A Standing Arbitral Tribunal as a Procedural Solution for Sovereign Debt Restructurings

Beyond Abaclat: Mass Claims in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Regulatory Governance for Sovereign Debt Restructuring

The Journal of World Investment & Trade ◽

10.1163/22119000-12340071 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 208-247

Author(s):

Kei Nakajima

Keyword(s):

Sovereign Debt ◽

Financial Policy ◽

Arbitral Tribunal ◽

Debt Restructuring ◽

Regulatory Governance ◽

Regulatory Aspects ◽

Investment Treaty ◽

Balanced Approach ◽

Investment Arbitration ◽

Investment Treaty Arbitration

Abstract Whereas investment treaties and arbitration rules do not usually provide any explicit provision for mass claims in investment treaty arbitration, the Tribunal in Abaclat v Argentina established a landmark jurisprudence that allowed a massive 60,000 investors to bundle and bring their claims before a single arbitral tribunal. However, its reasoning has been severely criticised for its conclusion, which apparently favours bondholder protection at the expense of financial policy leeway of defaulted sovereigns: investment arbitration may adversely affect the orderly implementation of sovereign debt restructuring. This article attempts to take a more balanced approach towards this issue, by focusing on regulatory aspects of arbitral proceedings. A ‘regulatory’ investment treaty arbitration will not only provide creditor protection by opening the door for mass claims, but will also show a deference to an orderly restructuring by closing the door if circumstances so require.

Download Full-text

Lending to the Borrower from Hell

10.23943/princeton/9780691151496.001.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Mauricio Drelichman ◽

Hans-Joachim Voth

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Sixteenth Century ◽

Sovereign Debt ◽

Risk Sharing ◽

The United States ◽

Philip Ii ◽

Loan Contracts ◽

The Right ◽

Intelligent Model ◽

New Evidence

Why do lenders time and again loan money to sovereign borrowers who promptly go bankrupt? When can this type of lending work? As the United States and many European nations struggle with mountains of debt, historical precedents can offer valuable insights. This book looks at one famous case—the debts and defaults of Philip II of Spain. Ruling over one of the largest and most powerful empires in history, King Philip defaulted four times. Yet he never lost access to capital markets and could borrow again within a year or two of each default. Exploring the shrewd reasoning of the lenders who continued to offer money, the book analyzes the lessons from this historical example. Using detailed new evidence collected from sixteenth-century archives, the book examines the incentives and returns of lenders. It provides powerful evidence that in the right situations, lenders not only survive despite defaults—they thrive. It also demonstrates that debt markets cope well, despite massive fluctuations in expenditure and revenue, when lending functions like insurance. The book unearths unique sixteenth-century loan contracts that offered highly effective risk sharing between the king and his lenders, with payment obligations reduced in bad times. A fascinating story of finance and empire, this book offers an intelligent model for keeping economies safe in times of sovereign debt crises and defaults.

Download Full-text

European Economies Stability Faced With Potential Outburst of Sovereign Debt Crisis. An Empirical Study Using Neural Network

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPUTERS & TECHNOLOGY ◽

10.24297/ijct.v12i2.3318 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 12 (2) ◽

pp. 3255-3260

Author(s):

Stelian Stancu ◽

Alexandra Maria Constantin

Keyword(s):

Neural Network ◽

Sovereign Debt ◽

Debt Crisis ◽

Banking System ◽

Sovereign Debt Crisis ◽

European Level ◽

Continuous Growth ◽

Economic Context ◽

European Economies ◽

The Impact

Instilment, on a European level, of a state incompatible with the state of stability on a macroeconomic level and in the financial-banking system lead to continuous growth of vulnerability of European economies, situated at the verge of an outburst of sovereign debt crises. In this context, the current papers main objective is to produce a study regarding the vulnerability of European economies faced with potential outburst of sovereign debt crisis, which implies quantitative analysis of the impact of sovereign debt on the sensitivity of the European Unions economies. The paper also entails the following specific objectives: completing an introduction in the current European economic context, conceptualization of the notion of â€œsovereign debt crisis, presenting the methodology and obtained empirical results, as well as exposition of the conclusions.

Download Full-text