The Bounds of Morality

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 217-234
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Helmreich ◽  

Margaret Gilbert’s ‘Three Dogmas about Promising’ is a paradigm-shifting contribution to the literature, not only for its account of promissory obligation based on joint commitment, but for its equally important focus on two properties of such obligation, which her account uniquely and elegantly captures: first, that the duty to keep a promise is necessary—the obligation stands regardless of the content or morality of the promise—and, second, that it is directed, with the promisee having unique standing to demand performance. A related point, implied by Gilbert’s argument, is that moral requirements, alone, can never have those properties. Here I challenge that point, arguing that moral requirements, under the right circumstances, can give rise to necessary and directed obligations, after all, and I propose one such moral obligation of which the duty to keep a promise may well be an instance. Nevertheless, I conclude, it may not provide as plausible a basis of promissory obligation as joint commitment.

Author(s):  
Margaret Gilbert

This book is the first extended treatment of demand-rights, a class of rights apt to be considered rights par excellence. Centrally, to have a demand-right is to have the standing or authority to demand a particular action from another person, who has a correlative obligation to the right-holder. How are demand-rights possible? Linking its response to central themes and positions within rights theory, Rights and Demands argues for two main theses. First, joint commitment, in a sense that is explained, is a ground of demand-rights. Second, it may well be their only ground. The first thesis is developed with special reference to agreements and promises, generally understood to ground demand-rights. It argues that both of these phenomena are constituted by joint commitments, and that this is true of many other central social phenomena also. In relation to the second thesis it considers the possibility of demand-rights whose existence can be demonstrated by moral argument without appeal to any joint commitment, and the possibility of accruing demand-rights through the existence of a given legal system or other institution construed without any such appeal. The relevance of the book’s conclusions to our understanding of human rights is then explained. Classic and contemporary rights theorists whose work is discussed include Wesley Hohfeld, H. L. A. Hart, Joel Feinberg, Immanuel Kant, Thomas Scanlon, Judith Thomson, Joseph Raz, and Stephen Darwall.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Mittler

Many in the environmental movement have argued in recent years that in order to speed up climate actions we should take the ethics out of the climate change debate. Focusing on the moral obligation to act or on the effects of climate change on the most vulnerable was often judged to render the discourse too “heavy,” “negative,” or “difficult.” Many also deemed it unnecessary. After all, renewable energies, better designed cities that allow for reduced car use, and power plant regulations that lead to cleaner local air—to take just three examples—all have real and substantial benefits unrelated to the fact that they are “the right thing to do” in the face of climate change. They create jobs, reduce health problems and costs, and make society fitter.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-284
Author(s):  
Olga Nikolic ◽  
Igor Cvejic

The aim of this paper is to show, contra the right-libertarian critique of social justice, that there are good reasons for defending policies of social justice within a free society. In the first part of the paper, we will present two influential right-libertarian critiques of social justice, found in Friedrich Hayek?s Law, Legislation and Liberty and Robert Nozick?s Anarchy, State and Utopia. Based on their approach, policies of social justice are seen as an unjustified infringement on freedoms of individual members of a society. In response to this critique, we will introduce the distincion between formal and factual freedom and argue that the formal principle of freedom defended by Hayek and Nozick does not suffice for the protection of factual freedom of members of a society, because it does not recognize (1) the moral obligation to help those who, without their fault, lack factual freedom to a significant degree, and (2) the legal obligation of the state to protect civic dignity of all members of a society. In the second part of the paper, we offer an interpretation of Kant?s argument on taxation, according to which civic dignity presupposes factual freedom, in order to argue that Kant?s justification of taxation offers good reasons for claiming that the state has the legal obligation to protect factual freedom via the policies of social justice.


2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Edward Callies

AbstractIn this paper I first argue that when answering the question of whether or not governments may restrict emigration, Brock and Blake are staking out positions not astronomically far from one another. Despite the ostensibly large philosophical gap between the two, both think that certain governments may restrict emigration when such restriction is agreed to in a morally binding contract. Secondly, both authors think that there are specific “circumstances” or “conditions” under which a contract that restricts emigration can be morally binding. This second part of the paper will pose some questions that explore these various circumstances or conditions. The ultimate aim of the paper is to help point the debate in the right direction so as to further develop an answer to the question of whether or not governments may restrict emigration.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Munirul Abidin

This research aims to find out the paradigm shifting of Qur’anic interpretation on woman verses from Gadamerian perspective. This writing finds out three paradigms: classical, modern and neomodernism paradigm. Each paradigm has its own world view that necessary to its context. From Gadamerian perspective, the emergence of those three paradigms in Qur’anic interpretation about woman verses is necessity. As a text, Qur’an is not a dead object, but it will be understood by people from different point of views. In interpreting a text, an instrument is used to help finding out the right interpretation. Interpretation is not a hall of mirrors in which interpreters only see themselves in different poses and shapes depending on the shape and angle of the mirror which confronts them. Rather, interpretation is a process of listening to others through their words and deeds.


