scholarly journals Key agreement based on automaton groups

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-81
Author(s):  
Rostislav Grigorchuk ◽  
Dima Grigoriev
Keyword(s):  

Abstract We suggest several automaton groups as platforms for Anshel–Anshel–Goldfeld key agreement metascheme. They include Grigorchuk and universal Grigorchuk groups, Hanoi 3-towers group, the Basilica group and a subgroup of the affine group {\mathrm{Aff}_{4}(\mathbb{Z})} .

2013 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 258-265
Author(s):  
Pál Hegedűs

In this paper we analyse the natural permutation module of an affine permutation group. For this the regular module of an elementary Abelian p-group is described in detail. We consider the inequivalent permutation modules coming from nonconjugate complements. We prove their strong structural similarity well exceeding the fact that they have equal Brauer characters.


2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-44
Author(s):  
Shoba Bindu C ◽  
Chandra Sekhar Reddy P ◽  
Satya Narayana B

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (11) ◽  
pp. 2843-2852
Author(s):  
Wen-Hao LIU ◽  
Chun-Xiang XU
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (10) ◽  
pp. 2156-2167
Author(s):  
Qiang LI ◽  
Deng-Guo FENG ◽  
Li-Wu ZHANG ◽  
Zhi-Gang GAO

2009 ◽  
Vol 28 (12) ◽  
pp. 3165-3167
Author(s):  
Xin-yin XIANG

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hussein Abulkasim ◽  
Atefeh Mashatan ◽  
Shohini Ghose

AbstractQuantum key agreement enables remote participants to fairly establish a secure shared key based on their private inputs. In the circular-type multiparty quantum key agreement mode, two or more malicious participants can collude together to steal private inputs of honest participants or to generate the final key alone. In this work, we focus on a powerful collusive attack strategy in which two or more malicious participants in particular positions, can learn sensitive information or generate the final key alone without revealing their malicious behaviour. Many of the current circular-type multiparty quantum key agreement protocols are not secure against this collusive attack strategy. As an example, we analyze the security of a recently proposed multiparty key agreement protocol to show the vulnerability of existing circular-type multiparty quantum key agreement protocols against this collusive attack. Moreover, we design a general secure multiparty key agreement model that would remove this vulnerability from such circular-type key agreement protocols and describe the necessary steps to implement this model. The proposed model is general and does not depend on the specific physical implementation of the quantum key agreement.


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