The Strange Case of Welfare Chauvinism in Eastern Europe

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 107-122
Author(s):  
Marko Grdešić

According to welfare chauvinism, access to the welfare state should be reserved for the native population, whereas immigrants are seen as a drain on resources. The curious aspect of welfare chauvinism in Europe is that it is more prevalent in the East. Why is this the case? This article uses the European Social Survey (ESS) and the Life in Transition Survey (LITS) in order to locate the most robust individual-level determinants of welfare chauvinism for countries of both Eastern and Western Europe. The results suggest that there is no support for the socioeconomic explanation of welfare chauvinism. There is support for the cultural capital explanation of welfare chauvinism, but only for Western Europe. Finally, there is support for the theory that higher levels of trust lessen the likelihood that a person adopts welfare chauvinism. This finding holds for both Eastern and Western Europe.

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 336-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Márton Hadarics

We investigated how attitudes towards social equality can influence the relationship between conservation motivation (or openness) and personal ideological preferences on the left-right dimension, and how this relationship pattern differs between Western and Central & Eastern European (CEE) respondents. Using data from the European Social Survey (2012) we found that individual-level of conservation motivation reduces cultural egalitarianism in both the Western European and the CEE regions, but its connection with economic egalitarianism is only relevant in the CEE region where it fosters economic egalitarianism. Since both forms of egalitarianism were related to leftist ideological preferences in Western Europe, but in the CEE region only economic egalitarianism was ideologically relevant, we concluded that the classic “rigidity of the right” phenomenon is strongly related to cultural (anti)egalitarianism in Western Europe. At the same time, conservation motivation serves as a basis for the “rigidity of the left” in the post-socialist CEE region, in a great part due to the conventional egalitarian economic views.


2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 535-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mónica Brito Vieira ◽  
Filipe Carreira da Silva ◽  
Cícero Roberto Pereira

Do attitudes towards the welfare state change in response to economic crises? Addressing this question is sometimes difficult because of the lack of longitudinal data. This article deals with this empirical challenge using survey data from the 2008 European Social Survey and from our own follow-up survey of Spring 2013 to track welfare attitudes at the brink and at the peak of the socio-economic crisis in one of the hardest hit countries: Portugal. The literature on social policy preferences predicts an increased polarisation in opinions towards the welfare state between different groups within society – in particular between labour market insiders and outsiders. However, the prediction has scarcely been tested empirically. A notoriously dualised country, Portugal provides a critical setting in which to test this hypothesis. The results show attitudinal change, and this varies according to labour market vulnerability. However, we observe no polarisation and advance alternative explanations for why this is so.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Jasper Muis ◽  
Tobias Brils ◽  
Teodora Gaidytė

Abstract While debates about far-right populism often concentrate on Central and Eastern Europe, research on these parties predominantly focuses on Western countries. Addressing this remarkable gap, this article revisits the ‘protest voting’ explanation for electoral support for the far right. Using European Social Survey data (2002–16) from 22 countries, we show that political dissatisfaction is a stronger explanatory factor when far-right parties are in opposition, but is a less important determinant of electoral support when they are in government. Previous findings based on Western Europe – which similarly showed that the anti-elite hypothesis is less relevant when far-right parties join government coalitions – travel well to post-communist European countries. In Hungary and Poland, we even find that far-right voters have become less distrustful of national political institutions than the rest of the electorate. Our conclusion implies that anti-elite populism is context-dependent and has limited use for understanding successes of leaders such as Wilders, Salvini and Orbán.


Author(s):  
Léna Pellandini-Simányi ◽  
Emese Gulyás

This chapter compares political consumerism in Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as well as within the CEE region, using European Social Survey, Special Eurobarometer, Fairtrade sales, and qualitative data. The chapter begins by discussing the largely neglected legacy of the socialist era for political consumerism. The discussion then compares European countries along twenty-two aspects of political consumerism, encompassing everyday consumer choices, attitudes, and awareness. The chapter shows, first, that certain forms of political consumerism cross-cut the East-West divide. Second, it proposes a threefold classification of the CEE countries (Mainstreamer, Reluctant Comfortable, and Passively Willing). Finally, the chapter outlines a version of political consumerism, referred to as the embedded politics of everyday life, prevalent in CEE, which differs from its Western counterpart in that it is less linked to political action and more to everyday ethics, such as thrift and patriotism.


