scholarly journals Optimal Penalties for Repeat Offenders – The Role of Offence History

Author(s):  
Alfred Endres ◽  
Bianca Rundshagen

AbstractWithin an infinite and a corresponding finite game framework we analyse intertemporal punishment for repeat offenders. The legal authority is assumed to maximize social welfare by minimizing the sum of harm from crimes and cost of punishment. We show that the time horizon considerably affects the structure of the optimal penalty scheme. In the finite game framework decreasing as well as escalating penalty schemes may be optimal. For the more appropriate infinite game framework we show three main results: First, any penalty scheme can be replaced by a (weakly) escalating penalty scheme that leads to the same criminal activity and the same social penalization cost. Second, the optimal penalty scheme is of the escalating type. Third, the socially optimal level of crime under escalating penalties may be higher than the level which would be optimal under uniform penalties.

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 112-128
Author(s):  
Ido Weijers

This article explores the role of partners and parents of young adult repeat offenders in the process of desistance from crime. First, we conducted in-depth interviews with 22 young adults who had been involved in persistent criminal activity since adolescence but had since stopped. Some, but by no means all of them, stated that their partner had played an important role in this. In contrast, hardly any of them had any doubt about the importance of their parents’ role. We then investigated whether the same views were also found among young adult offenders where it was unclear whether or not they had desisted from crime. Based on in-depth interviews with 21 young adults, we conclude that this was indeed the case except for a minority who continued to offend. This article throws new light on the role of both partners and parents in the process of desisting from crime.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmad Bello Dogarawa ◽  
Suleiman Muhammad Hussain
Keyword(s):  

2000 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald R. King ◽  
Rachel Schwartz

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how legal regimes affect social welfare. We investigate four legal regimes, each consisting of a liability rule (strict or negligence) and a damage measure (out-of-pocket or independent-of-investment). The results of the experiment are for the most part consistent with the qualitative predictions of Schwartz's (1997) model; however, subjects' actual choices deviate from the point predictions of the model. We explore whether these deviations arise because: (1) subjects form faulty anticipations of their counterparts' actions and/or (2) subjects do not choose the optimal responses given their anticipations. We find that subjects behave differently under the four regimes in terms of anticipation errors and departures from best responses. For example, subjects playing the role of auditors anticipate investments most accurately under the regime with strict liability combined with out-of-pocket damages, but are least likely to choose the optimal response given their anticipations. This finding implies that noneconomic factors likely play a role in determining subjects' choices.


2007 ◽  
Vol 144B (2) ◽  
pp. 159-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rickard L. Sjöberg ◽  
Kent W. Nilsson ◽  
Hanna-Linn Wargelius ◽  
Jerzy Leppert ◽  
Leif Lindström ◽  
...  

1977 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Earl J. Hamilton

Wars in early modern times, although frequent, generated little price inflation because of their limited demands on real resources. The invention of paper currency and the resort to deficit financing to pay for wars changed that situation. In recent centuries wars have been the principal causes of inflation, although since World War II programs of social welfare unmatched by offsetting taxation have also fueled inflationary flames.


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