Aristotle’s View of the Relation Between Happiness(euadaimonia) and the External Goods

2017 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 177-208
Author(s):  
ByungSeok Son
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
C.C.W. Taylor

The literal sense of the Greek word eudaimonia is ‘having a good guardian spirit’: that is, the state of having an objectively desirable life, universally agreed by ancient philosophical theory and popular thought to be the supreme human good. This objective character distinguishes it from the modern concept of happiness: a subjectively satisfactory life. Much ancient theory concerns the question of what constitutes the good life: for example, whether virtue is sufficient for it, as Socrates and the Stoics held, or whether external goods are also necessary, as Aristotle maintained. Immoralists such as Thrasymachus (in Plato’s Republic) sought to discredit morality by arguing that it prevents the achievement of eudaimonia, while its defenders (including Plato) argued that it is necessary and/or sufficient for eudaimonia. The primacy of eudaimonia does not, however, imply either egoism (since altruism may itself be a constituent of the good life), or consequentialism (since the good life need not be specifiable independently of the moral life). The gulf between ‘eudaimonistic’ and ‘Kantian’ theories is therefore narrower than is generally thought.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Patricia L. Vesely

Abstract In this article, I argue that Job 29 provides an eudaimonic depiction of human happiness whereby virtue, combined with a number of “external goods” is held up as the best possible life for human beings. I compare Job’s vision of the “good life” with an Aristotelian conception of εὐδαιμονία and conclude that there are numerous parallels between Job and Aristotle with respect to their understanding of the “good life.” While the intimate presence of God distinguishes Job’s expectation of happiness with that of Aristotle, Job is unique among other eudaimonic texts in the Hebrew Bible in that expectations of living well are expressed in terms of virtue, rather than Torah piety. In the second portion of the article, I assess Job’s conception of human flourishing from the perspective of the divine speeches, which enlarge Job’s vision of the “good life” by bringing Job face-to-face with the “wild inhabitants” of the cosmos.


2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Marc Gasser-Wingate

AbstractAristotle tells us that contemplation is the most self-sufficient form of virtuous activity: we can contemplate alone, and with minimal resources, while moral virtues like courage require other individuals to be courageous towards, or courageous with. This is hard to square with the rest of his discussion of self-sufficiency in the Ethics: Aristotle doesn‘t generally seek to minimize the number of resources necessary for a flourishing human life, and seems happy to grant that such a life will be self-sufficient despite requiring a lot of external goods. In this paper I develop an interpretation of self-sufficiency as a form of independence from external contributors to our activity, and argue that this interpretation accounts both for Aristotle‘s views on contemplation and for the role self-sufficiency plays in his broader account of human happiness.


Author(s):  
Nancy E. Snow

Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics takes inspiration from Aristotle’s ethical theory. Central to this approach is that virtues, enduring dispositions of character and intellect, are essential, along with external goods, for us to live flourishing lives in accordance with our nature as rational beings. Aristotle’s theory is teleological, for the virtues direct us toward the end or telos of flourishing and enable us to attain it. The theory is naturalistic in the sense that to live a virtuous life is to live a life of natural goodness. This chapter explains these and other ideas by reviewing Rosalind Hursthouse’s view that virtue ethics is a viable alternative to deontology and consequentialism, followed by a discussion of two major themes of Daniel C. Russell’s account of the role of practical reason in virtue ethics. Finally, it turns to ethical naturalism as articulated by Hursthouse, Philippa Foot, and Michael Thompson, with mention of McDowell’s approach.


1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 625-636 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas W. Smith

Contemporary debates over liberal political theory should encourage renewed investigation of the common good, and it is appropriate to begin by interrogating Aristotle's account. Aristotle argues that injustice stands in the way of the common good. Injustice is motivated by both overgrasping for scarce external goods, such as money, honor, and power, and by excessive desires. Aristotle argues that the common good requires a reorientation away from external goods to satisfying activities that do not diminish in the sharing. He sketches an analogical account of familial and political relationships that leads us to wonder what the political conditions are for the common good. Reflecting on these conditions not only points to the strict limits of the common good but also speaks to both sides in debates over liberal theory.


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