The frame problem and problem frame

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 39-51
Author(s):  
Stanisław Buda

In the first part, the author discusses the methodological status of interdisciplinary research. Some general issues may be problematized within various disciplines; each of them only examines a certain aspect of the issue. Philosophical categories represent some ideas par excellence, while the terms used by the specific sciences represent models of some of their aspects. The second part recalls the most important problems signaled by engineers and programmers of machines, which are to operate in an external, changing environment, realizing autonomously the objectives set for them. In parts three and four, the author attempts to specify the essential operations that the decision making machine performs. The nature of these operations should be adapted to the requirement that the machine should focus on what is important for the task it performs.

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Sebastian Gałecki

Although the “frame problem” in philosophy has been raised in the context of the artificial intelligence, it is only an exemplification of broader problem. It seems that contemporary ethical debates are not so much about conclusions, decisions, norms, but rather about what we might call a “frame”. Metaethics has always been the bridge between purely ethical principles (“this is good and it should be done”, “this is wrong and it should be avoided”) and broader (ontological, epistemic, anthropological etc.) assumptions. One of the most interesting meta-ethical debates concerns the “frame problem”: whether the ethical frame is objective and self-evident, or is it objective but not self-evident? In classical philosophy, this problem takes the form of a debate on the first principles: nonprovable but necessary starting points for any practical reasoning. They constitute the invisible but essential frame of every moral judgment, decision and action. The role of philosophy is not only to expose these principles, but also to understand the nature of the moral frame.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason L. Megill

This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness — as generally formulated — are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio’s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras’ and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A.I., and the research program of affective computing.


Author(s):  
İ. Burhan Türkşen ◽  
İbrahim Özkan

Decision under uncertainty is an active interdisciplinary research field. A decision process is generally identified as the action of choosing an alternative that best suites our needs. This process generally includes several areas of research including but not limited to Economics, Psychology, Philosophy, Mathematics, Statistics, etc. In this chapter the authors attempt to create a framework for uncertainties which surrounds the environment where human decision making takes place. For this purpose, the authors discuss how one ought to handle uncertainties within Fuzzy Logic. Furthermore, they present recent advances in Type 2 fuzzy system studies.


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