The Right to Silence

2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 527-567
Author(s):  
Anthony Gray
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Home Country ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Right To Silence ◽  
The Right ◽  
Current Proposal

In recent years, we have seen continued erosion of an individual’s right to silence. The most recent attempts in the author’s home country, Australia, include a current proposal to adopt the United Kingdom approach, and allow inferences to be drawn from a failure to answer questions at an early stage of investigation, in circumstances where later the person does provide an explanation. An attempt to protect the right to silence in Australia at constitutional level is challenging, because Australia is one of the few Western nations that has not seen fit to enact an express bill of rights. This article will consider whether arguments might be made that, at least in some contexts, infringement of the right to silence is, nevertheless, contrary to the requirements of the Australian Constitution. Courts in other countries around the world have also recognized the right to silence in some circumstances where legislatures have attempted to limit it, and these will be considered in the Australian context, acknowledging appropriate contextual differences. Many countries are faced with the difficulty of reconciling fundamental due process principles with the need for effective investigatory powers sufficient to deal with evolving criminal threats. It will be instructive to consider how a successful balance has been accommodated in a range of jurisdictions. It is believed that the law of the author’s home country could be greatly enriched by engaging with North American and European case law, as this article will seek to demonstrate. The article is considered to be of interest to those outside of Australia, to understand the difficulties in protecting fundamental human rights when an express bill of rights does not exist in the relevant country, and to consider how other ways may be found to protect such rights. In this way, this article will use Australia as the example of a country without an express bill of rights, and will consider how, in that context, fundamental human rights can practically be protected by the courts. The conclusions are considered relevant to a range of nations. Specific examples include Singapore and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent India, as will be explained.

Standardy należytego uzasadnienia w świetle orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego i Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka

2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
Judicial Reasoning ◽  
The Right

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.

Overruling ‘the Salduz Doctrine’ in Beuze v Belgium: The ECtHR’s further retreat from the Salduz principles on the right to access to lawyer

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 342-362
Author(s):  
Ergul Celiksoy
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Increasing Trend ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access

In November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Beuze v Belgium. Relying on Ibrahim and Others v the United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber held that the Salduz principles require a two-stage test of analysis, and hence, ruled out that systematic statutory restriction of a general and mandatory nature would in itself constitute an automatic violation of Article 6 § 3(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the Beuze judgment appears to be very controversial, since the Grand Chamber failed to put forward any convincing reason why it departed from previous case law, particularly Dayanan v Turkey and other judgments against Turkey. In their separate opinion, the concurring Judges in Beuze were concerned that the Beuze judgment overruled ‘ Salduz itself and all other cases that have applied the Salduz test’, and thus, ‘actually distorts and changes the Salduz principle and devalues the right that the Court established previously’. This article analyses the Beuze judgment in the light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in order to examine whether it contradicts and dilutes the principles previously set out. Further, it discusses the implications of the new standards established in Ibrahim and Others and in subsequent cases, particularly Beuze. Particular attention is paid to the questions of how ‘fair’ is the application of overall fairness assessment in every case, how may the Court’s changing direction of approach concerning the right to access to a lawyer affect the increasing trend of recognition thereof, as a rule, by the contracting states, and finally, to what extent the new principles, especially those established in Beuze, comply with Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer.

scholarly journals L'égalité selon la Déclaration canadienne et la Charte québécoise : réflexions à partir de la nouvelle Loi sur les jurés ou la Charte des droits québécoise : un régime d'exception?

2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 627-662
Author(s):  
Bernard Grenier
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Specific Meaning ◽  
The Right

Quebec has a charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, which came into force by proclamation, on June 28th 1976. Yet, afresh Jurors Act was assented to barely two days later which contained a clause that a number of enumerated sections have effect notwithstanding the Charter. The concern there was clearly the right to equality, which is enshrined in some sections of the Charter. This article purports to assess the proper and specific meaning of equality within the context of the Quebec Charter, and in the light of the case law surrounding the Canadian Bill of Rights. The enactment of a non obstante clause into the Jurors Act has been, in our view, both unnecessary and inappropriate.

