scholarly journals Income redistribution effect of income tax expenditures in Korea

2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-65
Author(s):  
유한욱
1986 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margaret Wilkinson

ABSTRACT‘Tax expenditures’ are public revenue losses which result from special allowances and reliefs given to various categories of taxpayer for reasons of economic and social policy. In 1983/4 tax expenditures in the personal income tax system cost nearly £11 billion which was equal to 35 per cent of revenue from personal income tax or 9 per cent of total public expenditure. This paper assesses their significance in the context of public expenditure and tax policy. It identifies those allowances and reliefs in the personal income tax system which may be regarded as tax expenditures, evaluates them and compares their cost with direct expenditures in similar areas. Many tax expenditures are inequitable and inefficient; and they are difficult for governments to control. If they were reduced some public expenditures could be protected from cuts, or the general burden of income tax could be reduced.


1988 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 227-232
Author(s):  
Björn Söderfeldt ◽  
Berth Danermark ◽  
Sven Larsson

Social insurances effect income distributions between social strata. Here, insurance returns in relation to income are studied on the Swedish sickness allowance insurance, which is intended to redistribute from higher to lower social strata. Two measures of social class are used, the socio-economic classification, the official index of Sweden, and a structural class concept, which in earlier results discriminates better for material factors such as income and work conditions. The material consists of all sickness cases of 1983 for 3161 persons, sampled from insurance registers and cross-classified with registers at taxation authorities. Data on insurance returns, incomes, and occupation are used. Results clearly confirm the intended redistribution effect, but considerably clearer with the structural class concept. The effect is even stronger than intended for some strata, where the system seems to lack in implementation. The consequences for choice of class measure are finally discussed.


1985 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron Wildavsky

Not long ago, I found myself at an athletic breakfast. Having long supported a broader-based, lower-rate income tax, with fewer tax preferences, I was dismayed to discover a letter from an administrator requesting all present to protest against the new reform on the grounds that by weakening tax preferences it would reduce contributions to the University in general and sports in particular. To this special interest – all interests are special to those who care about them – one can add, among numerous others, museums, opera companies, and sports franchises. Indeed, until I started writing this review, I was unaware of how tax preferences help increase the salaries of athletes. These franchises make substantial income from box seats bought by corporations that can write them off as business expenses. Absent this subsidy, franchise income, hence allowable salaries, would be less. Do we want to subsidize athletes? Or owners? How is this to be avoided while protecting the busboys, waiters, and other people who depend on the ablity of businessmen to write off meals and drinks?


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