Tax Expenditures and the Tax Reform Act of 1969 in the United States

In the United States, tax favoritism—an approach that has weakened the extractive capacity of the federal government by providing tax loopholes and preferences for taxpayers—has remained since the 1930s. It has consumed the amount of tax revenue the government can spend and therefore weakened the possibility of the redistribution of fiscal resources. It has also made the federal tax system complicated and inequitable, resulting in undermining taxpayer consent. Therefore, since the 1930s, a tax reform to create a simple, fair, and equitable federal income tax system with the capacity to raise revenue has been long overdue. Many scholars have evaluated the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (TRA69), which Richard M. Nixon signed into law on December 30, 1969, as one of the most successful steps toward accomplishing this goal. This article demonstrates that TRA69 left tax favoritism in the United States. Furthermore, it points out that TRA69 turned taxpayers against the idea of federal taxation, a shift in public perception that greatly impacted tax reform in the years to follow.

Catala: a programming language for the law

Law at large underpins modern society, codifying and governing many aspects of citizens' daily lives. Oftentimes, law is subject to interpretation, debate and challenges throughout various courts and jurisdictions. But in some other areas, law leaves little room for interpretation, and essentially aims to rigorously describe a computation, a decision procedure or, simply said, an algorithm. Unfortunately, prose remains a woefully inadequate tool for the job. The lack of formalism leaves room for ambiguities; the structure of legal statutes, with many paragraphs and sub-sections spread across multiple pages, makes it hard to compute the intended outcome of the algorithm underlying a given text; and, as with any other piece of poorly-specified critical software, the use of informal, natural language leaves corner cases unaddressed. We introduce Catala, a new programming language that we specifically designed to allow a straightforward and systematic translation of statutory law into an executable implementation. Notably, Catala makes it natural and easy to express the general case / exceptions logic that permeates statutory law. Catala aims to bring together lawyers and programmers through a shared medium, which together they can understand, edit and evolve, bridging a gap that too often results in dramatically incorrect implementations of the law. We have implemented a compiler for Catala, and have proven the correctness of its core compilation steps using the F* proof assistant. We evaluate Catala on several legal texts that are algorithms in disguise, notably section 121 of the US federal income tax and the byzantine French family benefits; in doing so, we uncover a bug in the official implementation of the French benefits. We observe as a consequence of the formalization process that using Catala enables rich interactions between lawyers and programmers, leading to a greater understanding of the original legislative intent, while producing a correct-by-construction executable specification reusable by the greater software ecosystem. Doing so, Catala increases trust in legal institutions, and mitigates the risk of societal damage due to incorrect implementations of the law.

Why Do (Some) Ordinary Americans Support Tax Cuts for the Rich? Evidence From a Randomized Survey Experiment

Why do (some) ordinary citizens support tax cuts for the rich? A prominent explanation in the political economy literature stresses the role of unenlightened self-interest. According to this view, citizens consistently fail to gauge whether they are directly affected by tax policy reforms. We use a randomized survey experiment in the US to identify the drivers of preferences for cutting taxes on the rich. The results show that informing individuals of whether they are directly affected by a cut in the top federal income tax rate has no impact on preferences. We therefore find no support for the unenlightened self-interest explanation. In contrast, we find preferences for taxing the rich are fundamentally affected by information that shifts citizens' core fairness beliefs, as well as information on the past trajectory of top tax rates. Our results therefore align with explanations of tax policy preferences that emphasize the importance of fairness perceptions and reference points.

THE CASE FOR OVER-WITHHOLDING FEDERAL INCOME TAX: BENEFITS TO LOW-INCOME TAXPAYERS

The W-4 tax withholding form has been used by individual taxpayers for decades to calculate their tax withholdings. It is based, however, on the faulty assumption that most U.S. workers have a single source of income. This assumption has caused millions of taxpayers to incur unnecessary tax debt. The formula for calculating federal income tax withholding for employees routinely under-withholds for low-income workers who have multiple sources of income because, without substantial documentation and calculation by the employee, employers withhold as if they are the employee’s single source of income. Taxpayers may therefore see their income tax withheld at too low a marginal rate, oftentimes zero percent, and can have significant balances due on short notice at the end of the tax year.This Note documents that reality and proposes a solution. It proposes a reconception of the Form W-4 and the withholding formula through the lens of low-income filers and aims for a policy of over-withholding from those filers in order to reduce surprise tax due and related penalties. The proposed solution removes the bias towards achieving a “zero refund” from the form design by eliminating the tax-free threshold—for most filers, the equivalent of their standard deduction—from the withholding scheme. As discussed in the Note, the proposed policy would also have the benefit of increasing tax compliance, minimizing bureaucratic burdens, and providing a revenue-neutral solution for the government. This Note further suggests an extension of the proposed policy to provide a much-needed savings mechanism for low-income filers.