5. The Right to Silence and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination

Evidence ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L-T Choo
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Public Order ◽  
Substantial Body ◽  
Legal Advice ◽  
Right To Silence ◽  
The Right ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Chapter 5 deals with the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination. It considers relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. These include sections 34, 36, and 37, which permit adverse inferences to be drawn from certain failures of the defendant at the pre-trial stage. Section 34, in particular, has generated a substantial body of case law. The manner in which the Court of Appeal has resolved the issue of silence on legal advice has been subjected to particular criticism. The operation of section 34 has been held to be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights so long as a sufficiently watertight direction is given to the jury. The precise extent to which the privilege against self-incrimination applies to real evidence also remains uncertain and is an issue requiring resolution.

scholarly journals ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krešimir Kamber ◽  
Lana Kovačić Markić
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fair Trial ◽  
World Health ◽  
European Convention ◽  
European Court ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Way

On 11 March 2020 the World Health Organization announced the Covid-19 (coronavirus) to be a pandemic. To combat the pandemic, many countries had to adopt emergency measures and some of these measures have affected the judicial system, especially the functioning of courts. The pandemic has been characterised as far as the judiciary is concerned by complete or partial closure of court buildings for the parties and for the public. It is clear that the functioning of national judicial systems has been severely disrupted. This limited functioning of courts impacted the individuals’ right to a fair trial guaranteed, in particular, under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The aim of this article is to examine the manner of the administration of justice during the Covid pandemic and its impact on the due process guarantees. Focus is put on the extent to which different Covid measures, in particular remote access to justice and online hearings have impacted the guarantees of the right to a fair trial and the due process guarantees in general, notably in detention cases. In this connection, the article provides a comparative overview of the functioning of the European legal systems during the pandemic. It also looks into the way in which the two European courts – the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union functioned, as well as the way in which the Croatian courts, including the Constitutional Court, organised their work during the pandemic. The article then provides an insight into the issue of online/remote hearings in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and in the Croatian Constitutional Court’s case-law. On the basis of this assessment, the article identifies the differences in the use of remote/online hearings between and within jurisdictions. In conclusion, the article points to some critical considerations that should be taken into account when devising the manner in which any Covid pandemic experience with the administration of justice (notably with regard to remote/online hearings) can be taken forward.

scholarly journals Judicial infringement of the right to internet access by the imposition of special sentencing conditions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Nina White
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Internet Access ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Legislative History ◽  
The Right ◽  
Broad Approach

<p>Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act extends to protect internet access within New Zealand as a means of expression. Judicial restriction of internet access via the imposition of special conditions during sentencing is therefore an infringement of s 14. This interpretation of s 14 is consistent with its purpose, legislative history, and the broad approach afforded to human rights generally, as well as international case law and statutes. Any imposition of special conditions restricting internet access must be a demonstrably justifiable limit per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act to be legitimate. The practical considerations of such a technological limit also warrant judicial consideration before it is imposed. As yet, New Zealand has no explicit protection of internet access but growing acceptance of its importance indicates that reform or judicial acknowledgement are, or soon will be, required.</p>

scholarly journals CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN DECISIONS REGARDING NON-COMPLIANCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-46
Author(s):  
Dzhuzha О. M. ◽  
◽  
Melnychenko І. P. ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Legal Analysis ◽  
Life Imprisonment ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
The Right

