The Middle East challenge to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Ttreaty

2020 ◽  
pp. 104-120
Author(s):  
Daniel Rajmil
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Nuclear Weapons

La histórica aprobación en julio de 2017 de un tratado para la prohibición de armas nucleares, in-cluso si está lleno de complejidades, puede representar un avance hacia su eliminación mundial. Además, el tratado refuerza el papel central de las Zonas Libres de Armamento Nuclear (ZLAN) como pasos decisivos en los procesos de desarme regional como en el caso de Próximo Oriente. En este documento se presenta un análisis de las opiniones políticas de los países de la región así como de los parámetros de su votación final. En un contexto de incertidumbre global, con dinámi-cas de disuasión renovadas, examinar la posible limitación del uso de armas nucleares a través de un estudio regional, ofrece una interesante visión del estado actual de las relaciones in-ternacionales.

The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons: The 1973 Middle East Crisis

1982 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry M. Blechman ◽  
Douglas M. Hart
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The Political

scholarly journals Looking Beyond a Nuclear-Armed Iran: The Major Implications of Nuclear Iran for the Middle East

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. p50
Author(s):  
Sayed Reza Hussaini
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Middle East ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
The West ◽  
Regional Powers ◽  
Cascade Effect ◽  
The Face ◽  
Enriched Uranium ◽  
Socioeconomic Consequences

Iran has pursued nuclear weapons for over four decades. The basic reasons for this quest have remained unchanged in the face of the most crippling sanctions. Almost three and a half years after Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Pact (JCPOA), Tehran officially announced that it has enriched uranium up to 60%, very close to the 90% suitable for nuclear weapons. Iran is highly likely to be the world’s next nuclear state. A nuclear-armed Iran will be emboldened to accelerate its aggressive activities in the region and act against its neighbors with little fear of retribution. Moreover, Iran’s network of proxies would adopt a more confrontational approach towards Israel. Besides, Iran’s politics of threat can have serious socioeconomic consequences for Israel.Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons could arguably set off a cascade effect, encouraging other major regional powers to move in the same direction. The West, particularly the United States, would seek to offset this risk by providing a “defenceumbrella”. HhhhjkhggHowever, some might be reluctant to be openly protected by the United Statesor would find the umbrella questionable and choose nuclear option for both security concerns and prestige.

scholarly journals Ingen panik - Iran kan balanceres

Politik ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Rahigh-Aghsan
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Persian Gulf ◽  
Global Security ◽  
The Persian Gulf ◽  
Rising Power

The majority view among Iran watchers and experts on the Middle East is that Iran is a rising power that poses an increasing threat to regional and even global security. This article takes issue with this view arguing that the rise of Iran and the threat it poses has been vastly exaggerated. There is no reason to panic - Iran will not be as dominant as some experts believe, and its ability to threaten the Persian Gulf let alone the Middle East is not as great as feared. Even an Iran armed with nuclear weapons can be contained and balanced. Bombing Iran would therefore be a major mistake. 

The United States and Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program, 1961–1973

2019 ◽  
pp. 64-111
Author(s):  
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Power Distribution ◽  
The United States ◽  
Johnson Administration ◽  
Arms Transfers ◽  
The Us ◽  
Nuclear Issue ◽  
Secondary Objective ◽  
The Cold War

Chapter 3 posits that the overriding objective of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations was to avoid containment failure in the Middle East. Thwarting the Israeli nuclear weapons program was a secondary objective. As Soviet arms sales to Egypt and Syria accelerated in the mid-1960s, the regional power distribution became unfavorable and the time horizons of threats to US interests grew shorter. The Johnson administration abandoned Kennedy’s demands for inspections of the Dimona reactor and instead sold M-48 tanks, A-4 Skyhawks, and later F-12 Phantoms to bolster Israel’s defenses. Congress, however, made it difficult for the Johnson and the Nixon administrations to link arms transfers to Israeli concessions on the nuclear issue. Chapter 3 examines the evolution of the US-Israeli strategic relationship against the backdrop of the Cold War from Kennedy’s demands for inspections in 1961 through the October 1973 Middle East War.

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