How City Lobbyists Bridge Representational Gaps

This chapter develops a simple theory of intergovernmental lobbying that emphasizes the relationship between cities and their elected delegations. Compared to most interest groups, cities are uniquely dependent on the state and federal officials who are elected to represent them by virtue of their political geography. The quality of this representation should therefore influence the demand for the lobbying. This chapter tests several observable implications of this theory using original panel data on annual city lobbying activity in all fifty states. A series of difference-in-differences designs reveal that municipal officials hire lobbyists in response to a wide array of representational challenges, such as hostile redistricting efforts and flips in the partisan composition of their delegations. The results are broadly consistent with a model of intergovernmental lobbying in which cities use lobbyists to compensate for the representational gaps that sometimes emerge in federal systems.

Regulating lobbyists in New Zealand

<p>Lobbying is a vital aspect of democratic governance and is for the most part beneficial to society. However, recent high-profile instances of lobbying activity in New Zealand have damaged governmental integrity and appear to have diminished public confidence in government decision-making processes. The Lobbying Disclosure Bill was introduced to the New Zealand Parliament in 2012 in the hope that transparency mechanisms could dissuade harmful lobbying without impeding ordinary activity. The Bill was rejected at the select committee stage due to a number of drafting deficiencies. These shortcomings made the Bill difficult to implement, and imposed a disproportionate limit on a number of human rights. Despite these failings, it is both possible and desirable to regulate lobbying activity in New Zealand. Drawing from overseas experiences, this paper suggests modifications to the Lobbying Disclosure Bill which would discourage harmful lobbying while also mitigating the concerns raised by critics of the Bill.</p>

Regulating lobbyists in New Zealand

<p>Lobbying is a vital aspect of democratic governance and is for the most part beneficial to society. However, recent high-profile instances of lobbying activity in New Zealand have damaged governmental integrity and appear to have diminished public confidence in government decision-making processes. The Lobbying Disclosure Bill was introduced to the New Zealand Parliament in 2012 in the hope that transparency mechanisms could dissuade harmful lobbying without impeding ordinary activity. The Bill was rejected at the select committee stage due to a number of drafting deficiencies. These shortcomings made the Bill difficult to implement, and imposed a disproportionate limit on a number of human rights. Despite these failings, it is both possible and desirable to regulate lobbying activity in New Zealand. Drawing from overseas experiences, this paper suggests modifications to the Lobbying Disclosure Bill which would discourage harmful lobbying while also mitigating the concerns raised by critics of the Bill.</p>

Il fascismo ‘liberista’ e la ‘quasi abolizione’ dell’imposta di successione del 1923

In summer 1923, in the midst of the ‘fight’ to balance the budget, Minister Alberto De Stefani announced the abolition of inheritance tax, pursuant to the ‘full powers’ granted to the government by the Parliament. This abolition – possibly the most iconic act of the ‘financial restauration’ carried on by De Stefani – provoked surprise and interest in the country and abroad but was substantially overlooked by historians. This chapter – first outcome of a research in progress – offers a first historical reconstruction of this episode of early 1920s Italian economic history, by documenting both the positions of an influent advisor of De Stefani, the economist Maffeo Pantaleoni, and even more, the lobbying activity carried on by pressure groups such as the bankers’ association, an influential businessman linked to Mussolini such as Cesare Goldmann, and a young, very proactive association of notaries. Moreover, the chapter surveys the way in which both Italian and international media reported on this case of politics of inequality, offering a different perspective on a crucial period in the consolidation of Fascist power.

Shadow Lobbyists

Special interest influence via lobbying is increasingly controversial and legislative efforts to deal with this issue have centered on the principle of transparency. In this paper we evaluate the effectiveness of the current regulatory framework provided by the US Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA). Specifically, we study the role of ex-Congressional officials who join US lobbying firms in positions that could be related to lobbying activity but without officially registering as lobbyists themselves. We find that firm lobbying revenues increase significantly when these potential ‘shadow lobbyists’ join, with effects in the range of 10-20%. This shadow lobbyist revenue effect is comparable to the effect of a registered lobbyist at the median of the industry skill distribution. As such, it is challenging to reconcile the measured shadow lobbyist effect with the 20% working time threshold for registering as a lobbyist. Based on our estimates, the contribution of unregistered ex-Congressional officials could explain 4.9% of the increase in sectoral revenues, compared to 24.0% for the group of registered officials.

Influence Activities, Coalitions, and Uniform Policies: Implications for the Regulation of Financial Institutions

We examine a setting in which agents can form lobbying coalitions to influence a policy maker. Policy uniformity causes agents to free ride on each other’s lobbying and gives them an incentive to form lobbying coalitions. We investigate when coalitions are formed by similar or dissimilar agents and show that endogenous coalition formation causes the effects of policy uniformity and lobbying costs on aggregate lobbying activity and policy strength to be nonmonotonic. Our model suggests that increased competition in the market for coalition-facilitating lobbyists can lead to less lobbying. We discuss implications for the regulation of financial institutions. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.

Professor Smith Goes to Washington: Educational Interest Group Lobbying, 1998–2017

Congressional lobbying by education-related interest groups is an understudied subject in education research. This brief uses congressional lobbying expenditure data from 1998 to 2017 to examine trends in lobbying behavior by labor unions; K–12 education providers; and public, private nonprofit, and for-profit higher education institutions. Education interest groups have spent in excess of $2 billion lobbying Congress since 1998. Higher education institutions represent a disproportionate share of lobbying activity and expenditures, accounting for almost 70% of education-focused interest groups and around 80% of education-related lobbying expenditures. Lobbying expenditures steadily rose until 2011 before rapidly declining. The brief speculates as to the possible reasons for these trends and concludes with a call for greater research on lobbying for education.

US Congress will spar over business liability

Significance Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell wants to shield corporate defendants from legal liability from some COVID-19 claims, as some states relax their lockdowns. Republicans including President Donald Trump insist that expanding legal immunity is a necessary condition for any additional stimulus bill to pass. Impacts The legal hurdles facing plaintiffs will grow, especially as more Republican-nominated judges are confirmed. Expanding legal liability has stimulated lobbying; changing liability standards will widely affect the disposition of lawsuits. The current lobbying activity will also shape the future pattern of campaign finance contributions.