Risk-Averse Managers, Labour Market Structures, Public Policies and Discrimination
AbstractThis article presents a model to analyze the effects of first and second-moment statistical discrimination on the labour market. Second-moment statistical discrimination occurs when risk-averse managers make decisions regarding wage and hiring based on productivity variances. We provide a framework exploring managers’ discrimination based on differences in average productivity and in variance of productivity. Furthermore, since discrimination is composed of two types (wage and hiring discrimination), our model allows for the interdependence between hiring practices and wages. Using our model, we examine the effects of various anti-discrimination policies along with changes to the labour market structure. We show that managers’ behaviour may be driven by anti-discrimination policies and labour market structures. A firm reduces hiring when required to implement anti-discrimination policies to address wage inequality. A firm applying policies to promote employment equity must stimulate minority participation. A change in labour market structure does not alter the efficiency of policies promoting employment equity, but it does alter the efficiency of policies aimed at reducing wage differences.