring, particularly in a competitive setting in which such communication is most likely to occur.

Consequentialism and Promises

I explore the debate about whether consequentialist theories can adequately accommodate the moral force of promissory obligation. I outline a straightforward act consequentialist account grounded in the value of satisfying expectations, and I raise and assess three objections to this account: that it counterintuitively predicts that certain promises should be broken when common-sense morality insists that they should be kept, that the account is circular, and Michael Cholbi’s argument that this account problematically implies that promise-making is frequently obligatory. I then discuss alternative act consequentialist accounts, including Philip Pettit’s suggestion that promise-keeping is an intrinsic good and Michael Smith’s agent-relative account. I outline Brad Hooker’s rule consequentialist account of promissory obligation and raise a challenge for it. I conclude that appeals to intuitions about cases will not settle the dispute, and that consequentialists and their critics must instead engage in substantive debate about the nature and stringency of promissory obligation.

Citizen ownership of the state: Definition and measurement

<p>This paper defines citizen ownership of the state as the implementation of election promises. It argues that the level of implementation of election promises is a measurement of citizen ownership of the state. To explain the definition, the paper models the authority of a representative government to a power of attorney. The citizen as principal awards a power of attorney to the winning party, alliance or individuals as an agent in their election. In the election, the set of election promises of the agent becomes the only written part of the power of attorney. The 2008-2012 tenure of US President Barack Obama is used to test how the methodological approach to the measurement of promise-keeping works with empirical data. The test proves the new approach crucially improved compared to existing approaches and the findings are found interesting.</p>

Designing and Validating a New Method the TUNEL Microwave (TUNEL-MW) for Rapid Quantification of Apoptosis in Islets Following Isolation and Post-Thaw

Background: Among the current quality control assays used in islet transplantation, there is an urgent need for more appropriate assays that measure cell damage via apoptosis that are accurate and rapid. Although the Terminal Uridine Nucleotide End Labeling (TUNEL) is a popular marker for apoptosis, the protocol takes 4 hours to complete. In this regard, microwave assisted histoprocessing, which shortens the time taken for processing, holds promise. Keeping this in mind, a new TUNEL Microwave (TUNEL-MW) method, for rapid quantification of apoptosis, was designed, developed and validated. Method: Two lots of post-thaw isolated human islets cultured for 24 hours, 3 days, 5 days and 7 days i.e. 8 samples, were used for the study. Dewaxed and rehydrated tissues were processed for routine histology, stained with haematoxylin and eosin (H&E) and the conventional TUNEL was carried out as per manufacturer’s instructions. For the TUNEL-MW, kit instructions were modified and microwave-assisted histoprocessing was done. The assessment of apoptotic index (AI%) by light microscopy (LM) was carried out by a pathologist who was completely blinded to the study. Results: The new TUNEL-Microwave (TUNEL-MW) developed by us reduced processing time from 4 hours to 30 minutes (saving 3½ hours). Results were validated by univariate linear regression (r2>0.990), coefficient of variation (<5% between all three methods) and the Bland Altman plot comparing AI% determined by the new TUNEL-MW with the conventional TUNEL and with LM (gold standard). Conclusion: TUNEL Microwave appears to be an ideal method. It is simple and takes just 30 minutes to perform and can therefore be used along with existing quality control measures to rule out or measure apoptosis prior to islet release for islet transplantation.

Citizen ownership of the state: Definition and measurement

<p>This paper defines citizen ownership of the state as the implementation of election promises. It argues that the level of implementation of election promises is a measurement of citizen ownership of the state. To explain the definition, the paper models the authority of a representative government to a power of attorney. The citizen as principal awards a power of attorney to the winning party, alliance or individuals as an agent in their election. In the election, the set of election promises of the agent becomes the only written part of the power of attorney. The 2008-2012 tenure of US President Barack Obama is used to test how the methodological approach to the measurement of promise-keeping works with empirical data. The test proves the new approach crucially improved compared to existing approaches and the findings are found interesting.</p>

Citizen ownership of the state: Definition and measurement

<p>This paper defines citizen ownership of the state as the implementation of election promises. It argues that the level of implementation of election promises is a measurement of citizen ownership of the state. To explain the definition, the paper models the authority of a representative government to a power of attorney. The citizen as principal awards a power of attorney to the winning party, alliance or individuals as an agent in their election. In the election, the set of election promises of the agent becomes the only written part of the power of attorney. The 2008-2012 tenure of US President Barack Obama is used to test how the methodological approach to the measurement of promise-keeping works with empirical data. The test proves the new approach crucially improved compared to existing approaches and the findings are found interesting.</p>

Citizen ownership of the state: Definition and measurement

<p>This paper defines citizen ownership of the state as the implementation of election promises. It argues that the level of implementation of election promises is a measurement of citizen ownership of the state. To explain the definition, the paper models the authority of a representative government to a power of attorney. The citizen as principal awards a power of attorney to the winning party, alliance or individuals as an agent in their election. In the election, the set of election promises of the agent becomes the only written part of the power of attorney. The 2008-2012 tenure of US President Barack Obama is used to test how the methodological approach to the measurement of promise-keeping works with empirical data. The test proves the new approach crucially improved compared to existing approaches and the findings are found interesting.</p>