The article provides a legal analysis of the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in such cases like “Vinter and Others v. The United Kingdom”, “Hutchinson v. The United Kingdom”. The European Court of Human Rights has established key standards for those sentenced to life imprisonment, compliance with which will ensure that this type of punishment meets the requirements of the Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such standards are: 1) sentencing of life imprisonment is not prohibited and does not conflict with the Article 3 or any other article of the Convention. The imposition of “non-reducible” life imprisonment may raise questions of compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention; 2) in decision making whether life imprisonment can be considered as “non-reducible”, it is necessary to establish whether the person convicted to life imprisonment had any prospect of release. If national law provides for the possibility of reviewing life imprisonment regarding its mitigating, reducing, terminating or releasing, this is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of th Article 3 of the Convention; 3) for the purposes of the Article 3 of the Convention it is sufficient that life imprisonment is reducible de jure and de facto; 4) European penitentiary policy is currently focusing on the correctional purpose of imprisonment, in particular until the end of long prison sentences; 5) at the very beginning of the sentence a person convicted to life imprisonment has the right to know what he must do to consider the possibility of his release and under what conditions the sentence will be reviewed or also in what order a request to this may be made; 6) if domestic law does not provide for any mechanism or possibility to review life imprisonment, then the non-compliance with the requirements of the Article 3 of the Convention occurs at the time of imposition of life imprisonment and not at a later stage. The importance of such standards separating of the European Court of Human Rights for the national theory and practice of life imprisonment is that these provisions are effective guidelines for determining the prospects of releasing from sentencing in the form life imprisonment. Key words: European Court of Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, case law, convict, life imprisonment.

scholarly journals THE EROSION OF THE SALDUZ DOCTRINE IN THE CASES OF IBRAHIM AND OTHERS V. THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BEUZE V. BELGIUM

2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 95-122
Author(s):  
Faruk H. Avdić ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Defense Attorney ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Grand Chamber ◽  
The Right

The so-called Salduz doctrine that concerns the right to a fair trial and the right to the defense attorney emerged from the case of Salduz v. Turkey, decided on the part of the European Court of Human Rights where the Grand Chamber found the violation of Article 6, paragraph 3(c) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In this connection, the aim of this paper is twofold. In the first place, the paper aims to demonstrate how the European Court of Human Rights has overturned the two main tenents of the so-called Salduz doctrine derived from its landmark case of Salduz v. Turkey in its later Judgments delivered in the case of Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom and the case of Beuze v. Belgium. The two tenets derived from the Salduz doctrine being examined in the paper are the right to access to the defense attorney as a rule during pre-trial proceedings and the absolute exclusionary rule. In the second place, the paper aims to offer a critique of the standard of compelling reasons employed in the Ibrahim Judgment. In order to achieve its aim, this paper primarily analyses the jurisprudence of the European Human Court of Human Rights in the cases of Salduz v. Turkey, Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom, and Beuze v. Belgium. Besides, the paper also touches upon other judgments of the European Court of Human Rights related to its subject. The paper in question, therefore, primarily relies on the case-law method in achieving its aims. The paper concludes that in overturning the Salduz doctrine in relation to aspects examined in the paper, the European Court of Human Rights has exacerbated the legal standing of the person against whom criminal proceedings are being conducted.

5. The Right to Silence and the Privilege against Self-Incrimination

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-141
Author(s):  
Andrew L-T Choo
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Case Law ◽  
European Convention ◽  
Public Order ◽  
Substantial Body ◽  
Legal Advice ◽  
Right To Silence ◽  
The Right ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Chapter 5 deals with the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination. It considers relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. These include sections 34, 36, and 37, which permit adverse inferences to be drawn from certain failures of the defendant at the pre-trial stage. Section 34, in particular, has generated a substantial body of case law. The manner in which the Court of Appeal has resolved the issue of silence on legal advice has been subjected to particular criticism. The operation of section 34 has been held to be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights so long as a sufficiently watertight direction is given to the jury. The implications for the privilege against self-incrimination of statutory provisions that criminalize the failure to provide information to law enforcement authorities are also considered.

scholarly journals Judicial infringement of the right to internet access by the imposition of special sentencing conditions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Nina White
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Internet Access ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Legislative History ◽  
The Right ◽  
Broad Approach

<p>Section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act extends to protect internet access within New Zealand as a means of expression. Judicial restriction of internet access via the imposition of special conditions during sentencing is therefore an infringement of s 14. This interpretation of s 14 is consistent with its purpose, legislative history, and the broad approach afforded to human rights generally, as well as international case law and statutes. Any imposition of special conditions restricting internet access must be a demonstrably justifiable limit per s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act to be legitimate. The practical considerations of such a technological limit also warrant judicial consideration before it is imposed. As yet, New Zealand has no explicit protection of internet access but growing acceptance of its importance indicates that reform or judicial acknowledgement are, or soon will be, required.</p>

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