scholarly journals External Goods and the Complete Exercise of Virtue in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sukaina Hirji
Keyword(s):  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Good Sense ◽  
Virtuous Agent ◽  
External Goods ◽  
Virtuous Character ◽  
Virtuous Activity

Abstract In Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, Aristotle seems to argue that certain external goods are needed for happiness because, in the first place, they are needed for virtuous activity. This has puzzled scholars. After all, it seems possible for a virtuous agent to exercise her virtuous character even under conditions of extreme hardship or deprivation. Indeed, it is natural to think these are precisely the conditions under which one’s virtue shines through most clearly. I argue that there is good sense to be made of Aristotle’s stance on external goods. Drawing on passages in Politics 7.13 and Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, I develop and defend a distinction between the “mere” exercise of virtue, and the full or complete exercise of virtue. I explain how, on his view, a range of external goods is required for the full exercise of virtue, and I show that it is only this full exercise that is constitutive of eudaimonia. I argue that, for Aristotle, the distinguishing feature of this distinction is the value of the virtuous action’s ends. An action that fully expresses virtue aims at an end that is unqualifiedly good, while an action that merely exercises virtue does not. The external goods Aristotle mentions in NE 1.8 are necessary for performing actions with unqualifiedly good ends, and so necessary for the complete exercise of virtue.

scholarly journals Aristotle on Self-Sufficiency, External Goods, and Contemplation

2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Marc Gasser-Wingate
Keyword(s):  
Human Life ◽  
Moral Virtues ◽  
Self Sufficiency ◽  
Human Happiness ◽  
External Goods ◽  
Virtuous Activity

AbstractAristotle tells us that contemplation is the most self-sufficient form of virtuous activity: we can contemplate alone, and with minimal resources, while moral virtues like courage require other individuals to be courageous towards, or courageous with. This is hard to square with the rest of his discussion of self-sufficiency in the Ethics: Aristotle doesn‘t generally seek to minimize the number of resources necessary for a flourishing human life, and seems happy to grant that such a life will be self-sufficient despite requiring a lot of external goods. In this paper I develop an interpretation of self-sufficiency as a form of independence from external contributors to our activity, and argue that this interpretation accounts both for Aristotle‘s views on contemplation and for the role self-sufficiency plays in his broader account of human happiness.

Good Sense on Research Ethics

1981 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 351-352
Author(s):  
M. Brewster Smith
Keyword(s):  
Research Ethics ◽  
Good Sense

Reading the Nicomachean Ethics as an Investigation

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-196
Author(s):  
Guy Schuh
Keyword(s):  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Small Point

Abstract Aristotle tells us that the Nicomachean Ethics is an “inquiry” and an “investigation” (methodos and zētēsis). This paper focuses on an under-appreciated way that the work is investigative: its employment of an exploratory investigative strategy—that is, its frequent positing of, and later revision or even rejection of, merely preliminary positions. Though this may seem like a small point, this aspect of the work’s methodology has important consequences for how we should read it—specifically, we should be open to the possibility that some contradictions in the text are the result of his employment of this investigative strategy. In the paper, I describe this investigative strategy, discuss what motivates Aristotle to employ it in the work, and go through three contradictions that are plausibly identified as examples of its use—specifically, his claims that courageous people do and do not fear death, that friendship is and is not mutually recognized goodwill, and that virtuous people do and do not choose noble actions for their own sake.

Spinoza’s Ethical Theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Don Garrett
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Moral Significance ◽  
Philosophical Naturalism ◽  
History Of Ethics ◽  
Virtuous Character ◽  
History Of ◽  
Good And Evil

This chapter analyzes Spinoza’s ethical theory in the context of his philosophical naturalism, his doctrine that the actual essence of each thing is its striving for self-preservation (conatus), and his psychology of the emotions as it concerns both “bondage to the passions” and the active emotions such as intellectual joy. It explains how Spinoza’s ethical precepts are expressed chiefly through demonstrated propositions about good and evil, virtue, the guidance of reason, and “the free man.” Particular attention is given to questions about (1) the meaning of ethical language, (2) the nature of the good, (3) the practicality of reason, (4) the role of virtuous character, (5) the requirements for freedom and moral responsibility (especially in light of his necessitarianism), and (6) the possibility and moral significance of altruism. The chapter concludes by briefly assessing the significance of Spinoza’s ethical theory and its place in the history of ethics.

‘Ought’ in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Annas
Keyword(s):  
Nicomachean Ethics

Much attention has been paid to the issue of whether, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle uses what we would recognize as deontic concepts. On the basis of a study of dei and other constructions I argue that Aristotle’s use of them is often misconstrued and should be interpreted as giving reasons that are reasons of virtue, not a distinct alternative. Many issues remain live in the interpretation (and the translation) of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics; in this essay I offer a contribution to one of these, the nature and role of deontic concepts in the work. I offer this essay with pleasure to a celebration of Terry and Gail’s work.

Practical Truth

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Charles
Keyword(s):  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Third Way ◽  
The Third ◽  
Two Component ◽  
Major Competitor ◽  
Additional Support

This paper concerns Aristotle’s discussion of practical truth in Nicomachean Ethics VI.2.1139a17–b5. The essay falls into five sections. In the first three, I outline two styles of interpretation of Aristotle’s remarks and suggest that one of them (which I call ‘the third way’) gives a better reading than that offered by its major competitor (which I call ‘the two-component’ view). In the fourth I consider some texts in the remainder of NE VI which provide additional support for the third way of reading. In a brief concluding section, I seek to locate Aristotle’s view of practical truth, so understood, in a broader philosophical context.

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