Music and philosophical naturalism

<p>The philosophical and scientific explication of music is a cutting-edge field in contemporary academia. This thesis develops a naturalistic framework for theorising about music. The following novel philosophical positions are motivated and defended: a polysemy analysis of “sound”, conceptual pluralism about music, a pluralistic framework for approaching the science of music, and a fictionalist account of Western musical artworks. The adaptation/ by-product framework for couching discussion about the evolution of music is critiqued. A novel, co-evolutionary, niche construction model of the foundations of musicality and the origins, expansion and stabilisation of music is developed, couched in the general context of hominin evolution and prehistory. Conceptual and methodological reflection accompanies the evolutionary scenario developed.</p>

Music and philosophical naturalism

<p>The philosophical and scientific explication of music is a cutting-edge field in contemporary academia. This thesis develops a naturalistic framework for theorising about music. The following novel philosophical positions are motivated and defended: a polysemy analysis of “sound”, conceptual pluralism about music, a pluralistic framework for approaching the science of music, and a fictionalist account of Western musical artworks. The adaptation/ by-product framework for couching discussion about the evolution of music is critiqued. A novel, co-evolutionary, niche construction model of the foundations of musicality and the origins, expansion and stabilisation of music is developed, couched in the general context of hominin evolution and prehistory. Conceptual and methodological reflection accompanies the evolutionary scenario developed.</p>

Introduction

This Introduction outlines the central focus of Philosophy of Psychedelics: the therapeutic use of psychedelics in psychiatry and its apparent conflict with philosophical naturalism. The chapter briefly describes recent findings that controlled psychedelic administration can have lasting psychological benefits for healthy subjects and for psychiatric patients. It then cites evidence that these psychological benefits are mediated by ‘mystical-type’ experiences. For those sympathetic to naturalism, the philosophical view that only the natural world exists, this prompts a concern: do psychedelics cause therapeutic benefits by inducing non-naturalistic beliefs in a cosmic consciousness or divine Reality? This Introduction outlines a plan to answer this ‘Comforting Delusion Objection’ in subsequent chapters. The basic strategy is to argue that, even if naturalism is true, psychedelic therapy is still acceptable because (i) its epistemic risks are smaller than they might appear, and (ii) it also has epistemic benefits that are consistent with naturalism.

The Scientific Weltanschauung: (Anti-)naturalism in Dilthey, Jaspers and Analytic Philosophy

Different forms of methodological and ontological naturalism constitute the current near-orthodoxy in analytic philosophy. Many prominent figures have called naturalism a (scientific) image (Sellars, W. 1962. “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man.” In Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, Reality, 1–40. Ridgeview Publishing), a Weltanschauung (Loewer, B. 2001. “From Physics to Physicalism.” In Physicalism and its Discontents, edited by C. Gillett, and B. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Stoljar, D. 2010. Physicalism. Routledge), or even a “philosophical ideology” (Kim, J. 2003. “The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism.” Journal of Philosophical Research 28: 83–98). This suggests that naturalism is indeed something over-and-above an ordinary philosophical thesis (e.g. in contrast to the justified true belief-theory of knowledge). However, these thinkers fail to tease out the host of implications this idea – naturalism being a worldview – presents. This paper draws on (somewhat underappreciated) remarks of Dilthey and Jaspers on the concept of worldviews (Weltanschauung, Weltbild) in order to demonstrate that naturalism as a worldview is a presuppositional background assumption which is left untouched by arguments against naturalism as a thesis. The concluding plea is (in order to make dialectical progress) to re-organize the existing debate on naturalism in a way that treats naturalism not as a first-order philosophical claim, but rather shifts its focus on naturalism’s status as a worldview.

ARTISTIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL NATURALISM AND THE NOOSPHERIC WORLD VIEW OF M. M. PRISHVIN

The author’s attention is focused on the creative heritage of M. M. Prishvin, considered in the context of the noospheric constructions of Russian cosmism. It is shown that the basis of the worldview of the writer (scientific in its origins) is the orientation towards “personal perception of nature”, as well as his anthropology unfolds in the “doctrine of the All-Human”. The specificity of M. M. Prishvin’s naturalism, organically combining science and art, through the ability to “instantly grasp the world as a whole” is revealed. The childishness (“baby in the soul”) as a necessary filter for the perception of the world, which “methodological” sets the ideal of “living knowledge” as a synthesis of rationalism and intuitionism is shown. The conclusion about the dual nature of man, dialectically connects nature struggle and nature conservation, is made

Transcendental Idealism and the Self-Knowledge Premise

The relation between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism awaits more careful determination, i. e. whether the issue of their compatibility hinges on their ontological view on the relation between physical and mental phenomena (i. e. whether it is supervenience or emergence) or on their epistemological view on our access to mental content. The aim of this paper is to identify a tension between transcendental idealism and philosophical naturalism, which lies not in their ontological view on the nature of substances, but in their epistemological view on the relation between self-awareness and the first-personal access to mental content. I will first trace the (mis)understanding of transcendental idealism as Berkeleyan idealism to a misinterpretation of the self-knowledge premise in transcendental arguments. I will argue that transcendental idealism is not so much concerned with grounding reality of the external world as with establishing the agential nature of the first-personal perspective of experience, and it has an important implication on the meaning and function of self-awareness in transcendental idealism.

Science, Scientism, and Evolution

This chapter discusses some themes to which Lewis returned often because they reflect philosophical errors that are still influential in culture—science and scientism, evolution and evolutionism. Under the facade of science, even the science of evolution, philosophical naturalism, materialism, and reductionism serve as the paragons of knowledge and often guide social policy. Thus, “scientism” and “evolutionism” are labels for the combination of naturalism and science in general and evolutionary science in particular. Lewis defines science as seeking natural causes for natural effects, which, when successful, formulates laws of the physical operation of nature. Such an intellectual enterprise is neutral with respect to religious and theological positions and is hardly strong evidence for naturalism and empiricism. Lewis identifies the conflict as occurring, not between science and religion (or theism), but between naturalism and theism as philosophical worldviews. As a case in point, Lewis sees no conflict between the scientific theory of evolution and its increasing confirmation by empirical evidence, but he does see a conflict between evolution as interpreted by philosophical naturalism—with ideas that humanity is not of special worth, that there is no God who is ultimately responsible for the existence of the world, and so on. An item of particular interest is the Lewis–Van Osdall correspondence (recently discovered, never before published) regarding what advice Lewis would offer on Van Osdall’s contemplated book aimed at presenting science to a general audience, especially a Christian audience.

Mind, Miracle, and Nature

Lewis as a theist (and Christian theist) was the sworn opponent of philosophical naturalism and materialism as worldviews. In his book Miracles, Lewis launches a philosophical attack on naturalism in a special way: he attacks its assumption that physical or material nature is all there is and runs by unbroken laws. He uses the technical Humean definition that a “miracle” would then be a “violation of the laws of nature” and goes on to show that rational thought (which must be free to decide on truth and not determined by physical processes to believe what it believes) is technically a miracle. Probably Lewis’s most important contribution to the field of philosophy is what we call his “argument from reason,” which maintains that naturalism cannot explain the logical reasoning process and that the very existence of this process strongly points to theism. We discuss the Lewis-Anscombe debate over the relation of naturalism and human reason, which spurred Lewis to revise his earlier argument. Prior to this debate, Lewis charged naturalists with committing a self-contradiction by claiming to hold his or her position by reasoning because naturalism implies that all events (including thoughts) are determined by law rather than freedom to discern logic. The Anscombe encounter led Lewis to say instead that there is a “cardinal difficulty,” which the naturalist cannot overcome.