Lobbying and the collective action problem: comparative evidence from enterprise surveys

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Barber ◽  
Jan Pierskalla ◽  
Simon Weschle
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Bayesian Variable Selection ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Level Indicator ◽  
Lobbying Activity ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
The Us ◽  
Major Shortcoming ◽  
Enterprise Surveys

Industry lobbying is traditionally thought of as a non-excludable good subject to collective action problems that are most easily solved by concentrated industries. However, there is very little empirical support for this hypothesis. In this paper, we address a major shortcoming of existing work on the topic: Its near-exclusive reliance on data from the US. Using comparative firm-level survey data from up to 74 countries, we construct an industry-level indicator of concentration and test its effect on firms’ lobbying activity. Using multilevel Extreme Bounds Analysis and Bayesian Variable Selection techniques to account for model uncertainty, we find no evidence that industry concentration is a predictor of lobbying activity. We discuss the implications of these non-findings for the literature and outline possible avenues for further research.

In retrospect: The influence of chief executive officers’ historical relative pay on overconfidence

2021 ◽  
pp. 147612702110048
Author(s):  
J Daniel Zyung ◽  
Wei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Self Confidence ◽  
Self Worth ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Leadership Research ◽  
The Relationship

This study proposes that chief executive officers who have received over their tenure a greater sum of total compensation relative to the market’s going rate become overconfident. We posit that this happens because historically overpaid chief executive officers perceive greater self-worth to the firm whereby such self-serving attribution inflates their level of self-confidence. We also identify chief executive officer- and firm-level cues that can influence the relationship between chief executive officers’ historical relative pay and their overconfidence, suggesting that chief executive officers’ perceived self-worth is more pronounced when chief executive officers possess less power and when their firm’s performance has improved upon their historical aspirations. Using a sample of 1185 firms and their chief executive officers during the years 2000–2016, we find empirical support for our predictions. Findings from this study contribute to strategic leadership research by highlighting the important role of executives’ compensation in creating overconfidence.

scholarly journals Agency in historical institutionalism coalitional work in the creation, maintenance, and change of institutions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Emmenegger
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Historical Institutionalism ◽  
Sociological Institutionalism ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
The Creation

AbstractInstitutionalism gives priority to structure over agency. Yet institutions have never developed and operated without the intervention of interested groups. This paper develops a conceptual framework for the role of agency in historical institutionalism. Based on recent contributions following the coalitional turn and drawing on insights from sociological institutionalism, it argues that agency plays a key role in the creation and maintenance of social coalitions that stabilize but also challenge institutions. Without such agency, no coalition can be created, maintained, or changed. Similarly, without a supporting coalition, no contested institution can survive. Yet, due to collective action problems, such coalitional work is challenging. This coalitional perspective offers a robust role for agency in historical institutionalism, but it also explains why institutions remain stable despite agency. In addition, this paper forwards several portable propositions that allow for the identification of who is likely to develop agency and what these actors do.

scholarly journals Financial constraint, trust, and export performances: firm-level evidence from Africa

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Maty Konte ◽  
Gideon Ndubuisi
Keyword(s):  
Financial Constraints ◽  
Interpersonal Trust ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Financial Constraint ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Country Level ◽  
The World Bank ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Enterprise Surveys

Abstract Several existing studies have documented a negative relationship between firm financial constraint and export activities but do not attempt to examine factors that could attenuate this relationship in Africa. In this paper, we examine the effect of financial constraint on exports in Africa and explore how the level of trust in countries where firms are located shapes this relationship. We combine the World Bank Enterprise Surveys with different measures of country-level personal and interpersonal trust computed from the Afrobarometer surveys of 19 African countries. Our results show that financial constraints negatively affect export activities. However, this negative effect is attenuated for firms that are located in trust-intensive societies. These findings are robust to different specifications. Interestingly, we find that small and medium-sized enterprises in Africa are more likely to be affected by financial constraints but also more likely to benefit from a higher level of both personal and interpersonal trust, while for larger firms only interpersonal trust matters.

scholarly journals Influencing Attitudes and Preferences Toward Climate Change using a Multi-Player, Transportation Themed Board Game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandra Xiaoyi Kjorven
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Board Game ◽  
Life Choices ◽  
Board Games ◽  
Effective Combination ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Game Board

Traditional tabletop board games have soared in popularity in recent years, and used often as tools for education and entertainment. Board games are an especially engaging format for studying themes of collective-action problem solving. This study looks at one of the most complex collective-action problems of this generation, climate change, and evaluates how individual attitudes and preferences may be altered by playing a board game specifically designed to influence how people relate to an issue. The board game Wheels was introduced and taught to 18 participants, who engaged in five separate playtesting sessions where observation, survey and interview data were collected. The study evaluates participants' attitudes and preferences toward certain transportation and climate change topics before and after playing the game. The game showed promise in changing players' preferences toward certain modes of transportation - increasing preferences toward electric vehicles and cycling, and decreasing preference towards gas powered cars. These findings indicate that the effective combination of select climate change game mechanics in a highly personalized theme may produce an engaging and entertaining experience that has the potential to transcend the game board and impact players' outlook upon real life choices.

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