Public Nomination and Direct Election in China

Asian Survey ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 484-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen-Hsuan Tsai ◽  
Peng-Hsiang Kao

Abstract This research takes the case of Public Nomination and Direct Election, currently being rolled out in the People's Republic of China, to explain the function of elections in China. We believe that the goal of implementing this election system is to increase the governing ability of the Chinese Communist Party, thus sustaining the survival of the party-state system.

1987 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 256-275
Author(s):  
Jon W. Huebner

On 1 October 1949 the People's Republic of China was formally established in Beijing. On 7 December Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), who had earlier moved to Taiwan to secure a final base of resistance in the civil war, ordered the Kuomintang (KMT) regime to withdraw to the island from Chengdu, Sichuan, its last seat on the mainland. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared its commitment to the goal of unifying the nation under the People's Republic, and thus called for the “liberation” of Taiwan. Although Taiwan represented the final phase of the still unfinished civil war, it was the strategic significance of the island that became of paramount concern to the CCP, the KMT and the United States.


2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
AMY KING

AbstractThe Chinese Communist Party was confronted with the pressing challenge of ‘reconstructing’ China's industrial economy when it came to power in 1949. Drawing on recently declassified Chinese Foreign Ministry archives, this article argues that the Party met this challenge by drawing on the expertise of Japanese technicians left behind in Northeast China at the end of the Second World War. Between 1949 and 1953, when they were eventually repatriated, thousands of Japanese technicians were used by the Chinese Communist Party to develop new technology and industrial techniques, train less skilled Chinese workers, and rebuild factories, mines, railways, and other industrial sites in the Northeast. These first four years of the People's Republic of China represent an important moment of both continuity and change in China's history. Like the Chinese Nationalist government before them, the Chinese Communist Party continued to draw on the technological and industrial legacy of the Japanese empire in Asia to rebuild China's war-torn economy. But this four-year period was also a moment of profound change. As the Cold War erupted in Asia, the Chinese Communist Party began a long-term reconceptualization of how national power was intimately connected to technology and industrial capability, and viewed Japanese technicians as a vital element in the transformation of China into a modern and powerful nation.


1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. G. Goodman

The position of first secretary of a provincial committee of the Chinese Communist Party – the highest ranking cadre at provincial level – was not originally one of major importance within the leadership in 1949 when the People's Republic of China was established. However, it has become so since largely as a result of the increase in the importance of the provincial level in the party–state system. The increased political significance of the first secretary was demonstrated most dramatically during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–69) when the provincial level was severely affected by the attack on the party–state system. Unlike their counterparts at the centre or sub-provincial levels almost all the provincial first party secretaries in office on the eve of the Cultural Revolution lost their positions as the attempt was made to completely reorganize the provincial level.


Author(s):  
Jeremy Wallace

Since 2012, politics in the People’s Republic of China has been remade. Both institutional and rhetorical changes characterize this neopolitical “new normal,” which coincides with Xi Jinping’s rise to the top of the party-state hierarchy. But these changes extend well beyond Xi himself. Political authority has been centralized and folded back into the Chinese Communist Party, while complaints, self-criticisms, and confessions have begun to air publicly. Repression and humiliation have been used against critics as wide-ranging as Hong Kong booksellers, feminist activists, and rights lawyers, among others. Most ominously, the government has embarked on a massive detention and reeducation scheme in Xinjiang, with the number of those interned estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands or even surpassing a million. This chapter investigates China’s neopolitical turn—its limits, sources, and implications.


1981 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 518-527 ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. G. Goodman

The Sixth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) met in Beijing from 27 to 29 June 1981. On its agenda were two items: changes in the highest-level leadership of the CCP, and the “ Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People's Republic of China.” ‘ Though the Plenum's decisions to a large extent confirmed and made official trends and policies that had become apparent during most of the previous year, they were nonetheless remarkable. The western press has, not unsurprisingly, focused on the replacement of Hua Guofeng by Hu Yaobang as Chairman of the CCP's Central Committee. However, the Plenum's reassessment of the Party's history since 1949; of the roles of Mao Zedong, Hua Guofeng and other CCP leaders; and of the nature of Mao Zedong Thought, are undoubtedly of greater significance in terms of the development of the People's Republic of China (PRC): as indeed is the fact of Hua Guofeng's demotion rather than his outright dismissal or “ purge.”


1965 ◽  
Vol 22 ◽  
pp. 14-30
Author(s):  
Kenneth Chen

In the journal Hsien-tai Fo-hsueh (Modern Buddhism), September 1959, there appeared a long article entitled “Lun Tsung-chiao Hsin-yang Tzu-yu” (“A Discussion Concerning Freedom of Religious Belief”), by Ya Han-chang, which was originally published in the official Communist ideological journal Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), 1959, No. 14. Appearing as it did in Red Flag it is justifiable to conclude that the views expressed in it represented the accepted Communist attitude toward religion. In this article, Ya wrote that the basic policy of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China is to “recognise that everyone has the freedom to believe in a religion, and also that everyone has the freedom not to believe in a religion.”


1972 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 593-598
Author(s):  
J. Chester Cheng

The historical experience of the Chinese Communist Party before 1949 has often assumed the dimension of a myth. As in any myth, what actually happens is not as important as the significant lesson to be learned. A case in point is the battle of “the last and the most strategic pass” of La-tzu-k'ou in the Long March. The Chinese annals contain at least five differing versions of this encounter on September 17–18, 1935. This may be attributed, inter alia, to the desire of the authors to glorify their own part in the Long March as much as that the battle of La-tzu-k'ou is of greater political than military significance. By publishing these accounts, the Chinese authorities hope to prove the correctness of Mao Tse-tung's policy of the northward march in mid-1935. Indeed Lin Piao's role was largely a magniloquent account of relevant events at La-tzu-k'ou, following his appointment as Minister of National Defense to succeed the disgraced P'eng Te-huao in 1959—notwithstanding the fact that Mao Tse-tung had in 1935 composed a well-known poem praising only P'eng's valor during the battle. True, history is historiography and historiography is politics in the People's Republic of China.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 208-219 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilie Frenkiel ◽  
Anna Shpakovskaya

This article traces the evolution of representative claim-making by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 up to the present day. Based on the analysis of official political discourses on the mass line, the Three Represents and more recent ongoing discourses on digitalization, we demonstrate the change and continuity of claim-making by the CCP. We show that while representative claim-making has undergone a significant transformation from the CCP as the representative of the working class to the sole representative of the Chinese people and nation, the CCP has been consistent throughout decades in maintaining its hegemony over representative claim-making.


1962 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 477-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Ayers

Biography in the People's Republic of China is not exempt from the ubiquitous slogan: “politics in command.” It is a highly purposeful craft, but rarely, if ever, is its primary purpose to portray an individual personality for his own sake, to inform objectively, or to entertain. The aim, instead, is to convince, enshrine, or inspire. Biography is didactic, hagiolatrous, or propagandistic. It is but one among many methods used in Communist China to support Marxist-Leninist views of history, provide sanction for the leaders of the Chinese Communist party, and fire enthusiasm for the acceptance and fulfillment of party programs. The accuracy, art, treatment of character, and probably even the quantity of biography published are limited by party preconceptions and enforced through party control over all media of information.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document