DEBT AND TAXES

The federal income tax conceptualizes the standard loan transaction as an exchange of cash for promises to pay interest and to repay the amount borrowed by the end of the term. This formulation is subtly incorrect in ways that have led to a weaker foundation for existing tax rules than they merit. Conceptualizing loans instead as closely akin to leases places most of the tax rules for debt on sounder footing because it clarifies that interest is the consideration paid for the use of the loan proceeds. If interest is the cost of the use of money, then simple borrowing is a fully-paid-for transaction, full basis credit in the loan proceeds for the period for which interest is paid is appropriate, and cancellation of debt is a straightforward accession to wealth in the period in which it occurs. These conclusions hold whether the interest is deductible or not and are consistent with current law, which has come under fire from some quarters.Although the proposed reconceptualization of loan as lease supports a number of longstanding income tax rules, one area in which it counsels significant reform is the taxation of partnerships. If loans are like cash leases made in exchange for interest qualifying as rent, Treasury should provide for the allocation of basis credit among partners for the partnership’s debt based on who bears the economic burden of the interest expense. The rule should apply regardless of whether the debt is recourse or nonrecourse and regardless of who would have discharge of indebtedness income on default. Such an approach differs markedly from the existing rules for recourse obligations but is closer to the rules for certain nonrecourse obligations. A modification of the rules applicable to partnership debt consistent with the loan-as-lease theory, therefore, would remove a significant discontinuity in the current tax treatment of partnership debt.

The Effects of Prefilled Tax Returns on Taxpayer Compliance

This study uses two online experiments to examine the potential consequences of a recent U.S. Senate proposal to prefill federal income tax returns on behalf of individuals. Consistent with omission theory, we find that prefilled returns lower compliance compared to selfcompleted returns when the prefilled returns do not estimate undocumented income (e.g., cash tips). However, the results show that including estimates of undocumented income increases taxpayer compliance relative to self-completed returns. We also find evidence suggesting that prefilled returns eliminate the often-replicated differences in reporting behavior between taxpayers in refund versus tax due settlement positions, suggesting that prefilled returns change individuals' reference points. These findings suggest the implementation of a prefilled return policy could have economically important effects on taxpayer decisions.

The Evolving Distribution of Giving in the United States

I compute the share of U.S. household giving accounted for by the American tax units donating the largest amounts over the 1960–2012 period from repeated cross-sectional samples of federal income tax returns. The share of donations accounted for by a minority of top donors rose sharply over this period. Donor concentration has risen both because the largest gifts have grown larger and because more households give little or nothing in any given year.

Does the Federal Income Tax Law Favor Entrepreneurs?

This paper estimates the effective tax rate on entrepreneurial income, defined as the return to an individual who starts a successful new business and then sells their interest once it becomes an established enterprise. The rate depends on both the tax imposed on the appreciation of the firm’s value during its growth phase and on the effects of the tax system on the value of equity in ongoing business enterprises. Under reasonable assumptions, this rate is lower than the rate the entrepreneur would pay on ordinary income. Preferential taxation of entrepreneurial income has consequences for both economic growth and income distribution.

Marginal Income Tax Rates, Economic Growth, and Primary Fiscal Deficits

Economic theory suggests that variations in marginal tax rates are more important for consumption and investment decisions than the average rates commonly studied. This article analyzes the aggregate implications of the statutory tax code, using a new times series on annual marginal tax rates, which decomposes the federal income tax code into its “level” and “progressive” (or spread) components. Robust results from a vector autoregression model show that increasing the spread of the marginal income tax rates has a positive impact on private spending growth, leading to an indirect, negative impact on the primary deficit ratio. Contrary to the political narrative, our findings suggest that the general level of these tax rates does not significantly impact growth rates or the primary deficit ratio.