2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 241-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomáš Sirovátka ◽  
Martin Guzi ◽  
Steven Saxonberg

This article tests several hypotheses for explaining the link between welfare-state performance and satisfaction with democracy. In conducting our multilevel analysis, we combine data from the European Social Survey 2012 special module on democracy with data on contextual and institutional conditions, including those on welfare-state regimes. Our results show that a discrepancy between desired policy goals and perceived policy outcomes in connection with the welfare state (i.e. the policy deficit) influences citizens’ perceptions of how well democracy in their country works. Social policies which citizens see as reducing poverty correlate positively with satisfaction with democracy. We also find evidence that satisfaction with democracy depends on the type of welfare regime, as well as on changes in economic conditions that arise due to financial crisis.


2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 201-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Toikko ◽  
Teemu Rantanen

AbstractThis study examines the relationship between the welfare state models and social political attitudes. The data are based on the sixth round of the European Social Survey. The study revealed a mechanism of how the relationship between concrete and abstract attitudes differs between the welfare states. In the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic welfare states the relationship is a positive one, which indicates that the welfare state has a broad support among citizens. In the Continental, Eastern and Southern welfare states the relationship is a negative one. This means that the less satisfied citizens are with governmental measures, the more positive their attitudes are regarding protecting citizens against poverty. Also the study showed that the welfare state model directly influences citizens’ concrete attitudes and indirectly influences abstract poverty attitudes. In this sense, the welfare state model is seen more as an attitudinal perception than an actual social policy.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nate Breznau ◽  
Maureen A. Eger

The intersection of group dynamics and socioeconomic status theories is applied as a framework for the puzzling relationship of immigration and support for the welfare state in Western Europe. Group dynamics theories suggest that how individuals define their group boundaries moderates the impact of immigration on support for the welfare state. Immigrant presence should have the strongest effects for those with exclusive national group boundaries; weaker for those with conditionally inclusive boundaries based on reciprocity; and weakest or non-existent for those with inclusive group boundaries. Group boundaries should interact with material self-interest leading individuals with less material security who are more likely to face social risks to be more supportive of the welfare state. Using data from the 4th European Social Survey linked to regional and national data we find that group boundary salience plays a large moderating role in the relationship of immigration and native support for the welfare state, and that this role is intricately linked to material self-interest. Group dynamics should therefore be viewed in conjunction with existing structural welfare state theories as opposed to an alternative or isolated mechanism.


Acta Politica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dimitri Gugushvili ◽  
Laura Ravazzini ◽  
Michael Ochsner ◽  
Martin Lukac ◽  
Orsolya Lelkes ◽  
...  

AbstractWelfare opinion research has traditionally viewed migration as a potential hazard for welfare solidarity. In this article, we argue that while increased presence of foreigners can indeed make some people less supportive of public welfare provision in general or trigger opposition to migrants’ social rights, the link between migration and solidarity is not universally a negative one. Instead, many people can combine support for migration with high preferences for comprehensive social protection; others can endorse migration while they are not particularly supportive of an all-encompassing welfare state. Based on this line of reasoning we construct a taxonomy of four ideal types of welfare solidarity that are present in contemporary European welfare states. To illustrate the usefulness of this heuristic tool, we apply Latent Class Factor Analysis to European Social Survey round 8 data. We find that the majority of Europeans (56%) combine strong support for both migration and the welfare state (extended solidarity). However, exclusive solidarity is also widely spread as over a quarter of respondents (28%) oppose migration while expressing strong support for the welfare state. People who oppose migration and have relatively low preference for the welfare state (diminished solidarity) represent a small minority (5%). A little more than a tenth (11%) of Europeans endorse migration, but express relatively low support for the welfare state, which we assume to be a reflection of cosmopolitan solidarity. Despite considerable variation in the incidence of the four solidarities across countries, the preference structure is the same for all. Further, we find that at the individual level, the propensity to hold one of these types of solidarities is influenced by social trust, citizenship and country of birth, financial situation, education, and residence type. However, the extent of migration and social spending do not appear to be related with the propensity of holding either type of solidarity as the liberal’s dilemma and the welfare chauvinism theories would predict.


2008 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudia Senik ◽  
Holger Stichnoth ◽  
Karine Van der Straeten

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
MARIUS R. BUSEMEYER ◽  
ALEXANDER H. J. SAHM

Abstract Rapid technological change – the digitalization and automation of work – is challenging contemporary welfare states. Most of the existing research, however, focuses on its effect on labor market outcomes, such as employment or wage levels. In contrast, this paper studies the implications of technological change for welfare state attitudes and preferences. Compared to previous work on this topic, this paper adopts a much broader perspective regarding different kinds of social policy. Using data from the European Social Survey, we find that individual automation risk is positively associated with support for redistribution, but negatively with support for social investment policies (partly depending on the specific measure of automation risk that is used), while there is no statistically significant association with support for basic income. We also find a moderating effect of the overall size of the welfare state on the micro-level association between risk and preferences.


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