Acta Humana ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-136
Author(s):  
Valéria Horváth

Although the issue of climate change mitigation and adaptation is fortunately evermore widely discussed, the problems facing ‘climate refugees’ only appears sporadically in the discussions adding to the current confusion. Taking recent and forecasted trends into account, the UN declares that states have serious moral obligations to provide humanitarian protection to all those displaced. The question which the international community and international lawyers face is whether states have more than just a moral obligation to provide protection. In this paper I will assess whether or not there are any roots in the various sources of international law – such as conventional law, customary international law, or the fundamental principles of international law – for the legal definition of ‘climate refugees’.


Author(s):  
Jason Brennan

Nothing is more integral to democracy than voting. Most people believe that every citizen has the civic duty or moral obligation to vote, that any sincere vote is morally acceptable, and that buying, selling, or trading votes is inherently wrong. This book challenges our fundamental assumptions about voting, revealing why it is not a duty for most citizens—in fact, it argues, many people owe it to the rest of us not to vote. Bad choices at the polls can result in unjust laws, needless wars, and calamitous economic policies. The book shows why voters have duties to make informed decisions in the voting booth, to base their decisions on sound evidence for what will create the best possible policies, and to promote the common good rather than their own self-interest. They must vote well—or not vote at all. This book explains why voting is not necessarily the best way for citizens to exercise their civic duty, and why some citizens need to stay away from the polls to protect the democratic process from their uninformed, irrational, or immoral votes. In a democracy, every citizen has the right to vote. This book reveals why sometimes it's best if they don't. In a new afterword, “How to Vote Well,” the book provides a practical guidebook for making well-informed, well-reasoned choices at the polls.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Zaki

Abstract: Islam has set the terms of ownership, whether public ownership, the individual and the state. By law, individuals are entitled to have, enjoy, and transfer of wealth, but people also have a moral obligation to spend in his property. Permissibility of individual ownership is an attempt to achieve distributive justice in real terms, and maintaining a balance in economic matters. Ownership system in Islam has many different features and systems of capitalism and communism, because Islam provides a balance between the opposites can be overstated by both the School of Economics. Although Islam gives rights to individuals to possess wealth, but the state has the right to regulate the ownership of individual interventions with the provisions outlined by the Islamic shariah.Keywords: Individual Ownership, Capitalism, SocialismAbstrak: Islam telah mengatur ketentuan kepemilikan, baik kepemilikan umum, individu maupun negara. Secara hukum, individu berhak untuk memiliki, menikmati, dan memindahtangankan kekayaan, akan tetapi individu juga memiliki kewajiban moral untuk menginfakkan hartanya. Kebolehan kepemilikan individu merupakan upaya untuk mencapai keadilan distributif secara riil, dan menjaga keseimbangan dalam masalah ekonomi. Sistem kepemilikan dalam Islam memiliki banyak keistimewaan dan berbeda dengan sistem kapitalisme dan komunisme, karena Islam memberikan keseimbangan antara hal-hal berlawanan yang terlalu dilebih-lebihkan oleh kedua mazhab ekonomi tersebut. Walaupun Islam memberikan hak kepada individu untuk memiliki kekayaan, namun negara memiliki hak intervensi untuk mengatur kepemilikan individu dengan ketentuan-ketentuan yang telah digariskan oleh syari’at Islam.Kata kunci: Kepemilikan Individu, Kapitalisme, Sosialisme


Yuridika ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 260
Author(s):  
Mahrus Ali ◽  
Ari Wibowo

 The study proposes the compensation and restitution regulations which should be oriented to protect the victim of crime. Although most regulations have been adopted the right of the victims to receive the compensation and restitution, but this study finds that there are some weaknesses in such regulations. Hence, compensation regulation should be specifically focused on the fulfillment of the right of the victims of crime. It shall not depend on court decisions, but such compensation should be provided even though the victims ceased before the court proceeding has started, or even if he or she wrongly arrested by police. This compensation is only to cover material losses and traumatic stress recovery cost. It could be paid directly monthly/yearly and could be converted to other form of compensation. Restitution refers to the paradigm of restorative justice. In Indonesia, restitution should be based on final and binding court decision. If the perpetrator does not want to provide it for the victim, he/she has moral obligation to provide it for the victim oven without inkracht court decision, and this could be used by the judges to pardon the perpetrator. Restitution shall be enforced for all criminal offences which resulting direct and indirect losses for the victims. Restitution is not merely about monetary values but moral obligation of the perpetrator to recover the victim’s condition.


1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji

Determinism is the thesis that ‘there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.’ When various compatibilists discuss determinism and moral responsibility, they champion the view that although determinism is inconsistent with freedom to do otherwise, it is nevertheless consistent with responsibility. Determinism, then, does not, in the view of these compatibilists, threaten one sort of moral appraisal — the sort we make, for example, when we say that someone is blameworthy for some deed. Call moral deontic normative statuses like those of being morally right, wrong, or obligatory, ‘moral anchors.’ A key objective of this paper is to show that even if compatibilists can secure moral responsibility against the threat of determinism, possibly, by establishing that freedom to do otherwise is not the right sort of freedom required for responsibility, they will not be able to secure the very anchors of morality by any similar line of reasoning. Specifically, I argue that if certain principles of moral obligation are true, nothing can be morally right, wrong, or obligatory in a world in which we lack alternative possibilities. Thus, whereas unfreedom to do otherwise may be compatible with responsibility, it is incompatible with moral anchorage.


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